

TEAM 1 PACK

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I was the only one of my family members who hadn't fought until the civil war. My grandfather fought at the Balkan wars (1912-1913) as a volunteer at the support department. My father was at Smyrna (during the Turkish-Greek war 1919-1922) and my two older brothers fought at Pindos (during the Italian-Greek war 1940-41). They are both dead. They died a hero's death (1). But we did not seem to catch a break. Some royalists in Halkidiki were causing trouble until 1935. Consider the Schism, you know Thessaloniki was the starting point of Venizelos, and the refugees that flooded in the streets of Thessaloniki (1922-1924) after the collapse of Asia Minor front. Things cooled off a bit with Metaxas. I was at EON for three years (2). We organized parades, dances, we worked all together for a good cause, raised money for Philoptochos and more. We were put in order.

1. Recent historical traumas
2. Relevant political ideology

We had enough of the democrats all these years. They only organized movements and people had no money (3). Personally, I didn't like the English and French long ago. I liked the Germans more, as I heard about the miracles that they made at their country (6). And Metaxas, had the country running fluently, that's what I liked about him (4). After April 1941 there was nothing to hold on to. Who would you listen to? The mayor already welcomed them at our city's entrance. I remember him saying that we should trust them (7).

3. Failure of political forces
6. Ideological relevance to totalitarian and fascist ideology
4. The experience of basic politics, security
7. Institutional collapse (officialdom, security forces)

My family had money in the past. My grandfather was a fabric merchant. Later, some Jewish shops opened near his and they shut his down. Jews were united and supported each other. That's how Jews are. Not like us. They knew how to control the market better than anyone. Money is their God, you know. We Greeks were against them very often in the city (10). We waited for something to happen, so that we felt that time was right. Maybe if the Germans started losing the war. No one expected that the situation would last so long (8). As I told you, we had been through a lot, due to political reasons (5). All I could think was what would my kids eat the very next day (12). The first two years were extremely difficult. People that lived at villages didn't starve as we did at Thessaloniki.

10. The significant other victim
8. The idea that the situation cannot be but temporary.
5. Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivalry in local, communal, economic or political fields)
12. Fear and instinctive defense.

I didn't climb the mountains to take part to resistance. Why should I? To help the communists? (9). But, we didn't wear that hood, even though we knew at which houses the insurgents were hiding (14). In 1942 I was called at the Administration Building and asked to take over the representation of the employees in the municipality cleaning service. I accepted. I thought that I could help put this city in order (16), (13). I knew the job better than most of people there. One could easily blame me, but I was not a collaborator. What could I do anyway? I had never fought, and, as I said before, my first priority was to help my family. Why would I pretend to be a hero? (18) In the end, the Germans didn't trouble us. At least, they didn't ever trouble me or my family. One time I even asked for the working hours to change. Even if I was arguing with them, they listened to me and in the end they offered us the hours that we wanted. (15)

How do you interpret passivity?

It is important to take under consideration a number of parameters, before any attempt to study indifference. What kind of a regime we are dealing with? (see **graphic 01**). The **duration of a regime** is a crucial factor for what studies call **reflective self**. It describes the assimilation of external tenets of a regime towards legitimating as personal, transformed and transforming material. We must separate two stages of **legitimizing** a regime, first **on terms of origins**, then **of results**. Although, most of the regimes of such kind control information about their achievements, they usually end up trying to secure a gap between promises and realization, because even for sacrifices made in the name of a better future there has been a limit to people's patience. A crucial parameter is also the **control of resources** as a tool of political obedience (welfare dictatorship – political repression by the regime, social provision through the regime). Apart from that, there are always **shared values** to which the regime could always appeal in the name of a great(er) social goal. And of course, all regimes show **signs of evolution and decline**, phases like dynamism, stagnation and entropy, mainly caused by **corruption, opportunism and poor quality recruitment**.

One of the strategies of "totalitarian" regimes is to have so severe legal regulations (criminal laws) that, if taken literally, everyone is guilty of something, and then to withdraw from their full enforcement. In this way, the regime can appear merciful and at the same time wield a permanent threat to discipline its subjects. In any case, belonging to a society involves a paradoxical point at which each of us is ordered to embrace freely, as result of our choice, what is anyway imposed on us (we all must love our country or our parents).

Part of the answer lays down to what we could call **domain of habit**. To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not use them; when to violate them; when not to use a choice which is offered; when we are effectively obliged to do something, but have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice. The same goes for many political situations in which a choice is given on condition that we make the right choice: we are solemnly reminded that we can say no - but we are expected to reject this offer and enthusiastically say yes. **Habits are thus the very stuff our identities are made of**: in them, we enact and thus define what we effectively are as social beings, often in contrast with our perception of what we are - in their very transparency, they are the medium of social violence, and so at any case (resistance-indifference-collaboration) we need to be careful. Such an **institutional Unconscious** sustains the public institution repulsing a sense of chaos. Major influence in forming both the domain of habit and consequently our institutional unconscious comes from **education**. Another key for our approach is the importance of a measure called **"estimated majority"**, meaning the

9. Luck of trustworthy resistance proposal

14. The moral excuse of non collaboration

16. We need some order in this chaos

13. The idea of being law abiding

18. I am all alone, my actions would be a mere suicide and totally useless

15. They didn't give me any trouble

feeling people have about how the majority thinks. We also know from historical figures and tables how political support has increased in totalitarian regimes because of **a sense of resignation**.


So, even in conditions of heavy repressive domination some kind of private space continued to exist permitting the formation of something legitimately called **popular opinion**, recognized by the regime. In conditions of silence, "frightened" by this loss of control a totalitarian regime usually institutes a spy network, not only to achieve suppression but also to search for legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Little sense is given to Manichean questions of whether people were "for" or "against" the solutions provided from the regime. Speaking about dedicated friends and committed opponents somebody "risks being telling a story of two minorities". People "in the middle" had a far more complex perspective over their experience, changeable through time and over different aspects of the same regime. Popular attitudes were formed basically based on **personal experience of the regime** and **available information** (mass media control). It is only a projection of modern individualistic liberal conception of choice the one often reflected upon totalitarian regimes. For example people in southern Italy even before Fascism were little concerned about what they should vote. But, let's return to the challenge of analyzing indifference.

Methodological – hermeneutical keys	Historical material
<p><u>Sociopolitical</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Recent historical traumas (historically documented) 2) Relevant political axon 3) Political failure 4) The experience of basic politics - security 5) Tradition of resistance 6) Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivals in local or communal or economic or political fields) 7) Near the edge – ideological relevance in parts of a totalitarian or fascist or extremist theory 8) Institutional collapse (religion , officialdom , security forces) 9) The idea of a provisional situation 10) Lack of a trustworthy resistance proposal 11) The significant “other” victim (cases that the victim has formerly negative relations with the passive mass) 12) Lack of spiritual leadership (intellectuals, religion leaders) <p><u>Personal-psychological</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 13) The prudential postponement (cases of late enlistment) 14) Instinctive defense (survival priorities) 15) The idea of been legitimate , structural personality effect 16) The moral excuse of non collaboration 17) They didn't hurt me 18) We need some order to this chaos 19) It's not my duty to save the world 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> I. Public Documents II. Maps III. Photos IV. Literary texts V. Spoken testimonies VI. Demographics VII. Newspapers VIII. Letters IX. Personal archives X. Posters XI. Personal items XII. Topographical data XIII, Telegraphs XIV. Cards, post cards XV. Building information

Index 01. Hermeneutical keys and categories of historical material

EXTRA HERMENEUTICAL KEYS
<p>20. legitimating by origins (shared values), and by results (control of resources)</p> <p>21. signs of evolution and decline of a regime</p> <p>22. domain of habit</p> <p>23. education</p> <p>24. estimated majority</p> <p>25. a sense of resignation</p> <p>26. personal experience of the regime</p> <p>27. available information(mass media control)</p>

Index 02. Extra hermeneutical keys



Graphic 03. Hermeneutical keys distributed per indifference area (rejection-acceptance-objection)

History Magazine

ERASMUS+, LESSONS FOR PRESENT, LESSONS FOR FUTURE

SUMMER 2016

LETS TALK ABOUT HISTOPIA

INDIFFERENCE CASES
1936-1941

Short political history of Histopia

The period of Histopia's history that interests us starts almost 90 years after its independence. Histopia started as a small geographical entity struggling to survive economically and expand its borders. Concerning the second aim first in 1864 and then again in 1881 Histopia expanded its territory significantly, but the idea of liberating all places inhabited from Histopians in big numbers remained the basic political and ideological orientation.

For almost 25 years Histopia was involved in political and military actions trying to incorporate Krete and Macedonia. In 1897 a traumatic war defeat caused the financial collapse of the country, making it seem almost like a miracle how 15 years later both Krete and Macedonia were parts of Histopia along with Epirus. World War I brought new troubles since political and military administration was divided concerning the formal stand of Histopia. Should the country stand by Entente or should it stay neutral?

That question triggered the Great Division (1915) which finally took the proportions of a ruthless civil war for 2 years (1916-17) and ended with Venizelos in head of the winning side and King Konstantinos exiled. Soon after his win Venizelos led Histopian forces to the borders of the national dream that haunted the country for decades. The disaster followed was as huge as the dream itself. The evacuation of Histopian army in 1922 left over 1 million dead and as many as 1,5 million refugees. Histopia by that time had a population of 4,5 million. Most of the refugees inhabited the two major cities of Histopia, Athens and Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki was a city with over half its population Jewish, part of Histopia for just 10 years and a real bone of contention for neighbor states around Histopia.

The years after the refugee flood a titanic effort took place for the relief, accommodation and rehabilitation of the refugees, although not within ideal sociopolitical conditions. Native Histopian families had also suffered hundreds of thousands of dead or wounded soldiers. The healing process needed time for both sides, but the truth is that a psychological schism tantalized Histopian society until 1940.

Political situation was anything but helpful as the following timeline presents emphatically.

- 1924, 25 March: Histopia is proclaimed a republic. Pavlos Kountouriotis becomes the first President of Histopia.
- 1924, 13 April: A plebiscite condones the change of constitution.
- 1924, 7 October: Failed military coup.
- 1925, 15 March: Successful coup directed by General Theodoros Pangalos. President Pavlos Kountouriotis resigns.
- 1926, 23 August: General Pangalos is overthrown after a coup. Caretaker government of Georgios Kondylis.
- 1928: Venizelos returns from exile and his Liberals win power again.
- 1933, March: Failed pro-Venezelist coup.
- 1933, 6 June: Second assassination attempt against Venizelos in Athens.
- 1935, March: Failed coup directed by Venizelos and Nikolaos Plastiras. Venizelos flees in France and dies in Paris the next year, the armed forces are purged of Venizelist and Republican officers.
- 1935, 10 October: Coup directed by Georgios Kondylis abolishes the Republic, confirmed by a rigged plebiscite later the same year.

During 1934 several major strikes took place in October 1935, C. Kondylis and Al. Papagos overturned threw K. Tsaldari and imposed an autocratic royalist regime. Immediately (16 / 11.20.35) the new government issued Emergency Law to refer any industrial dispute to an arbitration procedure and prohibited any strike with heavy effects (reduction of payment, imprisonment, dismissal etc.) for offenders. In response to the imprisonments and exiles the Left organized general political hunger strike and nationwide protests in December.

- 1935, 3 November: George II is restored to the throne.

King George, commissioned the formation of a provisional government to the jurist Constantine Demertzi on November 30, 1935. The country was led to new elections on January 26, 1936, but their effect was to tie the 143 seats among Venizelist Themistocles Sofouli and Republicans of Panayi Tsaldari. The Communists with 15 seats had been buffering agents, but disagreements between political leaders did not allow to form a government, despite lobbying contacts between Themistocles Sofoulis and the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Stelios Sklavainas. The tragic cycle of fateful deaths started from the first month of 1936, with George Kondylis, who died on January 31st, five days after the conducted elections. The ongoing interventions of

the Army in political developments forced King George to remove the Military Minister Alexandros Papagos and appoint in his place Ioannis Metaxas, on March 5th.

The Demertzi government renewed its mandate on March 14, 1936, because parliament parties still couldn't agree on forming a government. On March 18, 1936 Venizelos died exiled in Paris. His body was transferred to Chania and not in Athens, after fierce opponents reactions. Third in the series of deaths, Prime Minister Konstantinos Demertzis left this vain world on April 13, 1936. King George, without consulting the parties, entrusted the formation of a government to Metaxas. The government appeared to Parliament on April 27, 1936 and got confidence or tolerance vote to rule until parties agreed on forming a government. Only Communists and George Papandreou voted against him. The rest voted for. Meanwhile, fourth in a row, Panagis Tsaldaris died of a heart attack on May 17th. The death of Tsaldaris particular gave Metaxas the opportunity to present himself more as the undisputed leader of the anti-Venizelists' world, cancelling partly any reaction to his plans. The four deaths, left the country without personalities capable to oppose the Metaxas plans.

1936, 4 August: Coup by General Ioannis Metaxas, who declares a state of emergency, decrees martial law, annuls various articles of the Constitution and establishes a crisis cabinet to end the increasing riots and to restore social order.

The day after September 18, 1936, the dictatorship of August 4 issued the Emergency Law 117 "on measures to combating communism and his consequences." This law came to replace the Law 4229 / 25.07.1929 "On security measures of social status and protection of citizens' 'freedoms', the notorious "Idionimon", which was voted in 1929 from Venizelos government. In reality, of course, both legislations came from the same matrix, the matrix of anti-communism that made these two politicians -the democratic Venizelos and the dictator Metaxas- look like two drops of water.

The responsibilities and powers of Metaxas were restricted in the fields of foreign policy, military and youth by the king's powers. The role of Metaxas in the first two sectors remained until 1941 complementary. During the regime (1936-1941) there were two distinct (tangent but not concentric) political power poles with centers the King and the dictator. During the first two years, the balance system of power tilted toward the first pole and we can talk about a royal dictatorship. Since September 1938 the royal powers and initiatives were limited and the status could fully determined as Metaxas dictatorship.

Relations between the two strong men (King and Metaxas) emerged (unseen) competitive predominantly in the youth education field. In November 1936 the National Youth Organization (EON) was founded, which aimed at creating the massive popular support that the regime lacked. Through the ranks of EON the regime would seek, in the future, dedicated persons to staff the state agencies. The State pursued through EON to create a "truly independent, responsible and selfless leader class" a "national political aristocracy", which would lead the Nation to "new cultural achievements" all based to the triptych "Homeland, religion, family" perhaps the most widespread "motto" of modern Hellenic history connected with dominant ideology and over time following very complex paths from 1880 to 1930.

EON members wore dark blue uniforms and *dikocho* (special hat), and were separated according to age in pioneers (7-13 years), phalangites B (14-18) and phalangites A (19-25). In December 1937, also in Athens, after the initiative of Mr. Kotzias, the Labor Battalions were founded, a paramilitary organization (approximately 400 persons with gray uniforms) following the Nazi model. The Labor Battalions were typically formed for the exploitation of the unemployed in public works, but actually aimed at functioning the praetorians' guard. Their action, however, was short-lived and practically did not exceed the limits of picturesque. On June 9, 1938 the Labor Battalions were abolished after Metaxas's decision and their members joined EON. Some of them trying to fit best in their new organization -some of them were over 30 years old- dedicated themselves in witch-hunting for regime enemies. In many cases the accusations were products of imagination or personal hatred.

The truth is that Metaxas had no trouble to control the press. Most of the newspaper owners and editors (even those who had previously criticized Metaxas) served with great pleasure the interests of the regime from the first day. After all, business was growing fast due to Metaxas's Emergency Law 23/36, of August 19, 1936, by which serious benefits were granted to the owners and editors of newspapers in exchange for full cooperation and unreserved support.

The only resistance expressed by the press, except for Rizospastis, was some illegal, minimum in number, non-communist, newspapers. The illegal organization "Society of Friends" (*Filiki Etaireia*) was founded in November 1937 and released three secret papers: "Freedom", with six issues, "the Constitution", with five issues

and the Democrat, the first issue of which was printed, but was seized before the release. The organization adopted also the newspaper "Herald", which first issue was seized before its release too. Those publications were part of resistance activities from ex-Venizelists. Their greatest moment, the attempted coup of 1938, was an epic failure. Another newspaper, the "Flame" (Floga) was first published in 1937 by the Anti-dictatorship Youth Front (AMN) and continued to be issued until September 1938. By that time, only an illegal communist youth organization, OKNE, was kept on the anti-dictatorship publishing effort.

The weak press resistance to the regime was partly a result of police work. Central figure on this field of the government was Konstantinos Maniadakis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Μανιαδάκης) notorious as the formidably efficient head of the internal Security Services of the 4th of August Regime (1936–1941). The newly established Secretary of State had all the security forces in the country under its jurisdiction (the Royal Gendarmerie, the Police, the Fire Department and the Directorate of Immigration and Passports) and was entrusted with one of the basic functions of Metaxa's government: to fight Communism and detect foreign spies (especially those from Italy, Bulgaria and later on, Germany and Britain). Under the supervision of Maniadakis, the Gendarmerie force increased, the City Police by 20% – free from political interference and partisan considerations. These also boomed the Political Police (the Histopian equivalent to the Gestapo, which increased its staff to 445 officers and non-commissioned officers up to 1,200 agents. The headquarters of the Special Security in Athens during the dictatorship of August 4th was a building with labyrinthine corridors, basements and offices at the junction of September 3rd number 106 and Derigny. Many communists and democratic citizens were tortured or even murdered in that building, as the veteran communist Nikos Valianatos on August 9th, 1938. From there many communists took the road to the exile mostly to islands of the Aegean Sea, like Anafi and Ai-Stratis, or places like Akronafplia for political prisoners.

- 1937, 15 December: Mass NKVD operation against Histopians in the USSR begins, based on Joseph Stalin's Directive 50125 of Dec. 1937, resulting in the loss of 38,000 Soviet citizens of Histopian descent at the Gulags of Siberia.
- 1940, 28 October: After the dictator Ioannis Metaxas rejects an Italian ultimatum demanding the occupation of

Histopian territory, Italian forces invade Histopia. Beginning of the Histopio-Italian War.

After communism, a new, totally external enemy had emerged. And again even more than communism the external threat gave Metaxas the opportunity to increase social coherence around the regime. Anybody seems willing to tolerate something bad, if to avoid something worst.

You need also to use these:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_of_Greece
<http://metaxas-project.com/greek-fascist-youth-eon/>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_name

2016-01

TOP SECRET

**EYES
ONLY**

ACTIVE CASE FILE 2016-01

TABLE

Return to Service No.

Order No.

- EVIDENCE -

Case No.: 2016-01

Description of Enclosed Evidence: _____

Submitting Agency: ERASMUS+ HISTORY Dpt.

Telephone Number: classified

Evidence Recovered By: Research Team
(print name)

Victim's Full Name: no victim case

Suspect's Full Name: _____

Envelope Sealed By: Greek Office
(print name)

28th High School of Thessaloniki
(signature)


Date Sealed: 30/7/2016 Time Sealed: 23:51 am
pm



EVIDENCE 0104



EVIDENCE 0103



EVIDENCE 0102a

ΔΑΚΡΟΠΟΛΙΣ
Η ΑΡΧΑΙΟΤΕΡΑ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΩΝ ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΔΩΝ

ΤΟ ΧΘΕΣΙΝΟΝ ΑΝΕΥ ΠΡΟΗΓΟΥΜΕΝΟΥ ΑΙΜΑΤΟΚΥΛΙΣΜΑ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗΝ
12 ΝΕΚΡΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΚΑΤΟΝΤΑΔΕΣ ΤΡΑΥΜΑΤΙΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΤΟΠΟΝ ΤΩΝ ΑΙΜΑΤΗΡΩΝ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΤΩΝ
ΕΠΙ ΩΡΑΣ Η ΠΟΛΙΣ ΒΥΘΙΣΜΕΝΗ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΡΧΙΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΑΙΜΑ-ΑΛΗΘΙΝΑΙ ΜΑΧΑΙ
ΜΕΤΑΞΥ ΑΠΕΡΓΩΝ ΚΑΠΗΝΕΡΓΑΤΩΝ - ΣΤΡΑΤΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΧΩΡΟΦΥΛΑΚΩΝ ΠΟΥ ΚΤΥΠΟΥΝ «ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΨΑΧΝΟ»

ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟ ΧΥΘΕΝ ΑΙΜΑ

ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΙΣ ΠΕΡΙΓΡΑΦΑΙ ΔΙΑΒΙΒΑΣΘΕΙΣΑΙ ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΚΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΛΕΦΩΝΙΚΩΣ

Την πρώτη ληφθέντα φωτογραφία του τόπου των αιματηρών γεγονότων, η οποία δημοσιεύεται στην παρούσα σελίδα, είναι η πρώτη που δημοσιεύεται στην Ελλάδα. Η φωτογραφία αυτή, η οποία δημοσιεύεται στην παρούσα σελίδα, είναι η πρώτη που δημοσιεύεται στην Ελλάδα. Η φωτογραφία αυτή, η οποία δημοσιεύεται στην παρούσα σελίδα, είναι η πρώτη που δημοσιεύεται στην Ελλάδα.

ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΑΙΜΑΤΟΚΥΚΛΩΣΗΝ ΧΘΕΣ, ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗΝ - Ένας από τους πρώτους τραυματίες που μεταφέρθηκε στο νοσοκομείο, ο οποίος είναι στην κατάσταση της ζωής. Ο τραυματίας αυτός, ο οποίος είναι στην κατάσταση της ζωής, είναι ο πρώτος που μεταφέρθηκε στο νοσοκομείο.

Ο πρώτος τραυματίας που μεταφέρθηκε στο νοσοκομείο, ο οποίος είναι στην κατάσταση της ζωής, είναι ο πρώτος που μεταφέρθηκε στο νοσοκομείο. Ο τραυματίας αυτός, ο οποίος είναι στην κατάσταση της ζωής, είναι ο πρώτος που μεταφέρθηκε στο νοσοκομείο.

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ΠΡΙΖΟΣΦΑΣΤΗΣ

ΕΡΓΑΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΡΓΑΖΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΧΩΡΑΣ

ΕΡΓΑΤΕΣ ΟΜΟΣ ΠΑΛΕΟΥΝ ΑΚΟΝΗΤΟΙ!

Ο ΤΣΑΛΔΑΡΗΣ ΜΑΤΟΚΥΛΙΣΕ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΡΓΑΤΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΑΛΑΜΑΤΑΣ
ΚΑΤΩ Η ΔΟΛΟΦΟΝΑ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΑΛΕΥΡΟΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΩΝ!

Εργάτες και εργαζόμενοι της χώρας! Απαντήστε με απεργίες και διαδηλώσεις διαμαρτυρίας στο σφαγιστήριο των αδερφών σας στην Κολαμάτα! Απαντήστε: Νόσσοι ο στρατιωτικός δυναμεί! Να συλληθούν οι δολοφόνοι των εργατών διοικήτες της χωροφυλακής, οι φρουράρχοι, οι λιμενάρχες, ο νομάρχης και οι αλευροβιομηχανοί! Να ικανοποιηθούν όλα τα αιτήματα των απεργών!

Φανταστείτε! Μή χτυπάτε αδέρφια σας, τους άπεργους εργάτες που παλεύουν για το ψωμί τους! Κατωτά σφαγιστικά μετρού του Τσαλδάρη! Κατωτά Φασιστοί! Εργαζόμενοι! Απαντήστε με μη μεταφερθούν στην Ακροναυπλία οι φυλακισμένοι αγωνιστές των εργατών! Να τους δοθεί γενική άμνηστία! Έμπρός για το Παλλαδικό Αντιστασιακό Συνέδριο!

7 ΣΚΟΤΩΜΕΝΟΙ, ΔΕΚΑΔΕΣ ΤΡΑΥΜΑΤΙΣΜΕΝΟΙ ΕΡΓΑΤΕΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΚΑΛΑΜΑΤΑ
..Η ΡΟΥΦΗΧΤΡΑ ΝΑ ΜΠΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΝ ΑΚΟΜΑ ΒΑΡΕΣΟΥΜΕ ΣΤΟ ΨΑΧΝΟ» ΛΕΕΙ Ο ΥΦΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ

Τα λιθόστρωτα της Καλαμάτας, εσφιγμένα με αίμα εργατικό. Τα πελωρέλα του Τσαλδάρη ρίχνανε άμετρητες τις σφαίρες τους στα εσκαμμένα κεφάλια των λιμενεργατών, των μυλεργατών, που κατέβηκαν στην απεργία για να διακηρύξουν:

«ΔΕ ΘΕΛΟΥΜΕ ΝΑ ΠΕΘΑΝΟΥΜΕ ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΠΕΙΝΑ!»

Η ΕΝΩΤΙΚΗ ΓΕΝΙΚΗ ΣΥΝΟΜΟΣΠΟΝΔΙΑ ΚΑΛΕΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΡΓΑΤΕΣ Ν' ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΟΥΝ

1. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

2. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

3. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

4. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

5. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

6. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

7. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

8. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

9. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

10. Την Ενωτική Γενική Συνέλευση, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα, στην οποία θα συζητηθεί η κατάσταση της εργατικής τάξης στην Ελλάδα.

" My father never came to any of my school activities those four years. He allowed me -after me crying to death- to keep at home only this photo. I am the first on the left.



I remember him answering my complains by saying "I will show you how to be a real man when time comes. Those suits mean nothing. Men walk around with pride for their actions, not for their clothing".

Nikolaos Alivizakis 1997, born 1929)

EVIDENCE 0106

EVIDENCE 0105 - separate folder

INFORMATION ABOUT EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE 0101

(photo) Father and uncle 1897.

EVIDENCE 0102 Pack of newspapers in his draw

0102a (news paper Rizospastis) headline: Krete in turbulence after the brutal slaughter of Herakleion workers. Strikes and manifestations in Chania and Lasithi.

0102b (newspaper Rizospastis) headline: Tsaldaris's order the bloodshed of Kalamatas workers. Down with the government of the flour industrialists.

7 dead, tens of wounded workers in Kalamata

0102c (newspaper Akropolis, 10 May) headline: Yesterdays unprecedented bloodshed in Thessaloniki. 12 dead and hundreds of wounded. For hours the city slipped into anarchy and blood.

EVIDENCE 0103

Announcement for wanted communists giving their last known addresses and level of threat for the regime . Both men were characterized highly dangerous.

EVIDENCE 0104

Founded in a hiding spot in subjects attic

EVIDENCE 0105 (material from unfinished research)

16-18-27-29-31

EVIDENCE 0106 (spoken testimony of subjects son)

CASE FILE

2016-0_

NAME: Aliviz-**AKIS** Petros

AGE : 1901-1978

EDUCATION:Elementary

PROFESSION:Worker

ADRESS:Αγ.Κωνσταντίνου 22, Μοσχάτο

FAMILY INFO: 3 kids, no
other family in Athens

EVIDENCES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

INFO EXTRACTED BY RESEARCH:

NARRATION:

CASE SOLUTION:



TEAM 2 PACK

- Set 0
- Set 1
- History Magazine
- Case cover
- Evidence Registration form
- Evidences
- Info about evidences
- Solution file

I was the only one of my family members who hadn't fought until the civil war. My grandfather fought at the Balkan wars (1912-1913) as a volunteer at the support department. My father was at Smyrna (during the Turkish-Greek war 1919-1922) and my two older brothers fought at Pindos (during the Italian-Greek war 1940-41). They are both dead. They died a hero's death (1). But we did not seem to catch a break. Some royalists in Halkidiki were causing trouble until 1935. Consider the Schism, you know Thessaloniki was the starting point of Venizelos, and the refugees that flooded in the streets of Thessaloniki (1922-1924) after the collapse of Asia Minor front. Things cooled off a bit with Metaxas. I was at EON for three years (2). We organized parades, dances, we worked all together for a good cause, raised money for Philoptochos and more. We were put in order.

1. Recent historical traumas
2. Relevant political ideology

We had enough of the democrats all these years. They only organized movements and people had no money (3). Personally, I didn't like the English and French long ago. I liked the Germans more, as I heard about the miracles that they made at their country (6). And Metaxas, had the country running fluently, that's what I liked about him (4). After April 1941 there was nothing to hold on to. Who would you listen to? The mayor already welcomed them at our city's entrance. I remember him saying that we should trust them (7).

3. Failure of political forces
6. Ideological relevance to totalitarian and fascist ideology
4. The experience of basic politics, security
7. Institutional collapse (officialdom, security forces)

My family had money in the past. My grandfather was a fabric merchant. Later, some Jewish shops opened near his and they shut his down. Jews were united and supported each other. That's how Jews are. Not like us. They knew how to control the market better than anyone. Money is their God, you know. We Greeks were against them very often in the city (10). We waited for something to happen, so that we felt that time was right. Maybe if the Germans started losing the war. No one expected that the situation would last so long (8). As I told you, we had been through a lot, due to political reasons (5). All I could think was what would my kids eat the very next day (12). The first two years were extremely difficult. People that lived at villages didn't starve as we did at Thessaloniki.

10. The significant other victim
8. The idea that the situation cannot be but temporary.
5. Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivalry in local, communal, economic or political fields)
- 12 Fear and instinctive defense.

I didn't climb the mountains to take part to resistance. Why should I? To help the communists? (9). But, we didn't wear that hood, even though we knew at which houses the insurgents were hiding (14). In 1942 I was called at the Administration Building and asked to take over the representation of the employees in the municipality cleaning service. I accepted. I thought that I could help put this city in order (16), (13). I knew the job better than most of people there. One could easily blame me, but I was not a collaborator. What could I do anyway? I had never fought, and, as I said before, my first priority was to help my family. Why would I pretend to be a hero? (18) In the end, the Germans didn't trouble us. At least, they didn't ever trouble me or my family. One time I even asked for the working hours to change. Even if I was arguing with them, they listened to me and in the end they offered us the hours that we wanted. (15)

How do you interpret passivity?

It is important to take under consideration a number of parameters, before any attempt to study indifference. What kind of a regime we are dealing with? (see **graphic 01**). The **duration of a regime** is a crucial factor for what studies call **reflective self**. It describes the assimilation of external tenets of a regime towards legitimating as personal, transformed and transforming material. We must separate two stages of **legitimizing** a regime, first **on terms of origins**, then **of results**. Although, most of the regimes of such kind control information about their achievements, they usually end up trying to secure a gap between promises and realization, because even for sacrifices made in the name of a better future there has been a limit to people's patience. A crucial parameter is also the **control of resources** as a tool of political obedience (welfare dictatorship – political repression by the regime, social provision through the regime). Apart from that, there are always **shared values** to which the regime could always appeal in the name of a great(er) social goal. And of course, all regimes show **signs of evolution and decline**, phases like dynamism, stagnation and entropy, mainly caused **by corruption, opportunism and poor quality recruitment**. One of the strategies of "totalitarian" regimes is to have so severe legal regulations (criminal laws) that, if taken literally, everyone is guilty of something, and then to withdraw from their full enforcement. In this way, the regime can appear merciful and at the same time wield a permanent threat to discipline its subjects. In any case, belonging to a society involves a paradoxical point at which each of us is ordered to embrace freely, as result of our choice, what is anyway imposed on us (we all must love our country or our parents).

Part of the answer lays down to what we could call **domain of habit**. To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not use them; when to violate them; when not to use a choice which is offered; when we are effectively obliged to do something, but have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice. The same goes for many political situations in which a choice is given on condition that we make the right choice: we are solemnly reminded that we can say no - but we are expected to reject this offer and enthusiastically say yes. **Habits are thus the very stuff our identities are made of**: in them, we enact and thus define what we effectively are as social beings, often in contrast with our perception of what we are - in their very transparency, they are the medium of social violence, and so at any case (resistance-indifference-collaboration) we need to be careful. Such an **institutional Unconscious** sustains the public institution repulsing a sense of chaos. Major influence in forming both the domain of habit and consequently our institutional unconscious comes from **education**. Another key for our approach is the importance of a measure called **"estimated majority"**, meaning the

9. Luck of trustworthy resistance proposal

14. The moral excuse of non collaboration

16. We need some order in this chaos

13. The idea of being law abiding

18. I am all alone, my actions would be a mere suicide and totally useless

15. They didn't give me any trouble

feeling people have about how the majority thinks. We also know from historical figures and tables how political support has increased in totalitarian regimes because of **a sense of resignation**.

So, even in conditions of heavy repressive domination some kind of private space continued to exist permitting the formation of something legitimately called **popular opinion**, recognized by the regime. In conditions of silence, "frightened" by this loss of control a totalitarian regime usually institutes a spy network, not only to achieve suppression but also to search for legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Little sense is given to Manichean questions of whether people were "for" or "against" the solutions provided from the regime. Speaking about dedicated friends and committed opponents somebody "risks being telling a story of two minorities". People "in the middle" had a far more complex perspective over their experience, changeable through time and over different aspects of the same regime. Popular attitudes were formed basically based on **personal experience of the regime** and **available information** (mass media control). It is only a projection of modern individualistic liberal conception of choice the one often reflected upon totalitarian regimes. For example people in southern Italy even before Fascism were little concerned about what they should vote. But, let's return to the challenge of analyzing indifference.

Methodological – hermeneutical keys	Historical material
<p><u>Sociopolitical</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Recent historical traumas (historically documented) Relevant political axon Political failure The experience of basic politics - security Tradition of resistance Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivals in local or communal or economic or political fields) Near the edge – ideological relevance in parts of a totalitarian or fascist or extremist theory Institutional collapse (religion , officialdom , security forces) The idea of a provisional situation Lack of a trustworthy resistance proposal The significant “other” victim (cases that the victim has formerly negative relations with the passive mass) Lack of spiritual leadership (intellectuals, religion leaders) <p><u>Personal-psychological</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The prudential postponement (cases of late enlistment) Instinctive defense (survival priorities) The idea of been legitimate , structural personality effect The moral excuse of non collaboration They didn’t hurt me We need some order to this chaos It’ s not my duty to save the world 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Public Documents Maps Photos Literary texts Spoken testimonies Demographics Newspapers Letters Personal archives Posters Personal items Topographical data Telegraphs Cards, post cards Building information


Index 01. Hermeneutical keys and categories of historical material


EXTRA HERMENEUTICAL KEYS
<p>20. legitimating by origins (shared values), and by results (control of resources)</p> <p>21. signs of evolution and decline of a regime</p> <p>22. domain of habit</p> <p>23. education</p> <p>24. estimated majority</p> <p>25. a sense of resignation</p> <p>26. personal experience of the regime</p> <p>27. available information(mass media control)</p>

Index 02. Extra hermeneutical keys



Graphic 02. Indifference map





Graphic 03. Hermeneutical keys distributed per indifference area (rejection-acceptance-objection)

History Magazine

ERASMUS+ , LESSONS FOR PRESENT, LESSONS FOR FUTURE

SUMMER 2016

LETS TALK ABOUT HISTOPIA

INDIFFERENCE CASES
1936-1941

Short political history of Histopia

The period of Histopia's history that interests us starts almost 90 years after its independence. Histopia started as a small geographical entity struggling to survive economically and expand its borders. Concerning the second aim first in 1864 and then again in 1881 Histopia expanded its territory significantly, but the idea of liberating all places inhabited from Histopians in big numbers remained the basic political and ideological orientation.

For almost 25 years Histopia was involved in political and military actions trying to incorporate Krete and Macedonia. In 1897 a traumatic war defeat caused the financial collapse of the country, making it seem almost like a miracle how 15 years later both Krete and Macedonia were parts of Histopia along with Epirus. World War I brought new troubles since political and military administration was divided concerning the formal stand of Histopia. Should the country stand by Entente or should it stay neutral?

That question triggered the Great Division (1915) which finally took the proportions of a ruthless civil war for 2 years (1916-17) and ended with Venizelos in head of the winning side and King Konstantinos exiled. Soon after his win Venizelos led Histopian forces to the borders of the national dream that haunted the country for decades. The disaster followed was as huge as the dream itself. The evacuation of Histopian army in 1922 left over 1 million dead and as many as 1,5 million refugees. Histopia by that time had a population of 4,5 million. Most of the refugees inhabited the two major cities of Histopia, Athens and Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki was a city with over half its population Jewish, part of Histopia for just 10 years and a real bone of contention for neighbor states around Histopia.

The years after the refugee flood a titanic effort took place for the relief, accommodation and rehabilitation of the refugees, although not within ideal sociopolitical conditions. Native Histopian families had also suffered hundreds of thousands of dead or wounded soldiers. The healing process needed time for both sides, but the truth is that a psychological schism tantalized Histopian society until 1940.

Political situation was anything but helpful as the following timeline presents emphatically.

- 1924, 25 March: Histopia is proclaimed a republic. Pavlos Kountouriotis becomes the first President of Histopia.
- 1924, 13 April: A plebiscite condones the change of constitution.
- 1924, 7 October: Failed military coup.
- 1925, 15 March: Successful coup directed by General Theodoros Pangalos. President Pavlos Kountouriotis resigns.
- 1926, 23 August: General Pangalos is overthrown after a coup. Caretaker government of Georgios Kondylis.
- 1928: Venizelos returns from exile and his Liberals win power again.
- 1933, March: Failed pro-Venezelist coup.
- 1933, 6 June: Second assassination attempt against Venizelos in Athens.
- 1935, March: Failed coup directed by Venizelos and Nikolaos Plastiras. Venizelos flees in France and dies in Paris the next year, the armed forces are purged of Venizelist and Republican officers.
- 1935, 10 October: Coup directed by Georgios Kondylis abolishes the Republic, confirmed by a rigged plebiscite later the same year.

During 1934 several major strikes took place in October 1935, C. Kondylis and Al. Papagos overturned threw K. Tsaldari and imposed an autocratic royalist regime. Immediately (16 / 11.20.35) the new government issued Emergency Law to refer any industrial dispute to an arbitration procedure and prohibited any strike with heavy effects (reduction of payment, imprisonment, dismissal etc.) for offenders. In response to the imprisonments and exiles the Left organized general political hunger strike and nationwide protests in December.

- 1935, 3 November: George II is restored to the throne.

King George, commissioned the formation of a provisional government to the jurist Constantine Demertzi on November 30, 1935. The country was led to new elections on January 26, 1936, but their effect was to tie the 143 seats among Venizelist Themistocles Sofouli and Republicans of Panayi Tsaldari. The Communists with 15 seats had been buffering agents, but disagreements between political leaders did not allow to form a government, despite lobbying contacts between Themistocles Sofoulis and the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Stelios Sklavainas. The tragic cycle of fateful deaths started from the first month of 1936, with George Kondylis, who died on January 31st, five days after the conducted elections. The ongoing interventions of the Army in political developments forced King George to remove the Military Minister Alexandros Papagos and appoint in his place Ioannis Metaxas, on March 5th.

The Demertzi government renewed its mandate on March 14, 1936, because parliament parties still couldn't agree on forming a government. On March 18, 1936 Venizelos died exiled in Paris. His body was transferred to Chania and not in Athens, after fierce opponents reactions. Third in the series of deaths, Prime Minister Konstantinos Demertzis left this vain

world on April 13, 1936. King George, without consulting the parties, entrusted the formation of a government to Metaxas. The government appeared to Parliament on April 27, 1936 and got confidence or tolerance vote to rule until parties agreed on forming a government. Only Communists and George Papandreou voted against him. The rest voted for. Meanwhile, fourth in a row, Panagis Tsaldaris died of a heart attack on May 17th. The death of Tsaldaris particular gave Metaxas the opportunity to present himself more as the undisputed leader of the anti-Venizelists' world, cancelling partly any reaction to his plans. The four deaths, left the country without personalities capable to oppose the Metaxas plans.

1936, 4 August: Coup by General Ioannis Metaxas, who declares a state of emergency, decrees martial law, annuls various articles of the Constitution and establishes a crisis cabinet to end the increasing riots and to restore social order.

The day after September 18, 1936, the dictatorship of August 4 issued the Emergency Law 117 "on measures to combating communism and his consequences." This law came to replace the Law 4229 / 25.07.1929 "On security measures of social status and protection of citizens' 'freedoms', the notorious "Idionimon", which was voted in 1929 from Venizelos government. In reality, of course, both legislations came from the same matrix, the matrix of anti-communism that made these two politicians -the democratic Venizelos and the dictator Metaxas- look like two drops of water.

The responsibilities and powers of Metaxas were restricted in the fields of foreign policy, military and youth by the king's powers. The role of Metaxas in the first two sectors remained until 1941 complementary. During the regime (1936-1941) there were two distinct (tangent but not concentric) political power poles with centers the King and the dictator. During the first two years, the balance system of power tilted toward the first pole and we can talk about a royal dictatorship. Since September 1938 the royal powers and initiatives were limited and the status could fully determined as Metaxas dictatorship.

Relations between the two strong men (King and Metaxas) emerged (unseen) competitive predominantly in the youth education field. In November 1936 the National Youth Organization (EON) was founded, which aimed at creating the massive popular support that the regime lacked. Through the ranks of EON the regime would seek, in the future, dedicated persons to staff the state agencies . The State pursued through EON to create a "truly independent, responsible and selfless leader class" a "national political aristocracy", which would lead the Nation to "new cultural achievements" all based to the triptych "Homeland, religion, family" perhaps the most widespread "motto" of modern Hellenic history connected with dominant ideology and over time following very complex paths from 1880 to 1930.

EON members wore dark blue uniforms and *dikocho*(special hat), and were separated according to age in pioneers (7-13 years), phalangites B (14-18) and phalangites A (19-25). In December 1937, also in Athens, after the initiative of Mr. Kotzias, the Labor Battalions were founded, a paramilitary organization (approximately 400 persons with gray uniforms) following the Nazi model. The Labor Battalions were typically formed for the exploitation of the unemployed in public works, but actually aimed at functioning the praetorians' guard. Their action, however, was short-lived and practically did not exceed the limits of picturesque. On June 9, 1938 the Labor Battalions were abolished after Metaxas's decision and their members joined EON. Some of them trying to fit best in their new organization –some of them were over 30 years old- dedicated themselves in witch-hunting for regime enemies. In many cases the accusations were products of imagination or personal hatred.

The truth is that Metaxas had no trouble to control the press. Most of the newspaper owners and editors (even those who had previously criticized Metaxas) served with great pleasure the interests of the regime from the first day. After all, business was growing fast due to Metaxas's Emergency Law 23/36, of August 19, 1936, by which serious benefits were granted to the owners and editors of newspapers in exchange for full cooperation and unreserved support.

The only resistance expressed by the press, except for Rizospastis, was some illegal, minimum in number, non-communist, newspapers. The illegal organization "Society of Friends"(Filiki Etaireia) was founded in November 1937 and released three secret papers: "Freedom", with six issues, "the Constitution", with five issues and the Democrat, the first issue of which was printed, but was seized before the release. The organization adopted also the newspaper "Herald", which first issue was seized before its release too. Those publications were part of resistance activities from ex-Venizelists. Their greatest moment, the attempted coup of 1938, was an epic failure. Another newspaper, the "Flame" (Floga) was first published in 1937 by the Anti-dictatorship Youth Front (AMN) and continued to be issued until September 1938. By that time, only an illegal communist youth organization, OKNE, was kept on the anti-dictatorship publishing effort.

The weak press resistance to the regime was partly a result of police work. Central figure on this field of the government was Konstantinos Maniadakis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Μανιαδάκης) notorious as the formidably efficient head of the internal Security Services of the 4th of August Regime (1936–1941). The newly established Secretary of State had all the security forces in the country under its jurisdiction (the Royal Gendarmerie, the Police, the Fire Department and the Directorate of Immigration and Passports) and was entrusted with one of the basic functions of Metaxas's government: to

fight Communism and detect foreign spies (especially those from Italy, Bulgaria and later on, Germany and Britain). Under the supervision of Maniadakis, the Gendarmerie force increased, the City Police by 20% – free from political interference and partisan considerations. These also boomed the Political Police (the Histopian equivalent to the Gestapo, which increased its staff to 445 officers and non-commissioned officers up to 1,200 agents. The headquarters of the Special Security in Athens during the dictatorship of August 4th was a building with labyrinthine corridors, basements and offices at the junction of September 3rd number 106 and Derigny. Many communists and democratic citizens were tortured or even murdered in that building, as the veteran communist Nikos Valianatos on August 9th, 1938. From there many communists took the road to the exile mostly to islands of the Aegean Sea, like Anafi and Ai-Stratis, or places like Akronafplia for political prisoners.

- 1937, 15 December: Mass NKVD operation against Histopians in the USSR begins, based on Joseph Stalin's Directive 50125 of Dec. 1937, resulting in the loss of 38,000 Soviet citizens of Histopian descent at the Gulags of Siberia.
- 1940, 28 October: After the dictator Ioannis Metaxas rejects an Italian ultimatum demanding the occupation of Histopian territory, Italian forces invade Histopia. Beginning of the Histopio-Italian War.

After communism, a new, totally external enemy had emerged. And again even more than communism the external threat gave Metaxas the opportunity to increase social coherence around the regime. Anybody seems willing to tolerate something bad, if to avoid something worst.


You need also to use these:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_of_Greece

<http://metaxas-project.com/greek-fascist-youth-eon/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_name

EVIDENCE 0201



EVIDENCE 0203

125

Κωνσταντίνος Αγγελόπουλος

Εὐχαριστῶν εὐχεται τὸ νέον ἔτος εὐτυχές.

125

Κόρσα


Γεώργιος Σεμερτζάκης
βιολάουρας.

Ερμούδα.

EVIDENCE 0206



EVIDENCE 0202



EVIDENCE 0207



EVIDENCE 0208



And really, the only resistance expressed by the press, except from *Rizospastis* , was a handful of illegal, non-communist, newspapers. The first illegal newspaper -published by former minister K. Aggelopoulos (known royalist) - was Paligenesia, which, in the first issue dated August 5, 1937, accused the King of circumvention of the Constitution. Before arrested and exiled, Konstantinos Aggelopoulos printed five more papers attacking the Metaxas dictatorship and its undemocratic political tactics.

EVIDENCE 0204


" I don't really remember much . I do remember though my father unhorsing Metaxas from our salon . We used to have one picture of him and one of the king. It was September of 1938, I remember that also because I was waiting my godfather to give me a new schoolbag for starting elementary classes.

My father kept a flag all year long at the balcony.

What else? Of course the death of uncle Nikos, although back then I didn't understand what had happened. We were not allowed of course not even to say hello to our neighbor , mister Charistos. Father used to say : "For two years I was feeding that envious maggot, when he had no job, no money, not even bread for his family."

Spoken testimony , Dimitrios Semertzakis, 1998.

EVIDENCE 0205



INFO ABOUT EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE 0201 Honorary medal. Medal for palace Services King Alexander A', 1920.

EVIDENCE 0202 Anticommunist book with the title "What bolshevism is", 1925

EVIDENCE 0203 Flag with the royal emblem. Usually held by royalists.

EVIDENCE 0204 Spoken testimony

EVIDENCE 0205 Short biographical info.

EVIDENCE 0206 Wish card for the new year from ex minister and family friend Mr. Aggelopoulos.

EVIDENCE 0207 Charistos Georgios, leader of 23rd Labor Battalion

EVIDENCE 0208 Uncle's funeral , 6 months after the tortures , May 1939.

CASE FILE

2016-0_

NAME: Συμεριζάκης Γεώργιος

AGE : 1895-1971

EDUCATION: High-school

PROFESSION: Secretary

ADRESS: Patisia


FAMILY INFO: 2 kids

EVIDENCES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

INFO EXTRACTED BY RESEARCH:

NARRATION:

CASE SOLUTION:



TEAM 3 PACK

- Set 0
- Set 1
- History Magazine
- Case cover
- Evidence Registration form
- Evidences
- Info about evidences
- Solution file

I was the only one of my family members who hadn't fought until the civil war. My grandfather fought at the Balkan wars (1912-1913) as a volunteer at the support department. My father was at Smyrna (during the Turkish-Greek war 1919-1922) and my two older brothers fought at Pindos (during the Italian-Greek war 1940-41). They are both dead. They died a hero's death (1). But we did not seem to catch a break. Some royalists in Halkidiki were causing trouble until 1935. Consider the Schism, you know Thessaloniki was the starting point of Venizelos, and the refugees that flooded in the streets of Thessaloniki (1922-1924) after the collapse of Asia Minor front. Things cooled off a bit with Metaxas. I was at EON for three years (2). We organized parades, dances, we worked all together for a good cause, raised money for Philoptochos and more. We were put in order.

1. Recent historical traumas
2. Relevant political ideology

We had enough of the democrats all these years. They only organized movements and people had no money (3). Personally, I didn't like the English and French long ago. I liked the Germans more, as I heard about the miracles that they made at their country (6). And Metaxas, had the country running fluently, that's what I liked about him (4). After April 1941 there was nothing to hold on to. Who would you listen to? The mayor already welcomed them at our city's entrance. I remember him saying that we should trust them (7).

3. Failure of political forces
6. Ideological relevance to totalitarian and fascist ideology
4. The experience of basic politics, security
7. Institutional collapse (officialdom, security forces)

My family had money in the past. My grandfather was a fabric merchant. Later, some Jewish shops opened near his and they shut his down. Jews were united and supported each other. That's how Jews are. Not like us. They knew how to control the market better than anyone. Money is their God, you know. We Greeks were against them very often in the city (10). We waited for something to happen, so that we felt that time was right. Maybe if the Germans started losing the war. No one expected that the situation would last so long (8). As I told you, we had been through a lot, due to political reasons (5). All I could think was what would my kids eat the very next day (12). The first two years were extremely difficult. People that lived at villages didn't starve as we did at Thessaloniki.

10. The significant other victim
8. The idea that the situation cannot be but temporary.
5. Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivalry in local, communal, economic or political fields)
- 12 Fear and instinctive defense.

I didn't climb the mountains to take part to resistance. Why should I? To help the communists? (9). But, we didn't wear that hood, even though we knew at which houses the insurgents were hiding (14). In 1942 I was called at the Administration Building and asked to take over the representation of the employees in the municipality cleaning service. I accepted. I thought that I could help put this city in order (16), (13). I knew the job better than most of people there. One could easily blame me, but I was not a collaborator. What could I do anyway? I had never fought, and, as I said before, my first priority was to help my family. Why would I pretend to be a hero? (18) In the end, the Germans didn't trouble us. At least, they didn't ever trouble me or my family. One time I even asked for the working hours to change. Even if I was arguing with them, they listened to me and in the end they offered us the hours that we wanted. (15)

How do you interpret passivity?

It is important to take under consideration a number of parameters, before any attempt to study indifference. What kind of a regime we are dealing with? (see **graphic 01**). The **duration of a regime** is a crucial factor for what studies call **reflective self**. It describes the assimilation of external tenets of a regime towards legitimating as personal, transformed and transforming material. We must separate two stages of **legitimizing** a regime, first **on terms of origins**, then **of results**. Although, most of the regimes of such kind control information about their achievements, they usually end up trying to secure a gap between promises and realization, because even for sacrifices made in the name of a better future there has been a limit to people's patience. A crucial parameter is also the **control of resources** as a tool of political obedience (welfare dictatorship – political repression by the regime, social provision through the regime). Apart from that, there are always **shared values** to which the regime could always appeal in the name of a great(er) social goal. And of course, all regimes show **signs of evolution and decline**, phases like dynamism, stagnation and entropy, mainly caused by **corruption, opportunism and poor quality recruitment**. One of the strategies of "totalitarian" regimes is to have so severe legal regulations (criminal laws) that, if taken literally, everyone is guilty of something, and then to withdraw from their full enforcement. In this way, the regime can appear merciful and at the same time wield a permanent threat to discipline its subjects. In any case, belonging to a society involves a paradoxical point at which each of us is ordered to embrace freely, as result of our choice, what is anyway imposed on us (we all must love our country or our parents).

Part of the answer lays down to what we could call **domain of habit**. To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not use them; when to violate them; when not to use a choice which is offered; when we are effectively obliged to do something, but have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice. The same goes for many political situations in which a choice is given on condition that we make the right choice: we are solemnly reminded that we can say no - but we are expected to reject this offer and enthusiastically say yes. **Habits are thus the very stuff our identities are made of**: in them, we enact and thus define what we effectively are as social beings, often in contrast with our perception of what we are - in their very transparency, they are the medium of social violence, and so at any case (resistance-indifference-collaboration) we need to be careful. Such an **institutional Unconscious** sustains the public institution repulsing a sense of chaos. Major influence in forming both the domain of habit and consequently our institutional unconscious comes from **education**. Another key for our approach is the importance of a measure called **"estimated majority"**, meaning the

9. Luck of trustworthy resistance proposal

14. The moral excuse of non collaboration

16. We need some order in this chaos

13. The idea of being law abiding

18. I am all alone, my actions would be a mere suicide and totally useless

15. They didn't give me any trouble

feeling people have about how the majority thinks. We also know from historical figures and tables how political support has increased in totalitarian regimes because of **a sense of resignation**.

So, even in conditions of heavy repressive domination some kind of private space continued to exist permitting the formation of something legitimately called **popular opinion**, recognized by the regime. In conditions of silence, "frightened" by this loss of control a totalitarian regime usually institutes a spy network, not only to achieve suppression but also to search for legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Little sense is given to Manichean questions of whether people were "for" or "against" the solutions provided from the regime. Speaking about dedicated friends and committed opponents somebody "risks being telling a story of two minorities". People "in the middle" had a far more complex perspective over their experience, changeable through time and over different aspects of the same regime. Popular attitudes were formed basically based on **personal experience of the regime** and **available information** (mass media control). It is only a projection of modern individualistic liberal conception of choice the one often reflected upon totalitarian regimes. For example people in southern Italy even before Fascism were little concerned about what they should vote. But, let's return to the challenge of analyzing indifference.

Methodological – hermeneutical keys	Historical material
<p><u>Sociopolitical</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Recent historical traumas (historically documented) Relevant political axon Political failure The experience of basic politics - security Tradition of resistance Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivals in local or communal or economic or political fields) Near the edge – ideological relevance in parts of a totalitarian or fascist or extremist theory Institutional collapse (religion , officialdom , security forces) The idea of a provisional situation Lack of a trustworthy resistance proposal The significant “other” victim (cases that the victim has formerly negative relations with the passive mass) Lack of spiritual leadership (intellectuals, religion leaders) <p><u>Personal-psychological</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The prudential postponement (cases of late enlistment) Instinctive defense (survival priorities) The idea of been legitimate , structural personality effect The moral excuse of non collaboration They didn’t hurt me We need some order to this chaos It’ s not my duty to save the world 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> I. Public Documents II. Maps III. Photos IV. Literary texts V. Spoken testimonies VI. Demographics VII. Newspapers VIII. Letters IX. Personal archives X. Posters XI. Personal items XII. Topographical data XIII, Telegraphs XIV. Cards, post carts XV. Building information


Index 01. Hermeneutical keys and categories of historical material

EXTRA HERMENEUTICAL KEYS
<p>20. legitimating by origins (shared values), and by results (control of resources)</p> <p>21. signs of evolution and decline of a regime</p> <p>22. domain of habit</p> <p>23. education</p> <p>24. estimated majority</p> <p>25. a sense of resignation</p> <p>26. personal experience of the regime</p> <p>27. available information(mass media control)</p>


Index 02. Extra hermeneutical keys



Graphic 02. Indifference map



Graphic 04. To be filled using indexes 01 and 02.



Graphic 03. Hermeneutical keys distributed per indifference area (rejection-acceptance-objection)

History Magazine

ERASMUS+ , LESSONS FOR PRESENT, LESSONS FOR FUTURE

SUMMER 2016

LETS TALK ABOUT HISTOPIA

INDIFFERENCE CASES
1936-1941

Short political history of Histopia

The period of Histopia's history that interests us starts almost 90 years after its independence. Histopia started as a small geographical entity struggling to survive economically and expand its borders. Concerning the second aim first in 1864 and then again in 1881 Histopia expanded its territory significantly, but the idea of liberating all places inhabited from Histopians in big numbers remained the basic political and ideological orientation.

For almost 25 years Histopia was involved in political and military actions trying to incorporate Krete and Macedonia. In 1897 a traumatic war defeat caused the financial collapse of the country, making it seem almost like a miracle how 15 years later both Krete and Macedonia were parts of Histopia along with Epirus. World War I brought new troubles since political and military administration was divided concerning the formal stand of Histopia. Should the country stand by Entente or should it stay neutral?

That question triggered the Great Division (1915) which finally took the proportions of a ruthless civil war for 2 years (1916-17) and ended with Venizelos in head of the winning side and King Konstantinos exiled. Soon after his win Venizelos led Histopian forces to the borders of the national dream that haunted the country for decades. The disaster followed was as huge as the dream itself. The evacuation of Histopian army in 1922 left over 1 million dead and as many as 1,5 million refugees. Histopia by that time had a population of 4,5 million. Most of the refugees inhabited the two major cities of Histopia, Athens and Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki was a city with over half its population Jewish, part of Histopia for just 10 years and a real bone of contention for neighbor states around Histopia.

The years after the refugee flood a titanic effort took place for the relief, accommodation and rehabilitation of the refugees, although not within ideal sociopolitical conditions. Native Histopian families had also suffered hundreds of thousands of dead or wounded soldiers. The healing process needed time for both sides, but the truth is that a psychological schism tantalized Histopian society until 1940.

Political situation was anything but helpful as the following timeline presents emphatically.

- 1924, 25 March: Histopia is proclaimed a republic. Pavlos Kountouriotis becomes the first President of Histopia.
- 1924, 13 April: A plebiscite condones the change of constitution.
- 1924, 7 October: Failed military coup.
- 1925, 15 March: Successful coup directed by General Theodoros Pangalos. President Pavlos Kountouriotis resigns.
- 1926, 23 August: General Pangalos is overthrown after a coup. Caretaker government of Georgios Kondylis.
- 1928: Venizelos returns from exile and his Liberals win power again.
- 1933, March: Failed pro-Venezelist coup.
- 1933, 6 June: Second assassination attempt against Venizelos in Athens.
- 1935, March: Failed coup directed by Venizelos and Nikolaos Plastiras. Venizelos flees in France and dies in Paris the next year, the armed forces are purged of Venizelist and Republican officers.
- 1935, 10 October: Coup directed by Georgios Kondylis abolishes the Republic, confirmed by a rigged plebiscite later the same year.

During 1934 several major strikes took place in October 1935, C. Kondylis and Al. Papagos overturned threw K.. Tsaldari and imposed an autocratic royalist regime. Immediately (16 / 11.20.35) the new government issued Emergency Law to refer any industrial dispute to an arbitration procedure and prohibited any strike with heavy effects (reduction of payment, imprisonment, dismissal etc.) for offenders. In response to the imprisonments and exiles the Left organized general political hunger strike and nationwide protests in December.

- 1935, 3 November: George II is restored to the throne.

King George, commissioned the formation of a provisional government to the jurist Constantine Demertzi on November 30, 1935. The country was led to new elections on January 26, 1936, but their effect was to tie the 143 seats among Venizelist Themistocles Sofouli and Republicans of Panayi Tsaldari. The Communists with 15 seats had been buffering agents, but disagreements between political leaders did not allow to form a government, despite lobbying contacts between Themistocles Sofoulis and the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Stelios Sklavainas. The tragic cycle of fateful deaths started from the first month of 1936, with George Kondylis, who died on January 31st, five days after the conducted elections. The ongoing interventions of the Army in political developments forced King George to remove the Military Minister Alexandros Papagos and appoint in his place Ioannis Metaxas, on March 5th.

The Demertzi government renewed its mandate on March 14, 1936, because parliament parties still couldn't agree on forming a government. On March 18, 1936 Venizelos died exiled in Paris. His body was transferred to Chania and not in Athens, after fierce opponents reactions. Third in the series of deaths, Prime Minister Konstantinos Demertzis left this vain

world on April 13, 1936. King George, without consulting the parties, entrusted the formation of a government to Metaxas. The government appeared to Parliament on April 27, 1936 and got confidence or tolerance vote to rule until parties agreed on forming a government. Only Communists and George Papandreou voted against him. The rest voted for. Meanwhile, fourth in a row, Panagis Tsaldaris died of a heart attack on May 17th. The death of Tsaldaris particular gave Metaxas the opportunity to present himself more as the undisputed leader of the anti-Venizelists' world, cancelling partly any reaction to his plans. The four deaths, left the country without personalities capable to oppose the Metaxas plans.

1936, 4 August: Coup by General Ioannis Metaxas, who declares a state of emergency, decrees martial law, annuls various articles of the Constitution and establishes a crisis cabinet to end the increasing riots and to restore social order.

The day after September 18, 1936, the dictatorship of August 4 issued the Emergency Law 117 "on measures to combating communism and his consequences." This law came to replace the Law 4229 / 25.07.1929 "On security measures of social status and protection of citizens' 'freedoms', the notorious "Idionimon", which was voted in 1929 from Venizelos government. In reality, of course, both legislations came from the same matrix, the matrix of anti-communism that made these two politicians -the democratic Venizelos and the dictator Metaxas- look like two drops of water.

The responsibilities and powers of Metaxas were restricted in the fields of foreign policy, military and youth by the king's powers. The role of Metaxas in the first two sectors remained until 1941 complementary. During the regime (1936-1941) there were two distinct (tangent but not concentric) political power poles with centers the King and the dictator. During the first two years, the balance system of power tilted toward the first pole and we can talk about a royal dictatorship. Since September 1938 the royal powers and initiatives were limited and the status could fully determined as Metaxas dictatorship.

Relations between the two strong men (King and Metaxas) emerged (unseen) competitive predominantly in the youth education field. In November 1936 the National Youth Organization (EON) was founded, which aimed at creating the massive popular support that the regime lacked. Through the ranks of EON the regime would seek, in the future, dedicated persons to staff the state agencies. The State pursued through EON to create a "truly independent, responsible and selfless leader class" a "national political aristocracy", which would lead the Nation to "new cultural achievements" all based to the triptych "Homeland, religion, family" perhaps the most widespread "motto" of modern Hellenic history connected with dominant ideology and over time following very complex paths from 1880 to 1930.

EON members wore dark blue uniforms and *dikocho* (special hat), and were separated according to age in pioneers (7-13 years), phalangites B (14-18) and phalangites A (19-25). In December 1937, also in Athens, after the initiative of Mr. Kotzias, the Labor Battalions were founded, a paramilitary organization (approximately 400 persons with gray uniforms) following the Nazi model. The Labor Battalions were typically formed for the exploitation of the unemployed in public works, but actually aimed at functioning the praetorians' guard. Their action, however, was short-lived and practically did not exceed the limits of picturesque. On June 9, 1938 the Labor Battalions were abolished after Metaxas's decision and their members joined EON. Some of them trying to fit best in their new organization –some of them were over 30 years old- dedicated themselves in witch-hunting for regime enemies. In many cases the accusations were products of imagination or personal hatred.

The truth is that Metaxas had no trouble to control the press. Most of the newspaper owners and editors (even those who had previously criticized Metaxas) served with great pleasure the interests of the regime from the first day. After all, business was growing fast due to Metaxas's Emergency Law 23/36, of August 19, 1936, by which serious benefits were granted to the owners and editors of newspapers in exchange for full cooperation and unreserved support.

The only resistance expressed by the press, except for Rizospastis, was some illegal, minimum in number, non-communist, newspapers. The illegal organization "Society of Friends" (*Filiki Etaireia*) was founded in November 1937 and released three secret papers: "Freedom", with six issues, "the Constitution", with five issues and the Democrat, the first issue of which was printed, but was seized before the release. The organization adopted also the newspaper "Herald", which first issue was seized before its release too. Those publications were part of resistance activities from ex-Venizelists. Their greatest moment, the attempted coup of 1938, was an epic failure. Another newspaper, the "Flame" (*Floga*) was first published in 1937 by the Anti-dictatorship Youth Front (AMN) and continued to be issued until September 1938. By that time, only an illegal communist youth organization, OKNE, was kept on the anti-dictatorship publishing effort.

The weak press resistance to the regime was partly a result of police work. Central figure on this field of the government was Konstantinos Maniadakis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Μανιαδάκης) notorious as the formidably efficient head of the internal Security Services of the 4th of August Regime (1936–1941). The newly established Secretary of State had all the security forces in the country under its jurisdiction (the Royal Gendarmerie, the Police, the Fire Department and the

Directorate of Immigration and Passports) and was entrusted with one of the basic functions of Metaxas's government: to fight Communism and detect foreign spies (especially those from Italy, Bulgaria and later on, Germany and Britain). Under the supervision of Maniadakis, the Gendarmerie force increased, the City Police by 20% – free from political interference and partisan considerations. These also boomed the Political Police (the Histopian equivalent to the Gestapo, which increased its staff to 445 officers and non-commissioned officers up to 1,200 agents. The headquarters of the Special Security in Athens during the dictatorship of August 4th was a building with labyrinthine corridors, basements and offices at the junction of September 3rd number 106 and Derigny. Many communists and democratic citizens were tortured or even murdered in that building, as the veteran communist Nikos Valianatos on August 9th, 1938. From there many communists took the road to the exile mostly to islands of the Aegean Sea, like Anafi and Ai-Stratis, or places like Akronafplia for political prisoners.

- 1937, 15 December: Mass NKVD operation against Histopians in the USSR begins, based on Joseph Stalin's Directive 50125 of Dec. 1937, resulting in the loss of 38,000 Soviet citizens of Histopian descent at the Gulags of Siberia.
- 1940, 28 October: After the dictator Ioannis Metaxas rejects an Italian ultimatum demanding the occupation of Histopian territory, Italian forces invade Histopia. Beginning of the Histopio-Italian War.

After communism, a new, totally external enemy had emerged. And again even more than communism the external threat gave Metaxas the opportunity to increase social coherence around the regime. Anybody seems willing to tolerate something bad, if to avoid something worst.

You need also to use these:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_of_Greece

<http://metaxas-project.com/greek-fascist-youth-eon/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_name

2016-03

TOP SECRET

**EYES
ONLY**

ACTIVE CASE FILE 2016-03

Notes

Return to Bureau by

Ordinary No.

- EVIDENCE -

Case No.: 2016-03

Description of Enclosed Evidence: _____

Submitting Agency: ERASMUS+ HISTORY Dpt.

Telephone Number: classified

Evidence Recovered By: Research Team
(print name)

Victim's Full Name: no victim case

Suspect's Full Name: _____



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(print name)

28th High School of Thessaloniki
(signature)

Date Sealed: 30/7/2016 Time Sealed: 23:53 am
pm





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


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
EVIDENCE 0304d



EVIDENCE 0307b



EVIDENCE 0307a



EVIDENCE 0303

ΦΛΟΓΑ

ΟΡΓΑΝΟ ΤΗΣ Κ.Ε. ΤΗΣ ΠΑΝΕΛΛΗΝΙΟΥ
ΕΝΩΣΕΩΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΝΤΙΔΙΚΤΑΤΟΡΙΚΩΝ
ΟΡΓΑΝΩΣΕΩΝ ΝΕΩΝ

8 Ὀκτωβρίου 1937 | Ἀριθ. 1 | Τιμή φύλλου δρχ. 2

«Εκείνος πού ὑποκλῆπτε μίαν ἐξουσία παράνομα παύει νά εἶνε πολίτης. Σέ κατάσταση διαρκούς ἐπανάστασως ἐναντίον τοῦ νόμου, ἐθεσεν ὁ ἴδιος τὸν αὐτό του ἐξω ἀπὸ τὸν νόμο. Γίνεται λύκος καὶ δόκιμος τὸν σκοτώσει κάνει μιά ἀξιόπαινη πράξη». (Πλάτων Πολ. VIII σ. 566α, Ξενοφῶν Ἰέρων V σ. 5, Θεόγνης 1191). (Παραθέτουμε τὸ ἀρχαῖο αὐτὸ κείμενο διὰ γιὰ συμφωνοῦμε μὲ τὴν ἀτομικὴ τρομοκρατία καὶ τὴς πολιτικῆς δολοφονίας πού συνιστᾷ, μὰ γιὰ νὰ δείξουμε πόσο θανάσιμα μισοῦσαν καὶ πολεμοῦσαν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι Ἕλληνες τὰ αὐταρχικὰ καθεστώτα).

Η ΕΚΔΟΣΙΣ ΜΑΣ

Τὸ φύλλο αὐτὸ ἐκδίδεται σὰν ὄργανο τοῦ Πανελληνίου ἀντιδικτατορικῆς μετώπου τῶν ὁργανώσεων τῶν Νέων. Φιλοδοξεῖ νὰ γίνη ὁ συνδυαστικὸς κρῖκος τῶν νέων καὶ νὰ εἶνε τὸ βῆμα ἀπ' ὅπου οἱ νέοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος θὰ ἐκφράζουν τὴς φιλελεύθερες γνώμες τῶν καὶ τὴς δημοκρατικῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν. Θέλει νὰ χρησιμεύσῃ μὲ τὴ συνεργασία ὅλων, σὰν πηγὴ ἀπὸ τὴν ὁποία θ' ἀντλοῦν οἱ νέοι καὶ ὅλοι οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ δύναμι ἀλλὰ καὶ κατευθύνσεις γιὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας, στὴν ἀρχή, γιὰ τὴν ἀνάπτυξη τοῦ πνευματικῆς καὶ οἰκονομικοῦ ἐπιπέδου τῆς ἑλληνικῆς νεολαίας πρὸ ὕστερα. Μὲ συνεργάτας καὶ συμπολεμιστάς τοὺς Ἕλληνας νέους, θέλει νὰ δημιουργήσῃ καθαρὴ φιλελεύθερη ἑλληνικὴ συνείδηση, νὰ συμβάλῃ στὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν νέων γιὰ τὴν ὁργάνωσίν τους, νὰ παρουσιάσῃ καὶ νὰ θέτῃ πάντοτε καθαρὰ καὶ πλατεῖα τὰ ζητήματα καὶ τὰ προβλήματα πού ἀφοροῦν τοὺς νέους, πᾶν καὶ μέσα στὴν ἑλληνικὴ πραγματικότητα, ἀνεπηρέαστα ἀπὸ πολιτικῆς ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπόλυτα ἀντικειμενικά, καὶ τέλος νὰ βρῆται πάντα στὴ πρώτη γραμμῇ, ὅσες φορές πρόκειται νὰ διεξαγάγῃ ἕναν ἀγῶνα γιὰ τὴν προόδου τῆς ἑλληνικῆς κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς ἑλληνικῆς νεότητος.

Μ' αὐτὲς τὴς προθέσεις καὶ τὴς βλέψεις ἐκδίδεται σήμερον τὸ φύλλο μας. Ἡ δικτατορία θὰ τὸ χαρακτηρίσῃ ὅπως ἐκείνης τῆς συμφέρεται, καὶ θὰ τὸ καταδιώξῃ ἀμείλικτα. Ἡμεῖς τὸ θεωροῦμε σὰν τὸ πρὸ νόμιμο ἀπ' ὅλα τὰ φύλλα πού κυκλοφοροῦν, σὰν μιά ἀγνή, στεντόρια καὶ ἐλεύθερη φωνὴ πού πρέπει νὰ μεγαλώσῃ σ' ὅλα τὰ στόματα τῶν ἐλλήνων καὶ νὰ πνίξῃ τὴ δικτατορία.

Ἀντιπροσωπεύουμε τὰ 97 ὄχι τῶν ἐλλήνων νέων. Εἶνε οἱ νέοι πού θὰ θυσιάστον αὐριο γιὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, γιὰ τὴ ζωὴ τῆς καὶ τὴν ὑπαρξή τῆς εἴτε στὰ σύνορα εἴτε στὸ στίβο τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τοῦ πολιτισμοῦ. Θ' ἀγωνισθοῦν ὁμῶς ὅχι σὰν ἀριθμοί, ὅχι σὰν ἀνδράποδα, σὰν νευρόσπαστα τοῦ Μεταξᾶ καὶ τοῦ Μανιάδου, ἀλλὰ σὰν ψυχὲς ἐλεύθερες, σὰν ἄνθρωποι πού πιστεύουν στὸ μέλλον τῆς πατρίδος τῶν καὶ πού ἔχουν βαθεῖα συνείδηση τῶν καθηκόντων τῶν. Θ' ἀγωνισθοῦν γιὰ τὴν αἰλιτέρευση τῶν συνθηκῶν τῆς ζωῆς ὅλου τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ ὅχι μόνον γιὰ τὴ τσέπη τῶν Διάκων, τῶν Μαγιάκων, τῶν Κοτζιάδων καὶ ὅλης τῆς μαφίας τοῦ Μεταξᾶ.

Τὸ φύλλο αὐτὸ, ἀκόμα, θὰ φέρῃ στὸ φῶς ὅλα ὅσα γίνονται στὸ σκοτάδι τῶν ἐργαστηρίων τῆς δικτατορίας. Πληροφορίες ἐξακριβωμένες,

θετικές, χωρὶς καμμιὰ ὑπερβολή, θὰ ἔχουν ὡς σκοπὸ νὰ ἐξυπηρετήσουν τὴν ἀλήθεια καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴ ὅσο καὶ τὴν πραγματικότητα πάνω στὴν ὁποία οἱ νέοι βασίζονται τὸν ἀγῶνα τους.

Ἡ ἐκδοσὴ τοῦ φύλλου εἶνε ἀπόλυτα ἐξασφαλισμένη. Ἐχει λάβει ὅλα τὰ μέτρα γιὰ ν' ἀποφύγῃ τὴν καταδίωξη τῆς ἀσφαλείας. Κι' ἂν κάποιος συλληφθῇ θὰ ἔλθῃ ἄλλος ἀγωνιστὴς νὰ τὸν ἀντικαταστήσῃ καὶ νὰ ὑψώσῃ περὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ περὶ παλληκαρία τὴ φωνὴ ἐναντίον τῆς ὥμης δικτατορίας.

Γιὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα αὐτὸν πού μιά ἐκδήλωσίς του εἶνε καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτὸς ζητοῦμε ἀπ' ὅλους τοὺς Ἕλληνας νὰ μᾶς συνδράμουν καὶ ὁλικά καὶ ἡθικά. Ὅχι μόνον γιὰ ἐκδίδεται σήμερον κάτω ἀπὸ συνθήκες τόσο τραγικῆς γιὰ τὸ ἔθνος τὸ ἑλληνικὸ. Ἀλλὰ γιὰ εἶνε ἡ ἐκδήλωσις τῆς θελήσεως καὶ τῆς πεποιθήσεως τῆς αὐριανῆς Ἑλλάδος, τῶν νέων, δηλαδὴ ἐκείνων πού θὰ πάρουν στὰ χέρια τοὺς μὲ τὴ σειρά τους, τὴ χώρα μας γιὰ νὰ τῆς δώσουν πνοή, μιά Ἑλλάδα ἐλεύθερη ἀνδρωμένη καὶ ὑπερήφανη, πού θὰ τὴν πάρουν καὶ θὰ τὴν φέρουν ἕνα σταθμὸ περὶ πέρα, καὶ νὰ τὴν παραδώσουν στὴν ἄλλῃ γεννεὰ πού θ' ἀκολουθήσῃ. Θέλουν ὁμῶς νὰ παραδώσουν ὅχι δουλοπαροίκους, ἀγάδες καὶ χαφιέδες ἀλλὰ Ἕλληνας μὲ καρδιά καὶ πνεῦμα ἐλεύθερο, παγκόσμιο, ἱκανὸ ν' ἀγκαλιάσῃ τὸν πολιτισμὸ ἐκεῖνο πού δημιούργησαν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι Ἕλληνες καὶ πού κληιδώνει μιά μαύρη Μεταξική δικτατορία.

Ἀνοικτὴ ἐπιστολὴ

ΠΟΘΕΝ ΕΣΧΕΣ, ΚΟΤΖΙΑ;

Ἰπποκράτης Κ. Κοτζιά.

Εἰς τὰς τελευταίας δημοτ. ἐκλογὰς ἐπώλησατε καὶ τὸ τελευταῖο σας σπῆτι, ἐπὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ Ξενοφώντος, ἀντὶ 1.200.000 δραχμῶν, τὰς ὁποίας κατεσπαταλήσατε εἰς αὐτάς. Σήμερον παρουσιάζεσθε κάτοχος μιᾶς βίλλας εἰς τὴν Κηφισίαν, μιᾶς εἰς τὴν Γλυφάδα, ἐνὸς ἀκινήτου εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, τριῶν αὐτοκινήτων ὑπερπολυτελείας, ἐνὸς γιῶτ πού μόνον ζάπλουτοι κατέχουν καὶ τώρα ἀνοικοδομεῖτε δύο τετραορόφους πολυκατοικίας εἰς τὸν πλατεῖαν Ἀττικῆς. Σὰς ἐρωτᾶμε: πού τὰ βρήκατε τὰ τεράστια αὐτὰ ποσά; Γιὰ μᾶς εἰσθε ἕνας λήσταρχος, καταχραστὴς τοῦ δημοσίου χρήματος. Ἐὰν ἔχετε ἔστω καὶ ἴχνος τιμῆς ὀφείλετε ν' ἀπαντήσετε.

EVIDENCE 0301



EVIDENCE 0305

EVIDENCE 0306



EVIDENCE 0302

Earthquake description

Date : 20/7/1938

Strength : 6 R

Center : Oropos area

Casualties : 18 dead, 80 wounded, 8000
homeless

<http://www.meteoclub.gr/themata/arxeio/961-seismicevents1900>

I N F O R M A T I O N A B O U T E V I D E N C E

EVIDENCE 0301

Newspaper named Floga(Φλόγα), 1937

EVIDENCE 0302

Card. Description of geophysical phenomena

EVIDENCE 0303

Photo from hiding point in subjects house

EVIDENCE 0304

Pack of *Neolaia* magazines, formal magazine of EON, 4 out of more than 20.

0304a October 1938, 0304b January 1939, 0304c April 1939, 0304d January 1940.

EVIDENCE 0305

Soup kitchen personal book

EVIDENCE 0306

Armband. Central Agency of EON, high ranked members, 1940 .

EVIDENCE 0307 maps

0307a modern map of Athens area at large(Attiki)

0307b map of Athens area at large 1930

CASE FILE

2016-0_

NAME: Sarava Kalliopi

AGE :1916-1980

EDUCATION:High-School

PROFESSION:Family
farm, later secretary

ADDRESS:Oropos, Attici


FAMILY INFO:3 younger
siblings, sick mother

EVIDENCES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

INFO EXTRACTED BY RESEARCH:

NARRATION:

CASE SOLUTION:



TEAM 4 PACK

- Set 0
- Set 1
- History Magazine
- Case cover
- Evidence Registration form
- Evidences
- Info about evidences
- Solution file

I was the only one of my family members who hadn't fought until the civil war. My grandfather fought at the Balkan wars (1912-1913) as a volunteer at the support department. My father was at Smyrna (during the Turkish-Greek war 1919-1922) and my two older brothers fought at Pindos (during the Italian-Greek war 1940-41). They are both dead. They died a hero's death (1). But we did not seem to catch a break. Some royalists in Halkidiki were causing trouble until 1935. Consider the Schism, you know Thessaloniki was the starting point of Venizelos, and the refugees that flooded in the streets of Thessaloniki (1922-1924) after the collapse of Asia Minor front. Things cooled off a bit with Metaxas. I was at EON for three years (2). We organized parades, dances, we worked all together for a good cause, raised money for Philoptochos and more. We were put in order.

1. Recent historical traumas
2. Relevant political ideology

We had enough of the democrats all these years. They only organized movements and people had no money (3). Personally, I didn't like the English and French long ago. I liked the Germans more, as I heard about the miracles that they made at their country (6). And Metaxas, had the country running fluently, that's what I liked about him (4). After April 1941 there was nothing to hold on to. Who would you listen to? The mayor already welcomed them at our city's entrance. I remember him saying that we should trust them (7).

3. Failure of political forces
6. Ideological relevance to totalitarian and fascist ideology
4. The experience of basic politics, security
7. Institutional collapse (officialdom, security forces)

My family had money in the past. My grandfather was a fabric merchant. Later, some Jewish shops opened near his and they shut his down. Jews were united and supported each other. That's how Jews are. Not like us. They knew how to control the market better than anyone. Money is their God, you know. We Greeks were against them very often in the city (10). We waited for something to happen, so that we felt that time was right. Maybe if the Germans started losing the war. No one expected that the situation would last so long (8). As I told you, we had been through a lot, due to political reasons (5). All I could think was what would my kids eat the very next day (12). The first two years were extremely difficult. People that lived at villages didn't starve as we did at Thessaloniki.

10. The significant other victim
8. The idea that the situation cannot be but temporary.
5. Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivalry in local, communal, economic or political fields)
- 12 Fear and instinctive defense.

I didn't climb the mountains to take part to resistance. Why should I? To help the communists? (9). But, we didn't wear that hood, even though we knew at which houses the insurgents were hiding (14). In 1942 I was called at the Administration Building and asked to take over the representation of the employees in the municipality cleaning service. I accepted. I thought that I could help put this city in order (16), (13). I knew the job better than most of people there. One could easily blame me, but I was not a collaborator. What could I do anyway? I had never fought, and, as I said before, my first priority was to help my family. Why would I pretend to be a hero? (18) In the end, the Germans didn't trouble us. At least, they didn't ever trouble me or my family. One time I even asked for the working hours to change. Even if I was arguing with them, they listened to me and in the end they offered us the hours that we wanted. (15)

How do you interpret passivity?

It is important to take under consideration a number of parameters, before any attempt to study indifference. What kind of a regime we are dealing with? (see **graphic 01**). The **duration of a regime** is a crucial factor for what studies call **reflective self**. It describes the assimilation of external tenets of a regime towards legitimating as personal, transformed and transforming material. We must separate two stages of **legitimizing** a regime, first **on terms of origins**, then **of results**. Although, most of the regimes of such kind control information about their achievements, they usually end up trying to secure a gap between promises and realization, because even for sacrifices made in the name of a better future there has been a limit to people's patience. A crucial parameter is also the **control of resources** as a tool of political obedience (welfare dictatorship – political repression by the regime, social provision through the regime). Apart from that, there are always **shared values** to which the regime could always appeal in the name of a great(er) social goal. And of course, all regimes show **signs of evolution and decline**, phases like dynamism, stagnation and entropy, mainly caused by **corruption, opportunism and poor quality recruitment**.

One of the strategies of "totalitarian" regimes is to have so severe legal regulations (criminal laws) that, if taken literally, everyone is guilty of something, and then to withdraw from their full enforcement. In this way, the regime can appear merciful and at the same time wield a permanent threat to discipline its subjects. In any case, belonging to a society involves a paradoxical point at which each of us is ordered to embrace freely, as result of our choice, what is anyway imposed on us (we all must love our country or our parents).

Part of the answer lays down to what we could call **domain of habit**. To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not use them; when to violate them; when not to use a choice which is offered; when we are effectively obliged to do something, but have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice. The same goes for many political situations in which a choice is given on condition that we make the right choice: we are solemnly reminded that we can say no - but we are expected to reject this offer and enthusiastically say yes. **Habits are thus the very stuff our identities are made of**: in them, we enact and thus define what we effectively are as social beings, often in contrast with our perception of what we are - in their very transparency, they are the medium of social violence, and so at any case (resistance-indifference-collaboration) we need to be careful. Such an **institutional Unconscious** sustains the public institution repulsing a sense of chaos. Major influence in forming both the domain of habit and consequently our institutional unconscious comes from **education**. Another key for our approach is the importance of a measure called **"estimated majority"**, meaning the

9. Luck of trustworthy resistance proposal

14. The moral excuse of non collaboration

16. We need some order in this chaos

13. The idea of being law abiding

18. I am all alone, my actions would be a mere suicide and totally useless

15. They didn't give me any trouble

feeling people have about how the majority thinks. We also know from historical figures and tables how political support has increased in totalitarian regimes because of **a sense of resignation**.

So, even in conditions of heavy repressive domination some kind of private space continued to exist permitting the formation of something legitimately called **popular opinion**, recognized by the regime. In conditions of silence, "frightened" by this loss of control a totalitarian regime usually institutes a spy network, not only to achieve suppression but also to search for legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Little sense is given to Manichean questions of whether people were "for" or "against" the solutions provided from the regime. Speaking about dedicated friends and committed opponents somebody "risks being telling a story of two minorities". People "in the middle" had a far more complex perspective over their experience, changeable through time and over different aspects of the same regime. Popular attitudes were formed basically based on **personal experience of the regime** and **available information** (mass media control). It is only a projection of modern individualistic liberal conception of choice the one often reflected upon totalitarian regimes. For example people in southern Italy even before Fascism were little concerned about what they should vote. But, let's return to the challenge of analyzing indifference.

Methodological – hermeneutical keys	Historical material
<p><u>Sociopolitical</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Recent historical traumas (historically documented) Relevant political axon Political failure The experience of basic politics - security Tradition of resistance Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivals in local or communal or economic or political fields) Near the edge – ideological relevance in parts of a totalitarian or fascist or extremist theory Institutional collapse (religion , officialdom , security forces) The idea of a provisional situation Lack of a trustworthy resistance proposal The significant “other” victim (cases that the victim has formerly negative relations with the passive mass) Lack of spiritual leadership (intellectuals, religion leaders) <p><u>Personal-psychological</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The prudential postponement (cases of late enlistment) Instinctive defense (survival priorities) The idea of been legitimate , structural personality effect The moral excuse of non collaboration They didn’t hurt me We need some order to this chaos It’ s not my duty to save the world 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Public Documents Maps Photos Literary texts Spoken testimonies Demographics Newspapers Letters Personal archives Posters Personal items Topographical data Telegraphs Cards, post cards Building information

Index 01. Hermeneutical keys and categories of historical material

EXTRA HERMENEUTICAL KEYS
<p>20. legitimating by origins (shared values), and by results (control of resources)</p> <p>21. signs of evolution and decline of a regime</p> <p>22. domain of habit</p> <p>23. education</p> <p>24. estimated majority</p> <p>25. a sense of resignation</p> <p>26. personal experience of the regime</p> <p>27. available information(mass media control)</p>


Index 02. Extra hermeneutical keys



Graphic 02. Indifference map

REJECTION	ACCEPTANCE		OBJECTION
	BY FEAR	BY HABIT	
	FEAR		
		SHARED VALUES	SHARED VALUES
SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP		SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP	SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE			SIGNIFICANT OTHER ENEMY
			PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
		MASS MEDIA	MASS MEDIA
CONTROL OF RESOURCES		CONTROL OF RESOURCES	CONTROL OF RESOURCES
	RESIGNATION-FORMER POLITICAL FAILURE OR INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE OR TRAUMATIZED COLLECTIVITY OR TRAUMAS (natural disaster etc)		

Graphic 04. To be filled using indexes 01 and 02.



Graphic 03. Hermeneutical keys distributed per indifference area (rejection-acceptance-objection)

History Magazine

ERASMUS+, LESSONS FOR PRESENT, LESSONS FOR FUTURE

SUMMER 2016

LETS TALK ABOUT HISTOPIA

INDIFFERENCE CASES
1936-1941

Short political history of Histopia

The period of Histopia's history that interests us starts almost 90 years after its independence. Histopia started as a small geographical entity struggling to survive economically and expand its borders. Concerning the second aim first in 1864 and then again in 1881 Histopia expanded its territory significantly, but the idea of liberating all places inhabited from Histopians in big numbers remained the basic political and ideological orientation.

For almost 25 years Histopia was involved in political and military actions trying to incorporate Krete and Macedonia. In 1897 a traumatic war defeat caused the financial collapse of the country, making it seem almost like a miracle how 15 years later both Krete and Macedonia were parts of Histopia along with Epirus. World War I brought new troubles since political and military administration was divided concerning the formal stand of Histopia. Should the country stand by Entente or should it stay neutral?

That question triggered the Great Division (1915) which finally took the proportions of a ruthless civil war for 2 years (1916-17) and ended with Venizelos in head of the winning side and King Konstantinos exiled. Soon after his win Venizelos led Histopian forces to the borders of the national dream that haunted the country for decades. The disaster followed was as huge as the dream itself. The evacuation of Histopian army in 1922 left over 1 million dead and as many as 1,5 million refugees. Histopia by that time had a population of 4,5 million. Most of the refugees inhabited the two major cities of Histopia, Athens and Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki was a city with over half its population Jewish, part of Histopia for just 10 years and a real bone of contention for neighbor states around Histopia.

The years after the refugee flood a titanic effort took place for the relief, accommodation and rehabilitation of the refugees, although not within ideal sociopolitical conditions. Native Histopian families had also suffered hundreds of thousands of dead or wounded soldiers. The healing process needed time for both sides, but the truth is that a psychological schism tantalized Histopian society until 1940.

Political situation was anything but helpful as the following timeline presents emphatically.

- 1924, 25 March: Histopia is proclaimed a republic. Pavlos Kountouriotis becomes the first President of Histopia.
- 1924, 13 April: A plebiscite condones the change of constitution.
- 1924, 7 October: Failed military coup.
- 1925, 15 March: Successful coup directed by General Theodoros Pangalos. President Pavlos Kountouriotis resigns.
- 1926, 23 August: General Pangalos is overthrown after a coup. Caretaker government of Georgios Kondylis.
- 1928: Venizelos returns from exile and his Liberals win power again.
- 1933, March: Failed pro-Venezelist coup.
- 1933, 6 June: Second assassination attempt against Venizelos in Athens.
- 1935, March: Failed coup directed by Venizelos and Nikolaos Plastiras. Venizelos flees in France and dies in Paris the next year, the armed forces are purged of Venizelist and Republican officers.
- 1935, 10 October: Coup directed by Georgios Kondylis abolishes the Republic, confirmed by a rigged plebiscite later the same year.

During 1934 several major strikes took place in October 1935, C. Kondylis and Al. Papagos overturned threw K.. Tsaldari and imposed an autocratic royalist regime. Immediately (16 / 11.20.35) the new government issued Emergency Law to refer any industrial dispute to an arbitration procedure and prohibited any strike with heavy effects (reduction of payment, imprisonment, dismissal etc.) for offenders. In response to the imprisonments and exiles the Left organized general political hunger strike and nationwide protests in December.

- 1935, 3 November: George II is restored to the throne.

King George, commissioned the formation of a provisional government to the jurist Constantine Demertzi on November 30, 1935. The country was led to new elections on January 26, 1936, but their effect was to tie the 143 seats among Venizelist Themistocles Sofouli and Republicans of Panayi Tsaldari. The Communists with 15 seats had been buffering agents, but disagreements between political leaders did not allow to form a government, despite lobbying contacts between Themistocles Sofoulis and the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Stelios Sklavainas. The tragic cycle of fateful deaths started from the first month of 1936, with George Kondylis, who died on January 31st, five days after the conducted elections. The ongoing interventions of the Army in political developments forced King George to remove the Military Minister Alexandros Papagos and appoint in his place Ioannis Metaxas, on March 5th.

The Demertzi government renewed its mandate on March 14, 1936, because parliament parties still couldn't agree on forming a government. On March 18, 1936 Venizelos died exiled in Paris. His body was transferred to Chania and not in Athens, after fierce opponents reactions. Third in the series of deaths, Prime Minister Konstantinos Demertzis left this vain

world on April 13, 1936. King George, without consulting the parties, entrusted the formation of a government to Metaxas. The government appeared to Parliament on April 27, 1936 and got confidence or tolerance vote to rule until parties agreed on forming a government. Only Communists and George Papandreou voted against him. The rest voted for. Meanwhile, fourth in a row, Panagis Tsaldaris died of a heart attack on May 17th. The death of Tsaldaris particular gave Metaxas the opportunity to present himself more as the undisputed leader of the anti-Venizelists' world, cancelling partly any reaction to his plans. The four deaths, left the country without personalities capable to oppose the Metaxas plans.

1936, 4 August: Coup by General Ioannis Metaxas, who declares a state of emergency, decrees martial law, annuls various articles of the Constitution and establishes a crisis cabinet to end the increasing riots and to restore social order.

The day after September 18, 1936, the dictatorship of August 4 issued the Emergency Law 117 "on measures to combating communism and his consequences." This law came to replace the Law 4229 / 25.07.1929 "On security measures of social status and protection of citizens' 'freedoms', the notorious "Idionimon", which was voted in 1929 from Venizelos government. In reality, of course, both legislations came from the same matrix, the matrix of anti-communism that made these two politicians -the democratic Venizelos and the dictator Metaxas- look like two drops of water.

The responsibilities and powers of Metaxas were restricted in the fields of foreign policy, military and youth by the king's powers. The role of Metaxas in the first two sectors remained until 1941 complementary. During the regime (1936-1941) there were two distinct (tangent but not concentric) political power poles with centers the King and the dictator. During the first two years, the balance system of power tilted toward the first pole and we can talk about a royal dictatorship. Since September 1938 the royal powers and initiatives were limited and the status could fully determined as Metaxas dictatorship.

Relations between the two strong men (King and Metaxas) emerged (unseen) competitive predominantly in the youth education field. In November 1936 the National Youth Organization (EON) was founded, which aimed at creating the massive popular support that the regime lacked. Through the ranks of EON the regime would seek, in the future, dedicated persons to staff the state agencies . The State pursued through EON to create a "truly independent, responsible and selfless leader class" a "national political aristocracy", which would lead the Nation to "new cultural achievements" all based to the triptych "Homeland, religion, family" perhaps the most widespread "motto" of modern Histopian history connected with dominant ideology and over time following very complex paths from 1880 to 1930.

EON members wore dark blue uniforms and dikochos (special hat), and were separated according to age in pioneers (7-13 years), phalangites B (14-18) and phalangites A (19-25). In December 1937, also in Athens, after the initiative of Mr. Kotzias, the Labor Battalions were founded, a paramilitary organization (approximately 400 persons with gray uniforms) following the Nazi model. The Labor Battalions were typically formed for the exploitation of the unemployed in public works, but actually aimed at functioning the praetorians' guard. Their action, however, was short-lived and practically did not exceed the limits of picturesque. On June 9, 1938 the Labor Battalions were abolished after Metaxas's decision and their members joined EON. Some of them trying to fit best in their new organization –some of them were over 30 years old- dedicated themselves in witch-hunting for regime enemies. In many cases the accusations were products of imagination or personal hatred.

The truth is that Metaxas had no trouble to control the press. Most of the newspaper owners and editors (even those who had previously criticized Metaxas) served with great pleasure the interests of the regime from the first day. After all, business was growing fast due to Metaxas's Emergency Law 23/36, of August 19, 1936, by which serious benefits were granted to the owners and editors of newspapers in exchange for full cooperation and unreserved support.

The only resistance expressed by the press, except for Rizospastis, was some illegal, minimum in number, non-communist, newspapers. The illegal organization "Society of Friends" (Filiki Etaireia) was founded in November 1937 and released three secret papers: "Freedom", with six issues, "the Constitution", with five issues and the Democrat, the first issue of which was printed, but was seized before the release. The organization adopted also the newspaper "Herald", which first issue was seized before its release too. Those publications were part of resistance activities from ex-Venizelists. Their greatest moment, the attempted coup of 1938, was an epic failure. Another newspaper, the "Flame" (Floga) was first published in 1937 by the Anti-dictatorship Youth Front (AMN) and continued to be issued until September 1938. By that time, only an illegal communist youth organization, OKNE, was kept on the anti-dictatorship publishing effort.

The weak press resistance to the regime was partly a result of police work. Central figure on this field of the government was Konstantinos Maniadakis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Μανιαδάκης) notorious as the formidably efficient head of the internal Security Services of the 4th of August Regime (1936–1941). The newly established Secretary of State had all the security forces in the country under its jurisdiction (the Royal Gendarmerie, the Police, the Fire Department and the Directorate of Immigration and Passports) and was entrusted with one of the basic functions of Metaxas's government: to

fight Communism and detect foreign spies (especially those from Italy, Bulgaria and later on, Germany and Britain). Under the supervision of Maniadakis, the Gendarmerie force increased, the City Police by 20% – free from political interference and partisan considerations. These also boomed the Political Police (the Histopian equivalent to the Gestapo, which increased its staff to 445 officers and non-commissioned officers up to 1,200 agents. The headquarters of the Special Security in Athens during the dictatorship of August 4th was a building with labyrinthine corridors, basements and offices at the junction of September 3rd number 106 and Derigny. Many communists and democratic citizens were tortured or even murdered in that building, as the veteran communist Nikos Valianatos on August 9th, 1938. From there many communists took the road to the exile mostly to islands of the Aegean Sea, like Anafi and Ai-Stratis, or places like Akronafplia for political prisoners.

- 1937, 15 December: Mass NKVD operation against Histopians in the USSR begins, based on Joseph Stalin's Directive 50125 of Dec. 1937, resulting in the loss of 38,000 Soviet citizens of Histopian descent at the Gulags of Siberia.
- 1940, 28 October: After the dictator Ioannis Metaxas rejects an Italian ultimatum demanding the occupation of Histopian territory, Italian forces invade Histopia. Beginning of the Histopio-Italian War.

After communism, a new, totally external enemy had emerged. And again even more than communism the external threat gave Metaxas the opportunity to increase social coherence around the regime. Anybody seems willing to tolerate something bad, if to avoid something worst.

You need also to use these:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_of_Greece

<http://metaxas-project.com/greek-fascist-youth-eon/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_name

2016-04

of El. he. les. el. if. nd. ty. om. ur.

TOP SECRET

**EYES
ONLY**

ACTIVE CASE FILE 2016-04

NAME

William L. Brown Jr.

Card No.

- EVIDENCE -

Case No.: 2016-04

Description of Enclosed Evidence: _____

Submitting Agency: ERASMUS+ HISTORY Dpt.

Telephone Number: classified

Evidence Recovered By: Research Team
(print name)

Victim's Full Name: no victim case

Suspect's Full Name: _____

Envelope Sealed By: Greek Office
(print name)

28th High School of Thessaloniki
(signature)

Date Sealed: 30/7/2016 Time Sealed: 23:54 am
pm

EVIDENCE 0403


“ I stayed in Athens . My business was here. I stayed and I worked hard. I always believed that money keep thing going and I most certainly had no hero complex. My duty was to my family.

Besides that I never had any special connections with the regime. It was business as always before and after. I had never given information about others, even if I had chances to undermine some of my competitors”.

Spoken testimony for a history research program, 1977.




EVIDENCE 0404





EVIDENCE 0406

EVIDENCE 0402



Α'
ΤΟ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΝ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΟΝ

Ι.-Ο ΘΕΣΜΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΕΝΩΣΕΩΝ ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΩΝ

Ἀκολουθοῦν τὸ Ὑπουργεῖον Ἑθνικῆς Οἰκονομίας τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀρχηγοῦ τῆς Κυβερνήσεως καθορισθείσας γενικὰς γραμ-
μὰς ἐσωτερικῆς καὶ ἐξωτερικῆς πολιτικῆς, ἐπεζητήσεν, ὅχι μό-
νον νὰ μὴ ὑποστῇ ζημίας ὁ τό-
πος ἐκ τῆς διεθνούς κρίσεως,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελήματα ν' ἀντλή-
σῃ. Ὁφελήματα μάλιστα, τὰ
ὁποῖα πρόκειται ν' ἀποτελέσουν καὶ διὰ τὸ μέλλον—τὸ εἰρη-
κὸν—μόνον πλέον κατάστασιν. Καὶ ἰδοὺ πῶς:

Διὰ ποῖα εἶδη ἰδρύθησαν Ἑνώσεις Εἰσαγωγῶν.

Εὐθὺς ὅμα τῇ ἐκρήξει τοῦ Ἑρωπαϊκοῦ πολέμου καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ προβλέψει τῶν τεραστίων ἀναγκῶν, αἰτίνας ἤθελον ἐν καιρῷ δημιουργηθῇ διὰ τὴν Χώραν εἰς πρώτας ὁδὰς, εἰς καύσιμα καὶ εἰς εἶδη πρώτης ἀνάγκης, ἡ Ἑθνικὴ Κυβέρνησις τῆς 4ης Αὐγού-
στου, διὰ τοῦ ἀρμοδίου Ὑπουργεῖου Ἑθνικῆς Οἰκονομίας, ἔλαβε
σειράν μέτρων, ὅπως ἐξακολουθῇ ἀπρόσκοπτος ὁ ἐφοδιασμός
τῆς Χώρας.

Πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξεδόθη ὁ Α. Ν. 1960, διὰ τοῦ ὁποῖου ἐξουσιο-
δοτήθη ὁ Ὑπουργός τῆς Ἑθνικῆς Οἰκονομίας ὅπως, διὰ πρᾶ-
ξεών του, ἰδρῇ μεταξὺ τῶν εἰσαγωγῶν Ἑνώσεις, δι' ὧν ἀπο-
κλειστικῶς θὰ ἐνεργοῦνται αἱ εἰσαγωγαί. Τοιαῦται Ἑνώσεις
ἰδρύθησαν διὰ τὰ ἑξῆς εἶδη: Γαϊάνθρακας, ὄρυζαν, ὄσπρια, ζάκ-
χαριν, καφὲν καὶ βακαλάον.

Ἐν προκειμένῳ, ἡ Κυβέρνησις ἀπέσπευεν νὰ ἐνεργήσει

πλεονεκτήματα, ἐκ τῶν ὁποίων, ἄξια ἰδιαίτερας μνείας εἶναι
τὰ ἑξῆς:

α) Δὲν ἠχρηστεύθησαν οἱ παράγοντες τοῦ εἰσαγωγικοῦ ἐμ-
πορίου, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον ἐχρησιμοποιήθησαν κατὰ τὸν καλλίτε-
ρον τρόπον, ὡς ἀρμοδιώτεροι παντός ἄλλου, εἰς τὴν ὑπὸ τὴν
κρατικὴν καθοδήγησιν πραγματοποιήσιν τῶν εἰσαγωγῶν.

β) Δὲν ἐχρησιμοποιήθησαν κεφάλαια ἐκ τοῦ Δημοσίου Τα-
μείου, τῶν ἀπαιτούμενων τοιοῦτων καταβληθέντων ἐξ ὁλοκλή-
ρου ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαρτισάντων τὰς Ἑνώσεις εἰσαγωγῶν, συνάμα
δὲ οὐδεμίαν εὐθὺνὴν ἀνέλαβε τὸ Κράτος διὰ τὰς τυχόν ζημίας
τῶν ἰδρυθεισῶν Ἑνώσεων.

γ) Αἱ ἀγοραὶ ἐν τῷ Ἑξωτερικῷ τῶν διαφόρων εἰδῶν ὑπὸ
τῶν Ἑνώσεων ἐνεργοῦνται εἰς μεγάλας ποσότητας ὑπὸ ἐνός
καὶ μόνον ἀγοραστοῦ, κατόπιν ἐλευθέρου συναγωνισμοῦ, ἐπιτυγ-
χανομένων οὕτω χαμηλοτέρων τιμῶν ἀπὸ ἐκείνας, τὰς ὁποίας
θὰ ἐπραγματοποιεῖ εἰς ἑκάστος μεμονωμένος εἰσαγωγέας.

δ) Ἡ μεταφορά καὶ ἀσφάλισις τῶν ἀγοραζομένων εἰδῶν
πραγματοποιεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦς εὐνοϊκωτέρους ὁρους, διὰ τῆς ναυ-
λώσεως ἰδιαίτερων ἀτμοπλοίων καὶ τῆς ἀσφαλείας συνολικῶς
τοῦ φορτίου ἐνός ἐκάστου.

ε) Ἀνὰ πᾶσαν στιγμὴν εἶναι γνωστὰ εἰς τὸ Κράτος τὰ ἀπο-
θέματα τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑνώσεων εἰσαγομένων εἰδῶν, τὰ ἐν πλῶ
ἐμπορεύματα καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ ἐκτέλεσιν παραγγελίαι, ὥστε νὰ παρέ-
χεται οὕτω ἡ εὐχέρεια εἰς τὸ Κράτος νὰ ρυθμίσῃ, ἀναλόγως τῶν
ἐκάστοτε δεδομένων, τὰ τῆς εἰσαγωγῆς καὶ διαθέσεως ἐκάστου
εἶδους.

στ) Ἀποκλείεται ἐντελῶς ἡ δημιουργία κερδοσκοπικοῦ πνεύ-
ματος καὶ πολεμικῶν κερδῶν, τοῦ Κράτους ὄντος εἰς θέσιν νὰ
γνωρίζῃ ἐν πάσῃ λεπτομερείᾳ τὸ ἀκριβὲς κόστος τῶν εἰσαγο-
μένων ἐμπορευμάτων κατ'ἐκάστην συγκεκριμένην εἰσαγωγήν, καὶ

ζ) Ἐπιτυγχάνεται αὐτομάτως ἡ δίκαια κατανομή τῶν
εἰσαγομένων ἐμπορευμάτων μεταξὺ τῶν εἰσαγωγῶν καὶ διοχε-
τεύονται συμμετρικῶς τὰ εἰσαγόμενα ἐμπορεύματα εἰς τὰς δια-
φόρους ἀγορὰς καταναλώσεως ἐν τῇ Χώρᾳ.

EVIDENCE 0407



AC 20-3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF AIR COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

IDENTIFICATION CARD NO.

APRIL 13 1938

This identification card issued on to **ANTONIS PANEILLAS** accompanies and is a part of Certificate of Competency bearing the same number.

The terms of this certificate include each and every provision of the currently effective Civil Air Regulations issued by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to law.

Unless sooner suspended or revoked, this certificate shall be kept until taken up by a Bureau of Air Commerce Inspector.

Antonios Panellas
SIGNATURE OF HOLDER

Robert K. Keining
CHIEF, REGISTRATION SECTION

By direction of the Secretary of Commerce

identification card is punishable by fine or imprisonment.

EVIDENCE 0401

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	FOREIGN
TELEGRAM	FULL RATE CABLE
DAY LETTER	DEFERRED CABLE
NIGHT MESSAGE	NIGHT CABLE LETTER
NIGHT LETTER	RADIOGRAM
SHIP RADIOGRAM	

Postal Telegraph

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Commercial Cables Mackay Radio

RECEIVER'S NUMBER

CHECK

R1 DKN.

STANDARD TIME

PATRONS SHOULD CHECK CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED. OTHERWISE MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED AS A FULL-RATE COMMUNICATION.

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

N TWS PAID 3 MINS=PLS LOSANGELES CALIF 1227P JUL 14 1937

LESTER SHURR=PDKM= ✕

MADE DEFINITE OFFER HOPE SIX WEEKS MINIMUM

GUARANTEE STARTING SEPTEMBER

PLEASE THIS IS THE GREAT

OPPORTUNITY HE HAS BEEN WAITING FOR

WE CANT AFFORD TO LOSE THIS PROMPSITION

EVIDENCE 0405

INFO ABOUT EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE 0401 Personal document

EVIDENCE 0402 Financial edition

EVIDENCE 0403 Spoken testimony

EVIDENCE 0404 Address

EVIDENCE 0405 Telegraph from subject's brother

EVIDENCE 0406 Photo in a family album. Noted behind "George, Akronafplia, 1936"

EVIDENCE 0407 Page from the formal review of regime's achievements about import-export economy. In the second paragraph it is written that with special law the government establishes Import Unions for the items below: coal, rise, sugar, coffee, legume and hake. Those Unions were in full prosperity that period, despite the world economy crisis.

CASE FILE

2016-0_

NAME: Panellas Antonis

AGE : 1897-1967

EDUCATION: Commercial
College

PROFESSION: Importer of
sugar

ADRESS: Kolonaki


FAMILY INFO: 2 kids

EVIDENCES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

INFO EXTRACTED BY RESEARCH:

NARRATION:

CASE SOLUTION:



TEAM 5 PACK

- Set 0
- Set 1
- History Magazine
- Case cover
- Evidence Registration form
- Evidences
- Info about evidences
- Solution file

I was the only one of my family members who hadn't fought until the civil war. My grandfather fought at the Balkan wars (1912-1913) as a volunteer at the support department. My father was at Smyrna (during the Turkish-Greek war 1919-1922) and my two older brothers fought at Pindos (during the Italian-Greek war 1940-41). They are both dead. They died a hero's death (1). But we did not seem to catch a break. Some royalists in Halkidiki were causing trouble until 1935. Consider the Schism, you know Thessaloniki was the starting point of Venizelos, and the refugees that flooded in the streets of Thessaloniki (1922-1924) after the collapse of Asia Minor front. Things cooled off a bit with Metaxas. I was at EON for three years (2). We organized parades, dances, we worked all together for a good cause, raised money for Philoptochos and more. We were put in order.

1. Recent historical traumas
2. Relevant political ideology

We had enough of the democrats all these years. They only organized movements and people had no money (3). Personally, I didn't like the English and French long ago. I liked the Germans more, as I heard about the miracles that they made at their country (6). And Metaxas, had the country running fluently, that's what I liked about him (4). After April 1941 there was nothing to hold on to. Who would you listen to? The mayor already welcomed them at our city's entrance. I remember him saying that we should trust them (7).

3. Failure of political forces
6. Ideological relevance to totalitarian and fascist ideology
4. The experience of basic politics, security
7. Institutional collapse (officialdom, security forces)

My family had money in the past. My grandfather was a fabric merchant. Later, some Jewish shops opened near his and they shut his down. Jews were united and supported each other. That's how Jews are. Not like us. They knew how to control the market better than anyone. Money is their God, you know. We Greeks were against them very often in the city (10). We waited for something to happen, so that we felt that time was right. Maybe if the Germans started losing the war. No one expected that the situation would last so long (8). As I told you, we had been through a lot, due to political reasons (5). All I could think was what would my kids eat the very next day (12). The first two years were extremely difficult. People that lived at villages didn't starve as we did at Thessaloniki.

10. The significant other victim
8. The idea that the situation cannot be but temporary.
5. Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivalry in local, communal, economic or political fields)
- 12 Fear and instinctive defense.

I didn't climb the mountains to take part to resistance. Why should I? To help the communists? (9). But, we didn't wear that hood, even though we knew at which houses the insurgents were hiding (14). In 1942 I was called at the Administration Building and asked to take over the representation of the employees in the municipality cleaning service. I accepted. I thought that I could help put this city in order (16), (13). I knew the job better than most of people there. One could easily blame me, but I was not a collaborator. What could I do anyway? I had never fought, and, as I said before, my first priority was to help my family. Why would I pretend to be a hero? (18) In the end, the Germans didn't trouble us. At least, they didn't ever trouble me or my family. One time I even asked for the working hours to change. Even if I was arguing with them, they listened to me and in the end they offered us the hours that we wanted. (15)

How do you interpret passivity?

It is important to take under consideration a number of parameters, before any attempt to study indifference. What kind of a regime we are dealing with? (see **graphic 01**). The **duration of a regime** is a crucial factor for what studies call **reflective self**. It describes the assimilation of external tenets of a regime towards legitimating as personal, transformed and transforming material. We must separate two stages of **legitimizing** a regime, first **on terms of origins**, then **of results**. Although, most of the regimes of such kind control information about their achievements, they usually end up trying to secure a gap between promises and realization, because even for sacrifices made in the name of a better future there has been a limit to people's patience. A crucial parameter is also the **control of resources** as a tool of political obedience (welfare dictatorship – political repression by the regime, social provision through the regime). Apart from that, there are always **shared values** to which the regime could always appeal in the name of a great(er) social goal. And of course, all regimes show **signs of evolution and decline**, phases like dynamism, stagnation and entropy, mainly caused by **corruption, opportunism and poor quality recruitment**. One of the strategies of "totalitarian" regimes is to have so severe legal regulations (criminal laws) that, if taken literally, everyone is guilty of something, and then to withdraw from their full enforcement. In this way, the regime can appear merciful and at the same time wield a permanent threat to discipline its subjects. In any case, belonging to a society involves a paradoxical point at which each of us is ordered to embrace freely, as result of our choice, what is anyway imposed on us (we all must love our country or our parents).

Part of the answer lays down to what we could call **domain of habit**. To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not use them; when to violate them; when not to use a choice which is offered; when we are effectively obliged to do something, but have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice. The same goes for many political situations in which a choice is given on condition that we make the right choice: we are solemnly reminded that we can say no - but we are expected to reject this offer and enthusiastically say yes. **Habits are thus the very stuff our identities are made of**: in them, we enact and thus define what we effectively are as social beings, often in contrast with our perception of what we are - in their very transparency, they are the medium of social violence, and so at any case (resistance-indifference-collaboration) we need to be careful. Such an **institutional Unconscious** sustains the public institution repulsing a sense of chaos. Major influence in forming both the domain of habit and consequently our institutional unconscious comes from **education**. Another key for our approach is the importance of a measure called **"estimated majority"**, meaning the

9. Luck of trustworthy resistance proposal

14. The moral excuse of non collaboration

16. We need some order in this chaos

13. The idea of being law abiding

18. I am all alone, my actions would be a mere suicide and totally useless

15. They didn't give me any trouble

feeling people have about how the majority thinks. We also know from historical figures and tables how political support has increased in totalitarian regimes because of **a sense of resignation**.

So, even in conditions of heavy repressive domination some kind of private space continued to exist permitting the formation of something legitimately called **popular opinion**, recognized by the regime. In conditions of silence, "frightened" by this loss of control a totalitarian regime usually institutes a spy network, not only to achieve suppression but also to search for legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Little sense is given to Manichean questions of whether people were "for" or "against" the solutions provided from the regime. Speaking about dedicated friends and committed opponents somebody "risks being telling a story of two minorities". People "in the middle" had a far more complex perspective over their experience, changeable through time and over different aspects of the same regime. Popular attitudes were formed basically based on **personal experience of the regime** and **available information** (mass media control). It is only a projection of modern individualistic liberal conception of choice the one often reflected upon totalitarian regimes. For example people in southern Italy even before Fascism were little concerned about what they should vote. But, let's return to the challenge of analyzing indifference.

Methodological – hermeneutical keys	Historical material
<p><u>Sociopolitical</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Recent historical traumas (historically documented) Relevant political axon Political failure The experience of basic politics - security Tradition of resistance Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivals in local or communal or economic or political fields) Near the edge – ideological relevance in parts of a totalitarian or fascist or extremist theory Institutional collapse (religion , officialdom , security forces) The idea of a provisional situation Lack of a trustworthy resistance proposal The significant “other” victim (cases that the victim has formerly negative relations with the passive mass) Lack of spiritual leadership (intellectuals, religion leaders) <p><u>Personal-psychological</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The prudential postponement (cases of late enlistment) Instinctive defense (survival priorities) The idea of been legitimate , structural personality effect The moral excuse of non collaboration They didn’t hurt me We need some order to this chaos It’ s not my duty to save the world 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> I. Public Documents II. Maps III. Photos IV. Literary texts V. Spoken testimonies VI. Demographics VII. Newspapers VIII. Letters IX. Personal archives X. Posters XI. Personal items XII. Topographical data XIII, Telegraphs XIV. Cards, post carts XV. Building information

Index 01. Hermeneutical keys and categories of historical material

EXTRA HERMENEUTICAL KEYS
<p>20. legitimating by origins (shared values), and by results (control of resources)</p> <p>21. signs of evolution and decline of a regime</p> <p>22. domain of habit</p> <p>23. education</p> <p>24. estimated majority</p> <p>25. a sense of resignation</p> <p>26. personal experience of the regime</p> <p>27. available information(mass media control)</p>


Index 02. Extra hermeneutical keys



Graphic 02. Indifference map

REJECTION	ACCEPTANCE		OBJECTION
	BY FEAR	BY HABIT	
	FEAR		SHARED VALUES
		SHARED VALUES	SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP
SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP		SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP	SIGNIFICANT OTHER ENEMY
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE			PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
	MASS MEDIA		MASS MEDIA
CONTROL OF RESOURCES		CONTROL OF RESOURCES	CONTROL OF RESOURCES
	RESIGNATION-FORMER POLITICAL FAILURE OR INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE OR TRAUMATIZED COLLECTIVITY OR TRAUMAS (natural disaster etc)		

Graphic 04. To be filled using indexes 01 and 02.



Graphic 03. Hermeneutical keys distributed per indifference area (rejection-acceptance-objection)

History Magazine

ERASMUS+ , LESSONS FOR PRESENT, LESSONS FOR FUTURE

SUMMER 2016

LETS TALK ABOUT HISTOPIA

INDIFFERENCE CASES
1936-1941

Short political history of Histopia

The period of Histopia's history that interests us starts almost 90 years after its independence. Histopia started as a small geographical entity struggling to survive economically and expand its borders. Concerning the second aim first in 1864 and then again in 1881 Histopia expanded its territory significantly, but the idea of liberating all places inhabited from Histopians in big numbers remained the basic political and ideological orientation.

For almost 25 years Histopia was involved in political and military actions trying to incorporate Krete and Macedonia. In 1897 a traumatic war defeat caused the financial collapse of the country, making it seem almost like a miracle how 15 years later both Krete and Macedonia were parts of Histopia along with Epirus. World War I brought new troubles since political and military administration was divided concerning the formal stand of Histopia. Should the country stand by Entente or should it stay neutral?

That question triggered the Great Division (1915) which finally took the proportions of a ruthless civil war for 2 years (1916-17) and ended with Venizelos in head of the winning side and King Konstantinos exiled. Soon after his win Venizelos led Histopian forces to the borders of the national dream that haunted the country for decades. The disaster followed was as huge as the dream itself. The evacuation of Histopian army in 1922 left over 1 million dead and as many as 1,5 million refugees. Histopia by that time had a population of 4,5 million. Most of the refugees inhabited the two major cities of Histopia, Athens and Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki was a city with over half its population Jewish, part of Histopia for just 10 years and a real bone of contention for neighbor states around Histopia.

The years after the refugee flood a titanic effort took place for the relief, accommodation and rehabilitation of the refugees, although not within ideal sociopolitical conditions. Native Histopian families had also suffered hundreds of thousands of dead or wounded soldiers. The healing process needed time for both sides, but the truth is that a psychological schism tantalized Histopian society until 1940.

Political situation was anything but helpful as the following timeline presents emphatically.

- 1924, 25 March: Histopia is proclaimed a republic. Pavlos Kountouriotis becomes the first President of Histopia.
- 1924, 13 April: A plebiscite condones the change of constitution.
- 1924, 7 October: Failed military coup.
- 1925, 15 March: Successful coup directed by General Theodoros Pangalos. President Pavlos Kountouriotis resigns.
- 1926, 23 August: General Pangalos is overthrown after a coup. Caretaker government of Georgios Kondylis.
- 1928: Venizelos returns from exile and his Liberals win power again.
- 1933, March: Failed pro-Venezelist coup.
- 1933, 6 June: Second assassination attempt against Venizelos in Athens.
- 1935, March: Failed coup directed by Venizelos and Nikolaos Plastiras. Venizelos flees in France and dies in Paris the next year, the armed forces are purged of Venizelist and Republican officers.
- 1935, 10 October: Coup directed by Georgios Kondylis abolishes the Republic, confirmed by a rigged plebiscite later the same year.

During 1934 several major strikes took place in October 1935, C. Kondylis and Al. Papagos overturned threw K. Tsaldari and imposed an autocratic royalist regime. Immediately (16 / 11.20.35) the new government issued Emergency Law to refer any industrial dispute to an arbitration procedure and prohibited any strike with heavy effects (reduction of payment, imprisonment, dismissal etc.) for offenders. In response to the imprisonments and exiles the Left organized general political hunger strike and nationwide protests in December.

- 1935, 3 November: George II is restored to the throne.

King George, commissioned the formation of a provisional government to the jurist Constantine Demertzi on November 30, 1935. The country was led to new elections on January 26, 1936, but their effect was to tie the 143 seats among Venizelist Themistocles Sofouli and Republicans of Panayi Tsaldari. The Communists with 15 seats had been buffering agents, but disagreements between political leaders did not allow to form a government, despite lobbying contacts between Themistocles Sofoulis and the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Stelios Sklavainas. The tragic cycle of fateful deaths started from the first month of 1936, with George Kondylis, who died on January 31st, five days after the conducted elections. The ongoing interventions of the Army in political developments forced King George to remove the Military Minister Alexandros Papagos and appoint in his place Ioannis Metaxas, on March 5th.

The Demertzi government renewed its mandate on March 14, 1936, because parliament parties still couldn't agree on forming a government. On March 18, 1936 Venizelos died exiled in Paris. His body was transferred to Chania and not in Athens, after fierce opponents reactions. Third in the series of deaths, Prime Minister Konstantinos Demertzis left this vain world on April 13, 1936. King George, without consulting the parties, entrusted the formation of a government to Metaxas.

The government appeared to Parliament on April 27, 1936 and got confidence or tolerance vote to rule until parties agreed on forming a government. Only Communists and George Papandreou voted against him. The rest voted for. Meanwhile, fourth in a row, Panagis Tsaldaris died of a heart attack on May 17th. The death of Tsaldaris particular gave Metaxas the opportunity to present himself more as the undisputed leader of the anti-Venizelists' world, cancelling partly any reaction to his plans. The four deaths, left the country without personalities capable to oppose the Metaxas plans.

1936, 4 August: Coup by General Ioannis Metaxas, who declares a state of emergency, decrees martial law, annuls various articles of the Constitution and establishes a crisis cabinet to end the increasing riots and to restore social order.

The day after September 18, 1936, the dictatorship of August 4 issued the Emergency Law 117 "on measures to combating communism and his consequences." This law came to replace the Law 4229 / 25.07.1929 "On security measures of social status and protection of citizens' 'freedoms', the notorious "Idionimon", which was voted in 1929 from Venizelos government. In reality, of course, both legislations came from the same matrix, the matrix of anti-communism that made these two politicians -the democratic Venizelos and the dictator Metaxas- look like two drops of water.

The responsibilities and powers of Metaxas were restricted in the fields of foreign policy, military and youth by the king's powers. The role of Metaxas in the first two sectors remained until 1941 complementary. During the regime (1936-1941) there were two distinct (tangent but not concentric) political power poles with centers the King and the dictator. During the first two years, the balance system of power tilted toward the first pole and we can talk about a royal dictatorship. Since September 1938 the royal powers and initiatives were limited and the status could fully determined as Metaxas dictatorship.

Relations between the two strong men (King and Metaxas) emerged (unseen) competitive predominantly in the youth education field. In November 1936 the National Youth Organization (EON) was founded, which aimed at creating the massive popular support that the regime lacked. Through the ranks of EON the regime would seek, in the future, dedicated persons to staff the state agencies. The State pursued through EON to create a "truly independent, responsible and selfless leader class" a "national political aristocracy", which would lead the Nation to "new cultural achievements" all based to the triptych "Homeland, religion, family" perhaps the most widespread "motto" of modern Hellenic history connected with dominant ideology and over time following very complex paths from 1880 to 1930.

EON members wore dark blue uniforms and *dikoko* (special hat), and were separated according to age in pioneers (7-13 years), phalangites B (14-18) and phalangites A (19-25). In December 1937, also in Athens, after the initiative of Mr. Kotzias, the Labor Battalions were founded, a paramilitary organization (approximately 400 persons with gray uniforms) following the Nazi model. The Labor Battalions were typically formed for the exploitation of the unemployed in public works, but actually aimed at functioning the praetorians' guard. Their action, however, was short-lived and practically did not exceed the limits of picturesque. On June 9, 1938 the Labor Battalions were abolished after Metaxas's decision and their members joined EON. Some of them trying to fit best in their new organization –some of them were over 30 years old- dedicated themselves in witch-hunting for regime enemies. In many cases the accusations were products of imagination or personal hatred.

The truth is that Metaxas had no trouble to control the press. Most of the newspaper owners and editors (even those who had previously criticized Metaxas) served with great pleasure the interests of the regime from the first day. After all, business was growing fast due to Metaxas's Emergency Law 23/36, of August 19, 1936, by which serious benefits were granted to the owners and editors of newspapers in exchange for full cooperation and unreserved support.

The only resistance expressed by the press, except for Rizospastis, was some illegal, minimum in number, non-communist, newspapers. The illegal organization "Society of Friends" (*Filiki Etaireia*) was founded in November 1937 and released three secret papers: "Freedom", with six issues, "the Constitution", with five issues and the Democrat, the first issue of which was printed, but was seized before the release. The organization adopted also the newspaper "Herald", which first issue was seized before its release too. Those publications were part of resistance activities from ex-Venizelists. Their greatest moment, the attempted coup of 1938, was an epic failure. Another newspaper, the "Flame" (*Floga*) was first published in 1937 by the Anti-dictatorship Youth Front (AMN) and continued to be issued until September 1938. By that time, only an illegal communist youth organization, OKNE, was kept on the anti-dictatorship publishing effort.

The weak press resistance to the regime was partly a result of police work. Central figure on this field of the government was Konstantinos Maniadakis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Μανιαδάκης) notorious as the formidably efficient head of the internal Security Services of the 4th of August Regime (1936–1941). The newly established Secretary of State had all the security forces in the country under its jurisdiction (the Royal Gendarmerie, the Police, the Fire Department and the Directorate of Immigration and Passports) and was entrusted with one of the basic functions of Metaxas's government: to fight Communism and detect foreign spies (especially those from Italy, Bulgaria and later on, Germany and Britain). Under the supervision of Maniadakis, the Gendarmerie force increased, the City Police by 20% – free from political interference

and partisan considerations. These also boomed the Political Police (the Histopian equivalent to the Gestapo, which increased its staff to 445 officers and non-commissioned officers up to 1,200 agents. The headquarters of the Special Security in Athens during the dictatorship of August 4th was a building with labyrinthine corridors, basements and offices at the junction of September 3rd number 106 and Derigny. Many communists and democratic citizens were tortured or even murdered in that building, as the veteran communist Nikos Valianatos on August 9th , 1938. From there many communists took the road to the exile mostly to islands of the Aegean Sea, like Anafi and Ai-Stratis, or places like Akronafplia for political prisoners.

- 1937, 15 December: Mass NKVD operation against Histopians in the USSR begins, based on Joseph Stalin's Directive 50125 of Dec. 1937, resulting in the loss of 38,000 Soviet citizens of Histopian descent at the Gulags of Siberia.
- 1940, 28 October: After the dictator Ioannis Metaxas rejects an Italian ultimatum demanding the occupation of Histopian territory, Italian forces invade Histopia. Beginning of the Histopio-Italian War.

After communism, a new, totally external enemy had emerged. And again even more than communism the external threat gave Metaxas the opportunity to increase social coherence around the regime. Anybody seems willing to tolerate something bad, if to avoid something worst.

You need also to use these:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_of_Greece

<http://metaxas-project.com/greek-fascist-youth-eon/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_name

2016-05

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TOP SECRET

**EYES
ONLY**

ACTIVE CASE FILE 2016-05

FOIA(b)(7)

Referred to: Bureau of

Case No.

- EVIDENCE -

Case No.: 2016-05

Description of Enclosed Evidence: _____

Submitting Agency: ERASMUS+ HISTORY Dpt.

Telephone Number: classified

Evidence Recovered By: Research Team
(print name)

Victim's Full Name: no victim case

Suspect's Full Name: _____

Envelope Sealed By: Greek Office
(print name)

28th High School of Thessaloniki
(signature)

Date Sealed: 30/7/2016 Time Sealed: 23:55 am
pm

ΑΥΤΟΓΡΑΦΟΝ ΤΟΥ Κ. ΒΕΝΙΖΕΛΟΥ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΚΛΟΓΕΙΣ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ-ΠΕΙΡΑΙΩΣ




Após isso, supõe-se Adversos e Repetidos

[illegible]

А. А. Гусев

Goodwin



Με βάση το παθρόν μας Θέο βράβευε την προσπάθειά σου.

(Continued on p. 74) (Continued on p. 74)

EVIDENCE 0503a

ΣΧΟΛΙΚΗ ΥΓΙΕΙΝΗ

ΠΕΡΙΟΔΙΚΟΝ ΠΑΙΔΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ & ΣΧΟΛΙΚΗΣ ΥΓΙΕΙΝΗΣ

ΕΚΔΙΔΕΤΑΙ ΜΕΤΑ ΜΗΝΑ ΥΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΙΔΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΥ ΚΕΝΤΡΟΥ ΕΡΕΥΝ. ΙΔ. Β. & ΤΗΣ 16 ΟΚΤΩΒΡΙΟΥ 1936

ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΤΑΙ ΕΙΣ ΟΛΑ ΤΑ ΣΧΟΛΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΔΙΑΔΟΣΙΝ ΤΩΝ ΓΝΩΣΕΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΠΑΙΔΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ & ΣΧΟΛΙΚΗΣ ΥΓΙΕΙΝΗΣ

ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΤΗΣ: ΔΗΜ. ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΥ
Καθηγητής Υγιεινής εν τη Παιδαγωγική 'Ακαδημία 'Αθηνών

ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΑ

- 1) ΔΡΟΘΟΝ ΔΙΕΤΩΝΣΕΩΣ: 'Η ὑγιεινή εἰς τὰ σχολεία.
- 2) ΕΜΜ. ΔΑΜΠΛΑΡΙΟΥ, Καθηγητὴς: 'Η προστασία τῆς ὑγιεινῆς τοῦ μαθητοῦ.
- 3) ΙΩ. ΠΑΤΡΙΚΙΟΥ: Αἱ παιδικαὶ ἀσθενεῖαι καὶ ἡ καταπολέμησις αὐτῶν.
- 4) ΔΗΜ. ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΥ: Τὰ μαθητικά σπορίδια.
- 5) ΚΩΝ. ΚΑΡΤΑΝΙΑ: Παρατηρήσεις καὶ συμπεράσματα ἐπὶ τῆς ὑγιεινῆς καταστάσεως τῶν μαθητῶν τῆς III 'Εκπαδ. Περιφερείας.
- 6) Τὰ σπορίδια τῆς προστασίας τοῦ μαθητοῦ (Dr. Pehul).
- 7) 'Υγιεινὴ τῆς οὐδοῦς (Dr. Delattre).
- 8) ΙΩ. ΚΥΑΤΕΛΛΗ: Πρακτικὴ ὑγιεινὴ ἐν τῇ σχολικῇ ζωῇ.
- 9) ΠΕ. ΒΛΑΒΕΤΑ: 'Η σημασία τῆς «Σχολικῆς 'Υγιεινῆς».
- 10) 'Οδοὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἀπὸ τῆς γυμναστικῆς.
- 11) Ἐξόφλησις: Ναι.

www.elia.org.gr

EVIDENCE 0506



EVIDENCE 0508



go.to/4thAugust

EVIDENCE 0503b



ΚΡΑΤΗΤΕ ΑΠΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΟΝ ΤΑ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑ ΤΟΥ ΤΙΤΛΟΥ ΔΕΛΤΙΑ ΔΙΑ ΝΑ ΠΑΡΕΤΕ ΤΑΣ ΒΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑΣ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ ΑΝΔΡΩΝ ΣΗΜΕΡΟΝ 6 ΣΕΛΙΔΕΣ

ΙΔΡΥΣΗ ΤΩ 1981
ΙΔΡΥΣΕΙΣ: ΔΑ. ΓΑΡΡΙΤΑΔΕ
ΔΕΥΤΕΡΗΣ - ΔΟΜΗΤΕΣ
ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ Σ. ΒΟΥΤΣΙΝΑΣ

ΑΚΡΟΠΟΛΙΣ

Η ΑΡΧΑΙΟΤΕΡΑ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΩΝ ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΔΩΝ

ΛΑΧΕΙΟΝ
200.000+200.000 ΑΡ.
(Το κομμάτι κοστίζει με το
πρόσθετο διπλόμισμο 100.000
πενταμισία και ένα
πενταμισία με το
πρόσθετο με το διπλόμισμο)

ΣΑΒΒΑΤΟΝ
1
ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟΥ 1936
Τετάρτη, 1 Σεπτεμβρίου
Αθήνα, 1936

ΑΘΗΝΑΙ ΕΤΟΣ Ν° ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ Β' ΑΡ. 474. 2517

ΓΡΑΦΕΙΑ ΟΔΟΣ ΣΤΑΣΙΟΥ 16, ΑΡ. ΤΗΛΕΦ. 20-138

Ο ΧΘΕΣΙΝΟΣ ΑΙΦΝΙΔΙΟΣ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΓΕΩΡΓ. ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗ

ΔΡΑΜΑΤΙΚΑΙ ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΙΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΑΠΡΟΟΠΤΟΥ ΕΚ ΣΥΓΚΟΠΗΣ ΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΤΟΥ

Ο ΝΕΚΡΟΣ ΤΑΡΙΧΕΥΘΕΙΣ ΔΙΑΚΟΜΙΖΕΤΑΙ ΕΝΤΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΗΜΕΡΑΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΜΗΤΡΟΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΝ ΝΑΟΝ

ΕΝΑΣ ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΗΣ

ΘΑ ΓΙΝΗ ΕΠΙΣΗΜΟΣ Η ΚΗΔΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ-Η ΘΥΕΛΛΩΔΗΣ ΣΤΑΔΙΟΔΡΟΜΙΑ ΤΟΥ-ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΙΣΤΙΚΑ ΑΝΕΚΔΟΤΑ

Μετά εις την υφεσάν καταγίλιν, τής θρονίας
και τής καρδιάς, τής χροιάς πρώτης - εις σαρ-
κογραφία ούτως επιμαρτυρούν από την υφάν άπο-
τυχίας - έδωσαν έξωθεν ή Σωφροσύνη Μανθιάλης.
Τό τέλος του είνε άποθανόν. Αίτις παθαίνει έν πλη-
ρη ήρωε, έν πλήρη ήρωε, την έπαύσην της έλευ-
τικής άποτυχίας, εις στυγρή όμοι ήλθείς τό άδρα-
μα. 'Αλλά και ή ζωή του άλόκληρος πόν είνε ένας
μύθος. 'Ο παλαιός αυτός λόγιος πόν έξείνεναι μέ-
στα από τό 'Επίσκοπον. Εξά τό πόν πόν τό σπεί-
του όχι μόνον τούς άνωτάτους στρατιωτικούς έπα-
μους, αλλά και τό έφτάστάτα άξιώματα της πολι-
τείας, μέγιστος αίσθη τό έθνικόν έπέντρον. - Πάν
είνε άποστατός όμοιότης έπέντρον, ήρώων, παρρησια-
σέντος μυστικισμός, και ή ήρωας πόν άποστατός
Εξά τό ήρωας πόν έν άποστατός στρατιώτης εις τό
έθνικόν άποστατός πόν ήρωας πόν έν άποστατός
πρός την χρυσόστομα. Εξά ή ήρωας της χροιάς πόν
πό έπέντρον εις τό πέντρον των χαρακτήρων του
έθνικισμός. 'Αλλά ή ήρωας ή ήρωας πόν ήρωας
πό χροιά άποστατός εις τό ήρωας πόν ήρωας πόν
ή ήρωας ήρωας ήρωας. Μετά την ήρωας, ή
ήρωας ήρωας ήρωας ήρωας πόν ήρωας πόν
ήρωας. 'Ούτως ήρωας ήρωας πόν ήρωας πόν
και ήρωας ήρωας πόν ήρωας πόν ήρωας πόν
ήρωας. 'Εξ ήρωας πόν ήρωας πόν ήρωας πόν
ήρωας. 'Εξ ήρωας πόν ήρωας πόν ήρωας πόν
ήρωας.

EVIDENCE 0502

[illegible]

ΠΛΗΡΗΣ ΕΞΙΣΤΟΡΗΣΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΝΥΚΤΕΡΙΝΩΝ ΑΙΜΑΤΩΝ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΤΩΝ

...the Egyptian... it is...
...the... it is...
...the... it is...

INTERVIEW WITH

KAPNABAM

I want to thank you for
 your kind attention to
 my letter of the 10th inst.
 and for the information
 you have given me.
 I am, Sir, very respectfully,
 Yours, Sir, very truly,
 J. H. [Signature]

The [illegible] of [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

4.1.1. The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been named in the above-mentioned documents:


Αιτία Θανάτου	Αριθμός Θανάτων
Καρκίνοι	23.049
Νόσοι πρώτης ηλικίας	30.489
Ουροποιητικό	32.387
Κυκλοφορικό	33.863
Νευρικό σύστημα	43.178
Γήρας	68.520
Ακαθόριστες αιτίες	69.216
Πεπτικό	89.692
Αναπνευστικό	128.448
Λοιμώδη νοσήματα	193.883

EVIDENCE 0507

“My mother always encouraged us to read newspapers. She, herself was really an active citizen, politically interested in a way often provocative for a woman. _That is why we were surprised when we heard her saying in 1936 that politics cannot work in chaos , that the country needed order first and then democracy. She was tired. Now I can see that.

So much death and diseases around us, she used to say, that’s what we should face up to first if we want to build a really human society.”

Eleni Foskolou,spoken testimony, 1984.



EVIDENCE 0501b

Πίνακας 1 Κατάλογος συνεργαζόμενων φορέων της Έκθεσης Υγιεινής του 1938

Υπουργεία	Νοσηλευτικά Ιδρύματα	Λοιπά Ιδρύματα/ Φορείς
Υπουργείο Υγιεινής	Ευαγγελισμός	Υγειονομική Σχολή
Υπουργείο Παιδείας	Σωτηρία	Ελληνικός Ερυθρός Σταυρός
Υπουργείο Διοικήσεως Πρωτευούσης	Δημόσιο Ψυχιατρείο Αθηνών	Ινστιτούτο Παστέρ Αθηνών
Υπουργείο Γεωργίας	Λοιπά Ελληνικά Νοσοκομεία:	Ελληνική Αντιφθισική Εταιρεία
Υπουργείο Εργασίας	Μαιευτήρια	Πανελλήνιος Σύλλογος κατά
Υπουργείο Αγορανομίας	Ψυχιατρεία	της Φυματώσεως
Υφυπουργείο Τύπου και Τουρισμού	Σανατόρια	Επιτροπή Ναρκωτικών και Κίνησης
Υπουργείο Στρατιωτικών, Ναυτικού και Αεροπορίας	Παιδιατρικά	Ελληνικό Αντικαρκινικό Ινστιτούτο
	Λεπροκομεία	Οδοντιατρικών Σχολείων
Ανωτέρα Διοίκηση Αεράμυνας	Λοιμωδών	Οδοντιατρικός Σύλλογος
	Αφροδισίων	Ιατρικός Σύλλογος Πειραιώς

ΕΝΙΣΧΥΣΑΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΔΟΣΑΤΕ ΜΕ ΦΑΝΑΤΙΣΜΟΝ ΤΗΝ "ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΝ ΦΩΝΗΝ", ΟΣΟΙ
ΕΠΙΘΥΜΕΙΤΕ ΜΙΑΝ ΝΕΑΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ, ΗΝΩΜΕΝΗΝ ΧΩΡΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΘΝΟΚΤΟΝΟΝ ΔΙΧΑΣΜΟΝ

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΦΩΝΗ

ΕΒΔΟΜΑΔΙΑΙΑ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΣ

ΙΔΡΥΤΗΣ: ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ ΚΑΝΕΛΛΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ

ΑΘΗΝΑΙ, ΣΑΒΒΑΤΟΝ 8 ΦΕΒΡΟΥΑΡΙΟΥ 1936

ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΤΗΣ: Γ. Θ. ΚΑΡΑΝΙΚΟΛΟΣ

ΤΟ ΑΔΙΕΞΟΔΟΝ

Ὁ τόπος περιῆλθεν εἰς ἠθικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ἀδιέξοδον. Αἱ ἐκλογαὶ δὲν ἀπέτελεσαν λύσιν, ἀλλὰ περιέπλεξαν ἀκόμη περισσότερο τὴν κατάστασιν. Αἱ πολιτικοὶ παρατάξεις — ἀποδειχθείσας διὰ μίαν ἀκόμη φοράν τῆς ἀδυναμίας των, ὅπως μεταβάλλουν τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν (καὶ ποιοτικὴν) πρὸς ἀλλήλους σχέσιν των — ζητοῦν νὰ ἐπιωφεληθῶσιν τοῦ ἀδιεξόδου. Δὲν ζητοῦν νὰ τὸ λύσουν, ἀλλὰ νὰ τὸ ἐκμεταλλευθῶσιν. Οἱ φιλελευθέροι, οἱ ὅποιοι γνωρίζουν, ὅτι ἀνώνυμοι παράγοντες καὶ ἀφανεὶς δυνάμεις — δυνάμεις, τὰς ὁποίας αὐτοὶ πρῶτον εἰσάγουν διὰ τῆς ὁμοφροσύνης τοῦ κράτους καὶ

διὰ μέσων τεχνητῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ψεύδους εἶνε δυνατόν νὰ ἐπικρατήσουν! Ἀδιαφοροῦντες διὰ τὸ κράτος ὡς ὑπερκομματικὴν ἔννοιαν, ἀδιαφοροῦντες καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀληθινὴν «λαϊκὴν κυριαρχίαν», ζητοῦν ἐκλογὰς μετ' ἐκλογαῖς, ζητοῦν δὲ νὰ διενεργήσων τὰς ἐκλογὰς οἱ ἴδιοι, ἂν καὶ ἐλέπουν, ὅτι δὲν ἔχουν τὴν πανελληνίαν πλειοψηφίαν. Τόσον ὁ βενιζελισμὸς, πόσον καὶ ὁ ἀντιβενιζελισμὸς (λαμπανόμενος, παρά τας μεγάλας ἐσωτερικὰς ἀντιθέσεις του, ὡς σύνολον) δὲν ἐκπροσωποῦν — ὅπως ἀποδεικνύουν αἱ τελευταὶ ἐκλογαὶ — παρά μόνον μειονότητα λαϊκῆν λευταῖα ἐκλογαί — παρά μόνον μειονότητα λαϊκῆν καὶ ὁμῶς ζητοῦν, στραγγαλίζοντες τὴν θέλησιν τοῦ λαοῦ, νὰ μεταμορφωθῶσιν εἰς ἀπόλυτον κοινωβουλίαν καὶ

Ἑλλάδα, σημαίνει, ὅτι τὸ κόμμα εἶνε μέσον καὶ οὐκ ἄντικρυς σκοπός, ὅτι τὰ κόμματα — ὅπου ὑπάρχει κράτος ἀληθινόν — δὲν ἀγωνίζονται καὶ δὲν κατέρχονται εἰς τὰς ἐκλογὰς διὰ νὰ μετροῦν, κατὰ τὴν νεοελληνικὴν φρασολογίαν, τὰς δυνάμεις των, διὰ νὰ ἱκανοποιήσων ἡθεληθὲς πείσματα, πάθη, φιλοτιμίας καὶ συμφέροντα, ἀλλ' ἀγωνίζονται διὰ νὰ συμβάλουν μετ' οὐκ ἀνιχνεύσιμης ἀναλογίας δυνάμεων εἰς τὸν σχηματισμὸν πολιτικῆς βουλῆς διερμηνεύουσας τὴν συνείδησιν τοῦ ἔθνους καὶ τοῦ λαοῦ ὡς συνόλου! Μήπως εἶνε καὶ αἱ φράσεις αὗται δύσκολοι; Ἀς σκεφθῇ ὁ ἀναγνώστης ὡς "Ἑλλήν καὶ τότε δὲν θὰ ὑπῆρχεν δυσκολία εἰς τὴν κατανόησιν.

Θυσιάζομεν καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες νὰ ἱκανοποιήσομεν συμφέροντα — ἀπεφασίσαιμεν, ἐν δυνάμει τῆς ἰδέας τοῦ ἔθνους καὶ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦ κράτους, νὰ διασχίσωμεν μετ' αὐτῶν τὴν θέλησιν μας τὸ ἠθικὸν κενόν, τὸ ὁποῖον ἐδημιουργήσαν οἱ παρατάξεις, νὰ ἀντιπαραταχθῶμεν εἰς αὐτὰς, καλοῦντες τὸν ἑλληνικὸν λαὸν νὰ ἀκολουθήσῃ τὸ παράδειγμα μας! Δυστυχῶς ἡ ἀπάχη, τὴν ὁποίαν εἰβεν ἡ πρόκλησις μας εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ λαοῦ, δὲν ὑπῆρξε μεγάλη, δὲν ὑπῆρξε οὕτε τὴν ὁσὴν θὰ ἔφθανε διὰ νὰ βοηθῇ εἰς τὴν φωνὴν μας τὸ δικαίωμα νὰ ἀκουσθῇ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ θήματος τῆς βουλῆς. Δὲν πειράζει ὁμῶς! Ἡμεῖς θὰ συνγίσωμεν τὸν σκληρὸν ἀγῶνα μας. Ἀς θύμα, ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁποῖου θὰ ἐλακούσθη ἀκούσιμη ἡ φωνὴ μας, ὡς θύμα

EVIDENCE 0505b



INFORMATION ABOUT EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE 0501

0501a Causes of death 1928-1937. First cause with 193.000 infectious diseases

0501b Index of collaborating partners for the Hygiene Exhibition in Athens. Last column : School of Hygiene , Hellenic Red Cross, Paster Institute of Athens

The exhibition was a major event equivalent of similar international occasions. For the first time in country's history such a social intervention for hygiene issues took place.

EVIDENCE 0502 newspaper

(Akropolis, 1 February) headline : Yesterdays sudden death of Georgios Kondilis.

EVIDENCE 0503 posters

0503a Poster of Venizelos. The woman escorting the children says : "With you our children will have a bright future"

0503b Poster of Metaxas as protector and inspiration for children

EVIDENCE 0504 pack of newspapers

0504a (Hellinikon Mellon , May 6) headline: Venizelos and Plastiras sentenced to death. To death.

0504b (Vradini , March 2) headline : How supporters of Venizelos and Plastiras bloodshed the capital.

EVIDENCE 0505 pack of newspapers

0505 (Akropolis, 28 April) headline : Within three years six elections and three coup d'état.

0505b (Hellenici Foni, 8 February) headline : Dead-end

EVIDENCE 0506

Subject's text in "School hygiene" magazine. The magazine was sent to every school around the country and it was an initiative of the new administration.

EVIDENCE 0507

Spoken testimony of subject's daughter

EVIDENCE 0508 photo

Note behind the photo: "With the man I trust most for my country (Venizelos) on his visit to our station (1930)".

CASE FILE

2016-0_

NAME: Foskolou Maria

AGE : 1890-1969

EDUCATION: Medicine Univ.

PROFESSION: Doctor

ADRESS: Ekali


FAMILY INFO: 2 kids

EVIDENCES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

INFO EXTRACTED BY RESEARCH:

NARRATION:

CASE SOLUTION:



TEAM 6 PACK

- Set 0
- Set 1
- History Magazine
- Case cover
- Evidence Registration form
- Evidences
- Info about evidences
- Solution file

I was the only one of my family members who hadn't fought until the civil war. My grandfather fought at the Balkan wars (1912-1913) as a volunteer at the support department. My father was at Smyrna (during the Turkish-Greek war 1919-1922) and my two older brothers fought at Pindos (during the Italian-Greek war 1940-41). They are both dead. They died a hero's death (1). But we did not seem to catch a break. Some royalists in Halkidiki were causing trouble until 1935. Consider the Schism, you know Thessaloniki was the starting point of Venizelos, and the refugees that flooded in the streets of Thessaloniki (1922-1924) after the collapse of Asia Minor front. Things cooled off a bit with Metaxas. I was at EON for three years (2). We organized parades, dances, we worked all together for a good cause, raised money for Philoptochos and more. We were put in order.

1. Recent historical traumas
2. Relevant political ideology

We had enough of the democrats all these years. They only organized movements and people had no money (3). Personally, I didn't like the English and French long ago. I liked the Germans more, as I heard about the miracles that they made at their country (6). And Metaxas, had the country running fluently, that's what I liked about him (4). After April 1941 there was nothing to hold on to. Who would you listen to? The mayor already welcomed them at our city's entrance. I remember him saying that we should trust them (7).

3. Failure of political forces
6. Ideological relevance to totalitarian and fascist ideology
4. The experience of basic politics, security
7. Institutional collapse (officialdom, security forces)

My family had money in the past. My grandfather was a fabric merchant. Later, some Jewish shops opened near his and they shut his down. Jews were united and supported each other. That's how Jews are. Not like us. They knew how to control the market better than anyone. Money is their God, you know. We Greeks were against them very often in the city (10). We waited for something to happen, so that we felt that time was right. Maybe if the Germans started losing the war. No one expected that the situation would last so long (8). As I told you, we had been through a lot, due to political reasons (5). All I could think was what would my kids eat the very next day (12). The first two years were extremely difficult. People that lived at villages didn't starve as we did at Thessaloniki.

10. The significant other victim
8. The idea that the situation cannot be but temporary.
5. Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivalry in local, communal, economic or political fields)
- 12 Fear and instinctive defense.

I didn't climb the mountains to take part to resistance. Why should I? To help the communists? (9). But, we didn't wear that hood, even though we knew at which houses the insurgents were hiding (14). In 1942 I was called at the Administration Building and asked to take over the representation of the employees in the municipality cleaning service. I accepted. I thought that I could help put this city in order (16), (13). I knew the job better than most of people there. One could easily blame me, but I was not a collaborator. What could I do anyway? I had never fought, and, as I said before, my first priority was to help my family. Why would I pretend to be a hero? (18) In the end, the Germans didn't trouble us. At least, they didn't ever trouble me or my family. One time I even asked for the working hours to change. Even if I was arguing with them, they listened to me and in the end they offered us the hours that we wanted. (15)

How do you interpret passivity?

It is important to take under consideration a number of parameters, before any attempt to study indifference. What kind of a regime we are dealing with? (see **graphic 01**). The **duration of a regime** is a crucial factor for what studies call **reflective self**. It describes the assimilation of external tenets of a regime towards legitimating as personal, transformed and transforming material. We must separate two stages of **legitimizing** a regime, first **on terms of origins**, then **of results**. Although, most of the regimes of such kind control information about their achievements, they usually end up trying to secure a gap between promises and realization, because even for sacrifices made in the name of a better future there has been a limit to people's patience. A crucial parameter is also the **control of resources** as a tool of political obedience (welfare dictatorship – political repression by the regime, social provision through the regime). Apart from that, there are always **shared values** to which the regime could always appeal in the name of a great(er) social goal. And of course, all regimes show **signs of evolution and decline**, phases like dynamism, stagnation and entropy, mainly caused **by corruption, opportunism and poor quality recruitment**.

One of the strategies of "totalitarian" regimes is to have so severe legal regulations (criminal laws) that, if taken literally, everyone is guilty of something, and then to withdraw from their full enforcement. In this way, the regime can appear merciful and at the same time wield a permanent threat to discipline its subjects. In any case, belonging to a society involves a paradoxical point at which each of us is ordered to embrace freely, as result of our choice, what is anyway imposed on us (we all must love our country or our parents).

Part of the answer lays down to what we could call **domain of habit**. To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not use them; when to violate them; when not to use a choice which is offered; when we are effectively obliged to do something, but have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice. The same goes for many political situations in which a choice is given on condition that we make the right choice: we are solemnly reminded that we can say no - but we are expected to reject this offer and enthusiastically say yes. **Habits are thus the very stuff our identities are made of**: in them, we enact and thus define what we effectively are as social beings, often in contrast with our perception of what we are - in their very transparency, they are the medium of social violence, and so at any case (resistance-indifference-collaboration) we need to be careful. Such an **institutional Unconscious** sustains the public institution repulsing a sense of chaos. Major influence in forming both the domain of habit and consequently our institutional unconscious comes from **education**. Another key for our approach is the importance of a measure called **"estimated majority"**, meaning the

9. Luck of trustworthy resistance proposal

14. The moral excuse of non collaboration

16. We need some order in this chaos

13. The idea of being law abiding

18. I am all alone, my actions would be a mere suicide and totally useless

15. They didn't give me any trouble

feeling people have about how the majority thinks. We also know from historical figures and tables how political support has increased in totalitarian regimes because of **a sense of resignation**.

So, even in conditions of heavy repressive domination some kind of private space continued to exist permitting the formation of something legitimately called **popular opinion**, recognized by the regime. In conditions of silence, "frightened" by this loss of control a totalitarian regime usually institutes a spy network, not only to achieve suppression but also to search for legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Little sense is given to Manichean questions of whether people were "for" or "against" the solutions provided from the regime. Speaking about dedicated friends and committed opponents somebody "risks being telling a story of two minorities". People "in the middle" had a far more complex perspective over their experience, changeable through time and over different aspects of the same regime. Popular attitudes were formed basically based on **personal experience of the regime** and **available information** (mass media control). It is only a projection of modern individualistic liberal conception of choice the one often reflected upon totalitarian regimes. For example people in southern Italy even before Fascism were little concerned about what they should vote. But, let's return to the challenge of analyzing indifference.

Methodological – hermeneutical keys	Historical material
<p><u>Sociopolitical</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Recent historical traumas (historically documented) Relevant political axon Political failure The experience of basic politics - security Tradition of resistance Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivals in local or communal or economic or political fields) Near the edge – ideological relevance in parts of a totalitarian or fascist or extremist theory Institutional collapse (religion , officialdom , security forces) The idea of a provisional situation Lack of a trustworthy resistance proposal The significant “other” victim (cases that the victim has formerly negative relations with the passive mass) Lack of spiritual leadership (intellectuals, religion leaders) <p><u>Personal-psychological</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The prudential postponement (cases of late enlistment) Instinctive defense (survival priorities) The idea of been legitimate , structural personality effect The moral excuse of non collaboration They didn’t hurt me We need some order to this chaos It’ s not my duty to save the world 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Public Documents Maps Photos Literary texts Spoken testimonies Demographics Newspapers Letters Personal archives Posters Personal items Topographical data Telegraphs Cards, post cards Building information


Index 01. Hermeneutical keys and categories of historical material

EXTRA HERMENEUTICAL KEYS
<p>20. legitimating by origins (shared values), and by results (control of resources)</p> <p>21. signs of evolution and decline of a regime</p> <p>22. domain of habit</p> <p>23. education</p> <p>24. estimated majority</p> <p>25. a sense of resignation</p> <p>26. personal experience of the regime</p> <p>27. available information(mass media control)</p>


Index 02. Extra hermeneutical keys



Graphic 02. Indifference map



Graphic 04. To be filled using indexes 01 and 02.



Graphic 03. Hermeneutical keys distributed per indifference area (rejection-acceptance-objection)

History Magazine

ERASMUS+, LESSONS FOR PRESENT, LESSONS FOR FUTURE

SUMMER 2016

LETS TALK ABOUT HISTOPIA

INDIFFERENCE CASES
1936-1941

Short political history of Histopia

The period of Histopia's history that interests us starts almost 90 years after its independence. Histopia started as a small geographical entity struggling to survive economically and expand its borders. Concerning the second aim first in 1864 and then again in 1881 Histopia expanded its territory significantly, but the idea of liberating all places inhabited from Histopians in big numbers remained the basic political and ideological orientation.

For almost 25 years Histopia was involved in political and military actions trying to incorporate Krete and Macedonia. In 1897 a traumatic war defeat caused the financial collapse of the country, making it seem almost like a miracle how 15 years later both Krete and Macedonia were parts of Histopia along with Epirus. World War I brought new troubles since political and military administration was divided concerning the formal stand of Histopia. Should the country stand by Entente or should it stay neutral?

That question triggered the Great Division (1915) which finally took the proportions of a ruthless civil war for 2 years (1916-17) and ended with Venizelos in head of the winning side and King Konstantinos exiled. Soon after his win Venizelos led Histopian forces to the borders of the national dream that haunted the country for decades. The disaster followed was as huge as the dream itself. The evacuation of Histopian army in 1922 left over 1 million dead and as many as 1,5 million refugees. Histopia by that time had a population of 4,5 million. Most of the refugees inhabited the two major cities of Histopia, Athens and Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki was a city with over half its population Jewish, part of Histopia for just 10 years and a real bone of contention for neighbor states around Histopia.

The years after the refugee flood a titanic effort took place for the relief, accommodation and rehabilitation of the refugees, although not within ideal sociopolitical conditions. Native Histopian families had also suffered hundreds of thousands of dead or wounded soldiers. The healing process needed time for both sides, but the truth is that a psychological schism tantalized Histopian society until 1940.

Political situation was anything but helpful as the following timeline presents emphatically.

- 1924, 25 March: Histopia is proclaimed a republic. Pavlos Kountouriotis becomes the first President of Histopia.
- 1924, 13 April: A plebiscite condones the change of constitution.
- 1924, 7 October: Failed military coup.
- 1925, 15 March: Successful coup directed by General Theodoros Pangalos. President Pavlos Kountouriotis resigns.
- 1926, 23 August: General Pangalos is overthrown after a coup. Caretaker government of Georgios Kondylis.
- 1928: Venizelos returns from exile and his Liberals win power again.
- 1933, March: Failed pro-Venezelist coup.
- 1933, 6 June: Second assassination attempt against Venizelos in Athens.
- 1935, March: Failed coup directed by Venizelos and Nikolaos Plastiras. Venizelos flees in France and dies in Paris the next year, the armed forces are purged of Venizelist and Republican officers.
- 1935, 10 October: Coup directed by Georgios Kondylis abolishes the Republic, confirmed by a rigged plebiscite later the same year.

During 1934 several major strikes took place in October 1935, C. Kondylis and Al. Papagos overturned threw K.. Tsaldari and imposed an autocratic royalist regime. Immediately (16 / 11.20.35) the new government issued Emergency Law to refer any industrial dispute to an arbitration procedure and prohibited any strike with heavy effects (reduction of payment, imprisonment, dismissal etc.) for offenders. In response to the imprisonments and exiles the Left organized general political hunger strike and nationwide protests in December.

- 1935, 3 November: George II is restored to the throne.

King George, commissioned the formation of a provisional government to the jurist Constantine Demertzi on November 30, 1935. The country was led to new elections on January 26, 1936, but their effect was to tie the 143 seats among Venizelist Themistocles Sofouli and Republicans of Panayi Tsaldari. The Communists with 15 seats had been buffering agents, but disagreements between political leaders did not allow to form a government, despite lobbying contacts between Themistocles Sofoulis and the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Stelios Sklavainas. The tragic cycle of fateful deaths started from the first month of 1936, with George Kondylis, who died on January 31st, five days after the conducted elections. The ongoing interventions of the Army in political developments forced King George to remove the Military Minister Alexandros Papagos and appoint in his place Ioannis Metaxas, on March 5th.

The Demertzi government renewed its mandate on March 14, 1936, because parliament parties still couldn't agree on forming a government. On March 18, 1936 Venizelos died exiled in Paris. His body was transferred to Chania and not in Athens, after fierce opponents reactions. Third in the series of deaths, Prime Minister Konstantinos Demertzis left

this vain world on April 13, 1936. King George, without consulting the parties, entrusted the formation of a government to Metaxas. The government appeared to Parliament on April 27, 1936 and got confidence or tolerance vote to rule until parties agreed on forming a government. Only Communists and George Papandreou voted against him. The rest voted for. Meanwhile, fourth in a row, Panagis Tsaldaris died of a heart attack on May 17th. The death of Tsaldaris particularly gave Metaxas the opportunity to present himself more as the undisputed leader of the anti-Venizelists' world, cancelling partly any reaction to his plans. The four deaths, left the country without personalities capable to oppose the Metaxas plans.

1936, 4 August: Coup by General Ioannis Metaxas, who declares a state of emergency, decrees martial law, annuls various articles of the Constitution and establishes a crisis cabinet to end the increasing riots and to restore social order.

The day after September 18, 1936, the dictatorship of August 4 issued the Emergency Law 117 "on measures to combating communism and his consequences." This law came to replace the Law 4229 / 25.07.1929 "On security measures of social status and protection of citizens' 'freedoms', the notorious "Idionimon", which was voted in 1929 from Venizelos government. In reality, of course, both legislations came from the same matrix, the matrix of anti-communism that made these two politicians -the democratic Venizelos and the dictator Metaxas- look like two drops of water.

The responsibilities and powers of Metaxas were restricted in the fields of foreign policy, military and youth by the king's powers. The role of Metaxas in the first two sectors remained until 1941 complementary. During the regime (1936-1941) there were two distinct (tangent but not concentric) political power poles with centers the King and the dictator. During the first two years, the balance system of power tilted toward the first pole and we can talk about a royal dictatorship. Since September 1938 the royal powers and initiatives were limited and the status could fully determined as Metaxas dictatorship.

Relations between the two strong men (King and Metaxas) emerged (unseen) competitive predominantly in the youth education field. In November 1936 the National Youth Organization (EON) was founded, which aimed at creating the massive popular support that the regime lacked. Through the ranks of EON the regime would seek, in the future, dedicated persons to staff the state agencies. The State pursued through EON to create a "truly independent, responsible and selfless leader class" a "national political aristocracy", which would lead the Nation to "new cultural achievements" all based to the triptych "Homeland, religion, family" perhaps the most widespread "motto" of modern Hellenic history connected with dominant ideology and over time following very complex paths from 1880 to 1930.

EON members wore dark blue uniforms and *dikochos* (special hat), and were separated according to age in pioneers (7-13 years), phalangites B (14-18) and phalangites A (19-25). In December 1937, also in Athens, after the initiative of Mr. Kotzias, the Labor Battalions were founded, a paramilitary organization (approximately 400 persons with gray uniforms) following the Nazi model. The Labor Battalions were typically formed for the exploitation of the unemployed in public works, but actually aimed at functioning the praetorians' guard. Their action, however, was short-lived and practically did not exceed the limits of picturesque. On June 9, 1938 the Labor Battalions were abolished after Metaxas's decision and their members joined EON. Some of them trying to fit best in their new organization -some of them were over 30 years old- dedicated themselves in witch-hunting for regime enemies. In many cases the accusations were products of imagination or personal hatred.

The truth is that Metaxas had no trouble to control the press. Most of the newspaper owners and editors (even those who had previously criticized Metaxas) served with great pleasure the interests of the regime from the first day. After all, business was growing fast due to Metaxas's Emergency Law 23/36, of August 19, 1936, by which serious benefits were granted to the owners and editors of newspapers in exchange for full cooperation and unreserved support.

The only resistance expressed by the press, except for Rizospastis, was some illegal, minimum in number, non-communist, newspapers. The illegal organization "Society of Friends" (*Filiki Etaireia*) was founded in November 1937 and released three secret papers: "Freedom", with six issues, "the Constitution", with five issues and the Democrat, the first issue of which was printed, but was seized before the release. The organization adopted also the newspaper "Herald", which first issue was seized before its release too. Those publications were part of resistance activities from ex-Venizelists. Their greatest moment, the attempted coup of 1938, was an epic failure. Another newspaper, the "Flame" (*Floga*) was first published in 1937 by the Anti-dictatorship Youth Front (AMN) and continued to be issued until September 1938. By that time, only an illegal communist youth organization, OKNE, was kept on the anti-dictatorship publishing effort.

The weak press resistance to the regime was partly a result of police work. Central figure on this field of the government was Konstantinos Maniadakis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Μανιαδάκης) notorious as the formidably efficient head of the internal Security Services of the 4th of August Regime (1936–1941). The newly established Secretary of State had all the security forces in the country under its jurisdiction (the Royal Gendarmerie, the Police, the Fire Department and the Directorate of Immigration and Passports) and was entrusted with one of the basic functions of Metaxa's government: to fight Communism and detect foreign spies (especially those from Italy, Bulgaria and later on, Germany and Britain). Under the supervision of Maniadakis, the Gendarmerie force increased, the City Police by 20% – free from political interference and partisan considerations. These also boomed the Political Police (the Histopian equivalent to the Gestapo, which increased its staff to 445 officers and non-commissioned officers up to 1,200 agents. The headquarters of the Special Security in Athens during the dictatorship of August 4th was a building with labyrinthine corridors, basements and offices at the junction of September 3rd number 106 and Derigny. Many communists and democratic citizens were tortured or even murdered in that building, as the veteran communist Nikos Valianatos on August 9th, 1938. From there many communists took the road to the exile mostly to islands of the Aegean Sea, like Anafi and Ai-Stratis, or places like Akronafplia for political prisoners.

- 1937, 15 December: Mass NKVD operation against Histopians in the USSR begins, based on Joseph Stalin's Directive 50125 of Dec. 1937, resulting in the loss of 38,000 Soviet citizens of Histopian descent at the Gulags of Siberia.
- 1940, 28 October: After the dictator Ioannis Metaxas rejects an Italian ultimatum demanding the occupation of Histopian territory, Italian forces invade Histopia. Beginning of the Histopio-Italian War.

After communism, a new, totally external enemy had emerged. And again even more than communism the external threat gave Metaxas the opportunity to increase social coherence around the regime. Anybody seems willing to tolerate something bad, if to avoid something worst.

You need also to use these:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_of_Greece

<http://metaxas-project.com/greek-fascist-youth-eon/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_name

- EVIDENCE -

Case No.: 2016-06

Description of Enclosed Evidence: _____

Submitting Agency: ERASMUS+ HISTORY Dpt.

Telephone Number: classified

Evidence Recovered By: Research Team
(print name)

Victim's Full Name: no victim case

Suspect's Full Name: _____


Envelope Sealed By: Greek Office
(print name)

28th High School of Thessaloniki
(signature)

Date Sealed: 30/7/2016 Time Sealed: 23:56 am
pm



EVIDENCE 0601



EVIDENCE 0602

**ΕΚΛΕΙΣΕ ΤΟ ΚΑΠΝΕΡΓΟΣΤΑΣΙΟΝ „ΚΟΜΕΡΣΙΑΛ”
ΚΑΙ ΑΠΕΛΥΘΗΣΑΝ 350 ΚΑΠΝΕΡΓΑΤΑΙ ΠΑΡΑ
ΤΗΝ ΕΓΓΡΑΦΟΝ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑΝ ΔΙΑ ΤΑ ΗΜΕΡΟΜΙΣΘΙΑ**

**ΟΙ ΚΑΠΝΕΜΠΟΡΟΙ ΚΗΡΥΤΤΟΥΝ ΛΟΚΑΟΥΤ
ΔΙΑ ΝΑ ΕΞΑΝΑΓΚΑΣΟΥΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΠΝΓΑΤΑΣ
ΝΑ ΔΕΧΘΟΥΝ ΗΛΑΤΤΩΜΕΝΑ ΗΜΕΡΟΜΙΣΘΙΑ**

Σήμερον τὴν πρωίαν ὁλοῦς αἰ-
ωνιδίως ἐκλείσεν ἡ καπναποθήκη
τῆς ἐταιρίας Κομέρσιαλ, ἐνῶ ἀπὸ
χθὲς τὸ βράδυ εἶχον διανεμηθῇ
εἰς τοὺς ἐργαζομένους εἰς αὐτὴν
καπνεργάτας καὶ καπνεργατρίας
μάρκες διὰ τὴν σημερινὴν ἡμέραν.

Οἱ μεταβάντες τὴν πρωίαν νὰ ἀ-
ναλάβουν ἐργασίαν 350 καπνεργά-
ται καὶ καπνεργατρίαι εὐρέθησαν
πρὸ κεκλεισμένων θυρῶν καὶ πρὸ
ἀστονομικῆς δυνάμεως, ἡ ὁποία ἐ-
φροῦρει τὸ καπνεργοστάσιον, διὰ
νὰ παρεμποδίσῃ τὴν βιαίαν εἰσο-
δον εἰς αὐτὸ καπνεργατῶν. Ἡ
κατὰ τοιοῦτον τρόπον ἀθέτησις
τῆς συμβάσεως ὑπὸ τῆς διευθυ-
σεως τοῦ καπνεργοστασίου—διότι
οἱ προσληθέντες διὰ νὰ ἐρ-
γασθῶν ὑπέγραψαν συμφωνη-
τικὸν τὸ ὁποῖον δημοσιεύομεν
ὀλίγον κατωτέρω—ἐξήγειρε τοὺς
καπνεργάτας, οἱ ὁποῖοι παρουσιά-
σθησαν ἐν σώματι εἰς τὸν διευθυ-
τὴν τοῦ καπνεργοστασίου καὶ ἐξή-

φόλλισμα.
Διὰ τὰς ἐργατρίας πρὸς 40 δραχ-
μὰς γενικῶς.
Θεσπικὴ τῇ 14-4-34
Ὁ διευθυντής
ΑΒΡΑΜ ΡΑΖΟΝ


**ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΙ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΓΕΝ. ΔΙΟΙ-
ΚΗΣΙΝ**

Πολυμελεῖς ἐπιτροπαὶ καπνεργα-
τῶν παρουσιάσθησαν σήμερον εἰς
τὴν Γεν. Διοίκησιν διεμαρτυρήθησαν
διὰ τὴν κρατοῦσαν εἰς τὰ καπνερ-
γοστάσια κατάστασιν, τὸ σπάσιμο
τῶν ἡμερομισθίων κλπ. ἐζήτησαν
δὲ τὴν ἐπέμβασιν τοῦ κ. Δραγοῦμη
προσωπικῶς διὰ τὴν βελτίωσιν τῆς
ἀφορήτου ταύτης καταστάσεως, ἡ
ὁποία ἐξωθεῖ τοὺς ἐργάτας εἰς τὰ
ἄκρα.

Ἀφ' ἑτέρου ἐπιτροπὴ καπνεργα-
τῶν τῆς Κομέρσιαλ διεμαρτυρήθη
εἰς τὸν κ. Γεν. Διοικητὴν διότι ἡ
ἐταιρία δὲν ἐτήρησε τὴν γραπτὴν
ὁπόσχεσιν τῆς περὶ πληρωμῆς ἡμε-



EVIDENCE 0606



EVIDENCE 0605




EVIDENCE 0608

ΑΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟΝΙΚΗ

Χάρτης του 1931

Εμφατισμένη περιοχή (βλ.)

Α.Π.



Six years after the arrival of the refugees there were still texts demanding the "purification of the capital," the separation of "pure Greeks" by "Tourkosporous"(Turkish seeds). Examples of the anti-refugee hysteria that gripped the pro-monarchy citizens were the slogans that were heard (9 November 1923) at the rally of the monarchists at Olympian Zeus columns. One characteristic was: "Burn the refugees". This attitude was not confined to the ignorant "indigenous" people who could be fanaticized by unscrupulous monarchist politicians, but also characterized the intellect of the Greek Kingdom. Typical were the outbreaks of George Vlahos in "Kathimerini" newspaper, who even in 1928 called the refugees as "refugee herd". Nikos Kraniotakis, monarchist publisher of the newspaper Proinos Tipos demanded in 1933 refugees to wear yellow armbands to distinguish themselves and to avoid the Greeks. Parliament member Bourboulis from Spetses accused in 1934 refugees members of the parliament that the Jews of Thessalonica "are more Greeks than you".

Γιώργος Κόκκινος – Βλάσης Αγτζίδης – Έλλη Λεμονίδου, Το τραύμα και οι πολιτικές της Μνήμης. Ενδεικτικές όψεις των συμβολικών πολέμων για την Ιστορία και τη Μνήμη, εκδ. Ταξιδευτής, 2010, Αθήνα.

EVIDENCE 0604

ΛΟΓΟΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΠΕΥΜΑ ΤΩΝ ΕΡΓΑΤΙΚΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΩΣΕΩΝ
ΕΝ ΝΕΩ ΦΑΛΗΡΩ

(10 Ιανουαρίου 1937)

Είναι μεγάλη ή υπερηφάνεια και μεγάλη ή ικανοποίησης που αισθάνομαι απόψε, εργάται, εργάτριαι και υπάλληλοι, γιατί μαζί σας, δλόγυρα από αυτό τὸ τραπέζι, μέσα σὲ τόση ἀδελφωσύνη και πραγματικὴ καλωσύνη, γευθήκαμε ὅλοι μαζί τὸ ψωμί και ἤπιαμε τὸ κρασί που θγαίνει ἀπὸ τοὺς κόπους σας και ἀπὸ τὸν ἰδρώτα σας.

Και τώρα θὰ σὰς πῶ γιατί τὸ κρασί σας τὸ ἤπια με ἱκανοποίησι και εὐχαρίστησι.

Ἀπὸ πολὺ καιρὸ αισθανόμουν πὼς δὲν μπορεί νὰ εἶναι ποτὲ εὐτυχισμένος και μεγάλος ἕνας λαός, όταν τὸ θάθρον αὐτοῦ τοῦ λαοῦ, ἐπάνω στὸ ὅποιο στηρίζεται ὁλόκληρο τὸ ἐθνικὸ οἰκοδόμημα, όταν με ἄλλα λόγια ἡ ἐργατικὴ τάξις, ἡ ἀγροτικὴ τάξις και ἡ τάξις τῶν μισθωτῶν πάσχουν και ὑποφέρουν και τὴ ζωὴ των τὴν περνοῦν σὰν θάρος. Χρόνια πολλὰ περάσανε ἀπὸ ἐπάνω μου μέσα στὰ ὅποια γι' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα και γιὰ τὴν ἰδέα πὼς πηγαίναμε ἐξ αἰτίας του σὲ γενικὸ κατακρήμνισμα, αισθανόμουν πίκρες και πόνους και μὴ τρομερὴ ἀπογοήτευσι, γιατί δὲν ἤμπορουσα νὰ κάμω τίποτε μέσα στὴν πνιγερὴ ἀτιμω- σφαιρα τοῦ κοιμητισμοῦ, που ἔφερνε τὴν Ἑλλάδα στὴν ἀβυσσο και που ἐτοί-

νὰ κάμωμεν ἦσαν νὰ ἐφαρμόσωμεν ἐκεῖνα που ἐνομύζαμε μέχρι τὴ στιγμὴ ἐκείνη θνεῖρα γιὰ τὴν ἐργατικὴ τάξι.

Τὰ μέτρα που ἔλαβα μᾶς τὰ εἶπατε σεῖς ἀπόψε και τὰ ξεύρετε ὅλοι σας. Ἀλλὰ συμφωνῶ με τὸν κ. Καλύβαν, συμφωνῶ, ὅτι αὐτὰ που ἐγιναν ἔως τώρα δὲν εἶναι οὔτε τὸ Α ἀκόμα ἀπὸ ἐκεῖνα που ἔχομε σκοπὸ και ἀπόφασι νὰ κάμωμε. Θέλω μονάχα νὰ καταλάβετε πὼς ἔχω ἀπόφασι και θὰ τὸ κάμω. Ὁ ἐργάτης ἀπὸ τώρα και ἔπειτα με ὑπερηφάνεια και με τὸ κεφάλι του ὑψηλὰ και χωρὶς ντροπὴ, με θάρρος και αὐτοπεποίθησι, μπορεί νὰ λέγῃ πὼς εἶναι ἐργάτης. Ἡ ἐργασία ἔχει ὅλα τὰ δικαιώματα και ἐκεῖνος που πραγματικὰ ἐργάζεται εἶναι τίμιος. Γιατί νὰ ντραπῇ νὰ λέγῃ πὼς εἶναι ἐργάτης; Χρειάζεται γι' αὐτὸ ἐργασία μεγάλη και χρειάζεται πρὸ πάντων ἐργασία γιὰ τὴν πρόοδο τοῦ ἐργάτου τὴν οικονομική, τὴν πνευματική. Θὰ τὰ κάμωμεν αὐτά. Γιατί εἴμεθα ἀποφασισμένοι νὰ τὰ κάμωμε. Γιατί αισθανόμαστε, ὅτι πρώτη ὑποχρέωσις μᾶς κοινωνίας πολιτισμένης και ἠθικῆς, εἶναι νὰ φροντίξῃ γιὰ ἐκείνους που πάσχουν περισσότερο. Ὑπάρχει πραγματικὰ πολιτισμός, ὑπάρχει πραγματικὰ εὐγένεια ψυχῆς, ὑπάρχει ἠθικὴ, ἐκεῖ που δὲν ὑπάρχει ἀλληλεγγύη πρὸς ἐκείνους που πάσχουν και ὑποφέρουν; Κοινωνία που δὲν ἔχει αὐτὰ τὰ ἐφόδια δὲν ἤμπορεῖ νὰ ζήσῃ, θὰ ἐκλείψῃ. Ἀλλὰ κανένας ἀπὸ τοὺς Ἕλληνας δὲν θέλει αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα. Θέλομεν ὅλοι νὰ ἔχωμε μὴ Ἑλλάδα, ἀδιαίρετη, ἐνιαία, ἀπὸ τὸν πρῶτον Ἕλληνα ἔως τὸν τελευταῖον, ἀπὸ τὸν Βασιλέα ἔως τὸ μικρότερο παιδάκι.


Θέλομε τὴν Ἑλλάδα νὰ τὴν κυδερνᾷ μὴ καρδιά που μονάχα γι' αὐτὴν

Metaxas speech (January 10th) to Worker's Unions , very sentimental, focusing to the fact that the worker identity brings pride with it, pride which everybody should acknowledge.

Historical data

Metaxas implemented the 8 hour working day, the Sunday holiday was imposed in 80 towns and villages, so as the 15 days annual compulsory leave of absence. 237 collective agreements were signed until 1938 and the use of minors in work was banned. Treatment of all employees was institutionalized and organized. Metaxas founded the "Workers' House" with the aim to offer entertainment, literacy courses, excursions and theatrical plays for workers and unemployed. A Social Welfare School was established together with clinics for monitoring pregnant women. The government combated malaria by creating 42 clinics and trachoma in 51 clinics across the country, where 7124 children were hospitalized, organized student rations for 50,000 children and in 1937 decided the soup kitchens to become pedagogical and educational institutions. Soup kitchens were also organized for needy and unemployed in 48 cities of Greece.

EVIDENCE 0607



EVIDENCE 0603

INFO ABOUT EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE 0601 cart postal

EVIDENCE 0602 newspaper

(Macedonia) headline: Tobacco industry "Komersial" shut down. 350 workers were fired despite the written agreement for their daily wages

EVIDENCE 0603

Worker's identification card, important for health insurance and other benefits, should be considered a step forward for any worker back then. Still empty from stamps meaning probably either new professional status or great financial difficulty.

EVIDENCE 0604

Excerpt from a published history book.

EVIDENCE 0605 photo

Note behind : My fellow coworkers welcoming Metaxas.
The sign : Go on great social reformer. The working class stays vigil on your side.

EVIDENCE 0606 photo

Note behind: Welcome photo. Me sitting, my brother standing, the whole neighborhood around.

EVIDENCE 0607

Short historical data and an excerpt from Metaxa's speech to workers (1937). Subject present from his first social experiences in Athens

EVIDENCE 0608

topographic depiction - plot of the refugee neighborhood where the subject moved in from Thessaloniki in 1936.

CASE FILE

2016-0_

NAME: Ram-**OGLOU** Nikos

AGE : 1908-1989

EDUCATION: elementary

PROFESSION: Worker

ADDRESS: ΔΡΑΠΕΤΣΩΝΑ


FAMILY INFO: no family

EVIDENCES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

INFO EXTRACTED BY RESEARCH:

NARRATION:

CASE SOLUTION:



TEAM 7 PACK

- Set 0
- Set 1
- History Magazine
- Case cover
- Evidence Registration form
- Evidences
- Info about evidences
- Solution file

I was the only one of my family members who hadn't fought until the civil war. My grandfather fought at the Balkan wars (1912-1913) as a volunteer at the support department. My father was at Smyrna (during the Turkish-Greek war 1919-1922) and my two older brothers fought at Pindos (during the Italian-Greek war 1940-41). They are both dead. They died a hero's death (1). But we did not seem to catch a break. Some royalists in Halkidiki were causing trouble until 1935. Consider the Schism, you know Thessaloniki was the starting point of Venizelos, and the refugees that flooded in the streets of Thessaloniki (1922-1924) after the collapse of Asia Minor front. Things cooled off a bit with Metaxas. I was at EON for three years (2). We organized parades, dances, we worked all together for a good cause, raised money for Philoptochos and more. We were put in order.

1. Recent historical traumas
2. Relevant political ideology

We had enough of the democrats all these years. They only organized movements and people had no money (3). Personally, I didn't like the English and French long ago. I liked the Germans more, as I heard about the miracles that they made at their country (6). And Metaxas, had the country running fluently, that's what I liked about him (4). After April 1941 there was nothing to hold on to. Who would you listen to? The mayor already welcomed them at our city's entrance. I remember him saying that we should trust them (7).

3. Failure of political forces
6. Ideological relevance to totalitarian and fascist ideology
4. The experience of basic politics, security
7. Institutional collapse (officialdom, security forces)

My family had money in the past. My grandfather was a fabric merchant. Later, some Jewish shops opened near his and they shut his down. Jews were united and supported each other. That's how Jews are. Not like us. They knew how to control the market better than anyone. Money is their God, you know. We Greeks were against them very often in the city (10). We waited for something to happen, so that we felt that time was right. Maybe if the Germans started losing the war. No one expected that the situation would last so long (8). As I told you, we had been through a lot, due to political reasons (5). All I could think was what would my kids eat the very next day (12). The first two years were extremely difficult. People that lived at villages didn't starve as we did at Thessaloniki.

10. The significant other victim
8. The idea that the situation cannot be but temporary.
5. Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivalry in local, communal, economic or political fields)
- 12 Fear and instinctive defense.

I didn't climb the mountains to take part to resistance. Why should I? To help the communists? (9). But, we didn't wear that hood, even though we knew at which houses the insurgents were hiding (14). In 1942 I was called at the Administration Building and asked to take over the representation of the employees in the municipality cleaning service. I accepted. I thought that I could help put this city in order (16), (13). I knew the job better than most of people there. One could easily blame me, but I was not a collaborator. What could I do anyway? I had never fought, and, as I said before, my first priority was to help my family. Why would I pretend to be a hero? (18) In the end, the Germans didn't trouble us. At least, they didn't ever trouble me or my family. One time I even asked for the working hours to change. Even if I was arguing with them, they listened to me and in the end they offered us the hours that we wanted. (15)

How do you interpret passivity?

It is important to take under consideration a number of parameters, before any attempt to study indifference. What kind of a regime we are dealing with? (see **graphic 01**). The **duration of a regime** is a crucial factor for what studies call **reflective self**. It describes the assimilation of external tenets of a regime towards legitimating as personal, transformed and transforming material. We must separate two stages of **legitimizing** a regime, first **on terms of origins**, then **of results**. Although, most of the regimes of such kind control information about their achievements, they usually end up trying to secure a gap between promises and realization, because even for sacrifices made in the name of a better future there has been a limit to people's patience. A crucial parameter is also the **control of resources** as a tool of political obedience (welfare dictatorship – political repression by the regime, social provision through the regime). Apart from that, there are always **shared values** to which the regime could always appeal in the name of a great(er) social goal. And of course, all regimes show **signs of evolution and decline**, phases like dynamism, stagnation and entropy, mainly caused **by corruption, opportunism and poor quality recruitment**.

One of the strategies of "totalitarian" regimes is to have so severe legal regulations (criminal laws) that, if taken literally, everyone is guilty of something, and then to withdraw from their full enforcement. In this way, the regime can appear merciful and at the same time wield a permanent threat to discipline its subjects. In any case, belonging to a society involves a paradoxical point at which each of us is ordered to embrace freely, as result of our choice, what is anyway imposed on us (we all must love our country or our parents).

Part of the answer lays down to what we could call **domain of habit**. To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not use them; when to violate them; when not to use a choice which is offered; when we are effectively obliged to do something, but have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice. The same goes for many political situations in which a choice is given on condition that we make the right choice: we are solemnly reminded that we can say no - but we are expected to reject this offer and enthusiastically say yes. **Habits are thus the very stuff our identities are made of**: in them, we enact and thus define what we effectively are as social beings, often in contrast with our perception of what we are - in their very transparency, they are the medium of social violence, and so at any case (resistance-indifference-collaboration) we need to be careful. Such an **institutional Unconscious** sustains the public institution repulsing a sense of chaos. Major influence in forming both the domain of habit and consequently our institutional unconscious comes from **education**. Another key for our approach is the importance of a measure called **"estimated majority"**, meaning the

9. Luck of trustworthy resistance proposal

14. The moral excuse of non collaboration

16. We need some order in this chaos

13. The idea of being law abiding

18. I am all alone, my actions would be a mere suicide and totally useless

15. They didn't give me any trouble

feeling people have about how the majority thinks. We also know from historical figures and tables how political support has increased in totalitarian regimes because of **a sense of resignation**.

So, even in conditions of heavy repressive domination some kind of private space continued to exist permitting the formation of something legitimately called **popular opinion**, recognized by the regime. In conditions of silence, "frightened" by this loss of control a totalitarian regime usually institutes a spy network, not only to achieve suppression but also to search for legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Little sense is given to Manichean questions of whether people were "for" or "against" the solutions provided from the regime. Speaking about dedicated friends and committed opponents somebody "risks being telling a story of two minorities". People "in the middle" had a far more complex perspective over their experience, changeable through time and over different aspects of the same regime. Popular attitudes were formed basically based on **personal experience of the regime** and **available information** (mass media control). It is only a projection of modern individualistic liberal conception of choice the one often reflected upon totalitarian regimes. For example people in southern Italy even before Fascism were little concerned about what they should vote. But, let's return to the challenge of analyzing indifference.

Methodological – hermeneutical keys	Historical material
<p><u>Sociopolitical</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Recent historical traumas (historically documented) Relevant political axon Political failure The experience of basic politics - security Tradition of resistance Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivals in local or communal or economic or political fields) Near the edge – ideological relevance in parts of a totalitarian or fascist or extremist theory Institutional collapse (religion , officialdom , security forces) The idea of a provisional situation Lack of a trustworthy resistance proposal The significant “other” victim (cases that the victim has formerly negative relations with the passive mass) Lack of spiritual leadership (intellectuals, religion leaders) <p><u>Personal-psychological</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The prudential postponement (cases of late enlistment) Instinctive defense (survival priorities) The idea of been legitimate , structural personality effect The moral excuse of non collaboration They didn’t hurt me We need some order to this chaos It’ s not my duty to save the world 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> I. Public Documents II. Maps III. Photos IV. Literary texts V. Spoken testimonies VI. Demographics VII. Newspapers VIII. Letters IX. Personal archives X. Posters XI. Personal items XII. Topographical data XIII, Telegraphs XIV. Cards, post carts XV. Building information

Index 01. Hermeneutical keys and categories of historical material

EXTRA HERMENEUTICAL KEYS
<p>20. legitimating by origins (shared values), and by results (control of resources)</p> <p>21. signs of evolution and decline of a regime</p> <p>22. domain of habit</p> <p>23. education</p> <p>24. estimated majority</p> <p>25. a sense of resignation</p> <p>26. personal experience of the regime</p> <p>27. available information(mass media control)</p>


Index 02. Extra hermeneutical keys



Graphic 02. Indifference map

REJECTION	ACCEPTANCE		OBJECTION
	BY FEAR	BY HABIT	
	FEAR		SHARED VALUES
		SHARED VALUES	SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP
SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP		SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP	SIGNIFICANT OTHER ENEMY
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE			PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
		MASS MEDIA	MASS MEDIA
CONTROL OF RESOURCES		CONTROL OF RESOURCES	CONTROL OF RESOURCES
	RESIGNATION-FORMER POLITICAL FAILURE OR INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE OR TRAUMATIZED COLLECTIVITY OR TRAUMAS (natural disaster etc)		

Graphic 04. To be filled using indexes 01 and 02.



Graphic 03. Hermeneutical keys distributed per indifference area (rejection-acceptance-objection)

History Magazine

ERASMUS+, LESSONS FOR PRESENT, LESSONS FOR FUTURE

SUMMER 2016

LETS TALK ABOUT HISTOPIA

INDIFFERENCE CASES
1936-1941

Short political history of Histopia

The period of Histopia's history that interests us starts almost 90 years after its independence. Histopia started as a small geographical entity struggling to survive economically and expand its borders. Concerning the second aim first in 1864 and then again in 1881 Histopia expanded its territory significantly, but the idea of liberating all places inhabited from Histopians in big numbers remained the basic political and ideological orientation.

For almost 25 years Histopia was involved in political and military actions trying to incorporate Krete and Macedonia. In 1897 a traumatic war defeat caused the financial collapse of the country, making it seem almost like a miracle how 15 years later both Krete and Macedonia were parts of Histopia along with Epirus. World War I brought new troubles since political and military administration was divided concerning the formal stand of Histopia. Should the country stand by Entente or should it stay neutral?

That question triggered the Great Division (1915) which finally took the proportions of a ruthless civil war for 2 years (1916-17) and ended with Venizelos in head of the winning side and King Konstantinos exiled. Soon after his win Venizelos led Histopian forces to the borders of the national dream that haunted the country for decades. The disaster followed was as huge as the dream itself. The evacuation of Histopian army in 1922 left over 1 million dead and as many as 1,5 million refugees. Histopia by that time had a population of 4,5 million. Most of the refugees inhabited the two major cities of Histopia, Athens and Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki was a city with over half its population Jewish, part of Histopia for just 10 years and a real bone of contention for neighbor states around Histopia.

The years after the refugee flood a titanic effort took place for the relief, accommodation and rehabilitation of the refugees, although not within ideal sociopolitical conditions. Native Histopian families had also suffered hundreds of thousands of dead or wounded soldiers. The healing process needed time for both sides, but the truth is that a psychological schism tantalized Histopian society until 1940.

Political situation was anything but helpful as the following timeline presents emphatically.

- 1924, 25 March: Histopia is proclaimed a republic. Pavlos Kountouriotis becomes the first President of Histopia.
- 1924, 13 April: A plebiscite condones the change of constitution.
- 1924, 7 October: Failed military coup.
- 1925, 15 March: Successful coup directed by General Theodoros Pangalos. President Pavlos Kountouriotis resigns.
- 1926, 23 August: General Pangalos is overthrown after a coup. Caretaker government of Georgios Kondylis.
- 1928: Venizelos returns from exile and his Liberals win power again.
- 1933, March: Failed pro-Venezelist coup.
- 1933, 6 June: Second assassination attempt against Venizelos in Athens.
- 1935, March: Failed coup directed by Venizelos and Nikolaos Plastiras. Venizelos flees in France and dies in Paris the next year, the armed forces are purged of Venizelist and Republican officers.
- 1935, 10 October: Coup directed by Georgios Kondylis abolishes the Republic, confirmed by a rigged plebiscite later the same year.

During 1934 several major strikes took place in October 1935, C. Kondylis and Al. Papagos overturned threw K.. Tsaldari and imposed an autocratic royalist regime. Immediately (16 / 11.20.35) the new government issued Emergency Law to refer any industrial dispute to an arbitration procedure and prohibited any strike with heavy effects (reduction of payment, imprisonment, dismissal etc.) for offenders. In response to the imprisonments and exiles the Left organized general political hunger strike and nationwide protests in December.

- 1935, 3 November: George II is restored to the throne.

King George, commissioned the formation of a provisional government to the jurist Constantine Demertzi on November 30, 1935. The country was led to new elections on January 26, 1936, but their effect was to tie the 143 seats among Venizelist Themistocles Sofouli and Republicans of Panayi Tsaldari. The Communists with 15 seats had been buffering agents, but disagreements between political leaders did not allow to form a government, despite lobbying contacts between Themistocles Sofoulis and the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Stelios Sklavainas. The tragic cycle of fateful deaths started from the first month of 1936, with George Kondylis, who died on January 31st, five days after the conducted elections. The ongoing interventions of the Army in political developments forced King George to remove the Military Minister Alexandros Papagos and appoint in his place Ioannis Metaxas, on March 5th.

The Demertzi government renewed its mandate on March 14, 1936, because parliament parties still couldn't agree on forming a government. On March 18, 1936 Venizelos died exiled in Paris. His body was transferred to Chania and not in Athens, after fierce opponents reactions. Third in the series of deaths, Prime Minister Konstantinos Demertzis left this vain

world on April 13, 1936. King George, without consulting the parties, entrusted the formation of a government to Metaxas. The government appeared to Parliament on April 27, 1936 and got confidence or tolerance vote to rule until parties agreed on forming a government. Only Communists and George Papandreou voted against him. The rest voted for. Meanwhile, fourth in a row, Panagis Tsaldaris died of a heart attack on May 17th. The death of Tsaldaris particular gave Metaxas the opportunity to present himself more as the undisputed leader of the anti-Venizelists' world, cancelling partly any reaction to his plans. The four deaths, left the country without personalities capable to oppose the Metaxas plans.

1936, 4 August: Coup by General Ioannis Metaxas, who declares a state of emergency, decrees martial law, annuls various articles of the Constitution and establishes a crisis cabinet to end the increasing riots and to restore social order.

The day after September 18, 1936, the dictatorship of August 4 issued the Emergency Law 117 "on measures to combating communism and his consequences." This law came to replace the Law 4229 / 25.07.1929 "On security measures of social status and protection of citizens' 'freedoms', the notorious "Idionimon", which was voted in 1929 from Venizelos government. In reality, of course, both legislations came from the same matrix, the matrix of anti-communism that made these two politicians -the democratic Venizelos and the dictator Metaxas- look like two drops of water.

The responsibilities and powers of Metaxas were restricted in the fields of foreign policy, military and youth by the king's powers. The role of Metaxas in the first two sectors remained until 1941 complementary. During the regime (1936-1941) there were two distinct (tangent but not concentric) political power poles with centers the King and the dictator. During the first two years, the balance system of power tilted toward the first pole and we can talk about a royal dictatorship. Since September 1938 the royal powers and initiatives were limited and the status could fully determined as Metaxas dictatorship.

Relations between the two strong men (King and Metaxas) emerged (unseen) competitive predominantly in the youth education field. In November 1936 the National Youth Organization (EON) was founded, which aimed at creating the massive popular support that the regime lacked. Through the ranks of EON the regime would seek, in the future, dedicated persons to staff the state agencies. The State pursued through EON to create a "truly independent, responsible and selfless leader class" a "national political aristocracy", which would lead the Nation to "new cultural achievements" all based to the triptych "Homeland, religion, family" perhaps the most widespread "motto" of modern Hellenic history connected with dominant ideology and over time following very complex paths from 1880 to 1930.

EON members wore dark blue uniforms and *dikocho* (special hat), and were separated according to age in pioneers (7-13 years), phalangites B (14-18) and phalangites A (19-25). In December 1937, also in Athens, after the initiative of Mr. Kotzias, the Labor Battalions were founded, a paramilitary organization (approximately 400 persons with gray uniforms) following the Nazi model. The Labor Battalions were typically formed for the exploitation of the unemployed in public works, but actually aimed at functioning the praetorians' guard. Their action, however, was short-lived and practically did not exceed the limits of picturesque. On June 9, 1938 the Labor Battalions were abolished after Metaxas's decision and their members joined EON. Some of them trying to fit best in their new organization –some of them were over 30 years old- dedicated themselves in witch-hunting for regime enemies. In many cases the accusations were products of imagination or personal hatred.

The truth is that Metaxas had no trouble to control the press. Most of the newspaper owners and editors (even those who had previously criticized Metaxas) served with great pleasure the interests of the regime from the first day. After all, business was growing fast due to Metaxas's Emergency Law 23/36, of August 19, 1936, by which serious benefits were granted to the owners and editors of newspapers in exchange for full cooperation and unreserved support.

The only resistance expressed by the press, except for Rizospastis, was some illegal, minimum in number, non-communist, newspapers. The illegal organization "Society of Friends" (*Filiki Etaireia*) was founded in November 1937 and released three secret papers: "Freedom", with six issues, "the Constitution", with five issues and the Democrat, the first issue of which was printed, but was seized before the release. The organization adopted also the newspaper "Herald", which first issue was seized before its release too. Those publications were part of resistance activities from ex-Venizelists. Their greatest moment, the attempted coup of 1938, was an epic failure. Another newspaper, the "Flame" (*Floga*) was first published in 1937 by the Anti-dictatorship Youth Front (AMN) and continued to be issued until September 1938. By that time, only an illegal communist youth organization, OKNE, was kept on the anti-dictatorship publishing effort.

The weak press resistance to the regime was partly a result of police work. Central figure on this field of the government was Konstantinos Maniadakis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Μανιαδάκης) notorious as the formidably efficient head of the internal Security Services of the 4th of August Regime (1936–1941). The newly established Secretary of State had all the security forces in the country under its jurisdiction (the Royal Gendarmerie, the Police, the Fire Department and the Directorate of Immigration and Passports) and was entrusted with one of the basic functions of Metaxas's government: to

fight Communism and detect foreign spies (especially those from Italy, Bulgaria and later on, Germany and Britain). Under the supervision of Maniadakis, the Gendarmerie force increased, the City Police by 20% – free from political interference and partisan considerations. These also boomed the Political Police (the Histopian equivalent to the Gestapo, which increased its staff to 445 officers and non-commissioned officers up to 1,200 agents. The headquarters of the Special Security in Athens during the dictatorship of August 4th was a building with labyrinthine corridors, basements and offices at the junction of September 3rd number 106 and Derigny. Many communists and democratic citizens were tortured or even murdered in that building, as the veteran communist Nikos Valianatos on August 9th, 1938. From there many communists took the road to the exile mostly to islands of the Aegean Sea, like Anafi and Ai-Stratis, or places like Akronafplia for political prisoners.

- 1937, 15 December: Mass NKVD operation against Histopians in the USSR begins, based on Joseph Stalin's Directive 50125 of Dec. 1937, resulting in the loss of 38,000 Soviet citizens of Histopian descent at the Gulags of Siberia.
- 1940, 28 October: After the dictator Ioannis Metaxas rejects an Italian ultimatum demanding the occupation of Histopian territory, Italian forces invade Histopia. Beginning of the Histopio-Italian War.

After communism, a new, totally external enemy had emerged. And again even more than communism the external threat gave Metaxas the opportunity to increase social coherence around the regime. Anybody seems willing to tolerate something bad, if to avoid something worst.

You need also to use these:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_of_Greece

<http://metaxas-project.com/greek-fascist-youth-eon/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_name

2016-07

TOP SECRET

**EYES
ONLY**

ACTIVE CASE FILE 2016-07

NAME

Belam to Summer 1972

Case No.

- EVIDENCE -

Case No.: 2016-07

Description of Enclosed Evidence: _____

Submitting Agency: ERASMUS+ HISTORY Dpt.

Telephone Number: classified

Evidence Recovered By: Research Team
(print name)

Victim's Full Name: no victim case

Suspect's Full Name: _____

Envelope Sealed By: Greek Office
(print name)

28th High School of Thessaloniki

(signature)

Date Sealed: 30/7/2016 Time Sealed: 23:57 am
pm



EVIDENCE 0707



EVIDENCE 0701

EVIDENCE 0706b



Λότ Μεταγά.

Χαίρε πον' με' λόν' Ήγνητα λόν' Ροῦρκο Εσύ ἀδερ-
γώρεις
μαί δρόμο νέο μαί γωστινό σάν φρωτοχαρμένο
σλα' δοξαμένα σλα' παλιά σήματα μίσση σφώρεις.
τό δρόμο ἄγας λόν' ἀντζε, μα' ἔγω' τραγουδιμένο
δά' ἔ' ὄχι ἡ μοῖρα, που εἰ' εἶς νά' ζαχαροφουδύνη
με' τὴν Παλρίδα πον' γυνά, νά' εἰ' δοξοφόνου.

24 Ουλίου, 1937. Λούτς Μεταγάς

Απ' τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν
σὺν τῇ πρὸς τὴν ἀποστολὴν
τῶν ἀποστολῶν τῶν ἀποστολῶν.
Τὸ ἔργον ἔργον τῆς ἀποστολῆς. Χρὶς

" My father was responsible for my newspaper passion. Every day was something like a morning ritual. So I was reading the news every day throughout the regime period. I became also a radio fanatic. Things were getting better for the country day by day. And by all means nobody hurt me.


There was nothing wrong with the ideals of 4th of August. They were the same we have been learning both at school and home even before 1936. Homeland-Religion-Family. "

Spoken testimony , 1986.

EVIDENCE 0702



EVIDENCE 0705a



EVIDENCE 0705b

Delmouzos unable to explain the successive implementation failures of a linguistic reform in education, will -after the splitting of the Educational Group- support that the reason was the involvement of politics in subjects such as school and vernacular language issues, clearly "ethnic". Indeed, he identified the politicization of the request for the vernacular to Glinos, who led to the identification of vernacular and communism. Triantafyllidis also agreed with Delmouzos for the interclass character of the matter. But he considered that the cause of misfortune was the general political partisanship and stated that he was willing to become involved in any "national" policy, whoever applies it.

Thus, Delmouzos applauded Metaxas as Minister of Education and Triantafyllides spoke about a triumph of the vernacular thanks to Metaxas and assumed the syntax of a new grammar.

Indeed, Ioannis Metaxas didn't find almost any resistance from the liberal block. The confusion in the field of ideas and lack of social conscience of intellectuals allowed noble democratic figures to publish worshiping texts about Metaxas and his vernacular spirit.

Α. Φραγκουδάκη, *Εκπαιδευτική Μεταρρύθμιση και Φιλελεύθεροι Διανοούμενοι. Άγονοι αγώνες και ιδεολογικά αδιέξοδα στο μεσοπόλεμο*, Κέδρος, Αθήνα 1986.

EVIDENCE 0706a



EVIDENCE 0704



11 Ιουλίου 1939

Εγκύκλιος

«ὅπως διαγνωσθῇ ὁ Τερὸς Κλήρος καὶ οἱ Μοναχοὶ περὶ τοῦ δεσμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἔργου τῆς Ἐθνικῆς Ὄργανώσεως Νεολαίας (ΕΟΝ)» .

« Θεία συνάψει το ἐνοαπρώσαν τα ιδανικά του Ἐθνικοῦ Νέου Ἐθνικόν Κράτος, ὀργάνωσε τὴν Ἐθνικὴν Νεολαίαν, χειραγώγησεν αὐτὴν εἰς τὸν οἶκον τοῦ ἐθνικοῦ ενδιαφέροντος καὶ τῆς ἐθνικῆς δράσεως καὶ ἔδωκεν εἰς αὐτὴν τὰς νέας κατεπὶ ὄψεις τῆς ἀνθρωπενικῆς καὶ νηδικῆς προσηματικῆς ἀναπόψεως, ἐπὶ τῇ βάσει τῶν αἰωνίων ἀξιών τῆς χριστιανικῆς πίστεως , τοῦ Ἐθνικοῦ ἡμῶν Κυβερνήτου ἀναλαβόντος προσωπικῶς τὴν ἀρχηγίαν αὐτῆς , ἀποτελοῦσης τὴν γοχὴν τοῦ Ἐθνικοῦ» .

EVIDENCE 0703a



9

«Ἐκεῖνο ὅμως ποῦ θέλω εἶναι νὰ πιστεύουν εἰς τὴν ἀνωτέραν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ νὰ ὑποτάσσωνται εἰς αὐτήν».

I, Ματαξῆς

EVIDENCE 0703B

INFORMATION ABOUT EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE 0701 photo

My father with Venizelos in Ankara meeting 1930. His last trip.

EVIDENCE 0702

Spoken testimony of the subject.

EVIDENCE 0703

0703a Bulletin of the Holy Synod of the Greek Church

describing EON as a blessed christian organization

0703b photos from EON's magazine. Note: "What I want for them is to believe in God's higher force and submit to it" I.Metaxas

EVIDENCE 0704 photos

EON activities about ancient history of the country

EVIDENCE 0705 photos

Note : "Beautiful days"

EVIDENCE 0706

0706a Excerpt from historical research monograph

(Alexandros Delmouzos , Manolis Triantaffilides --- wikipedia)

0706b Handwritten laudatory about Metaxas from Kostis Palamas, one of the greatest poets in country's history.

EVIDENCE 0707 Personal ID booklet for EON members

fully stamped , meaning that the member is fully consistent to her obligations.

CASE FILE

2016-0_

NAME: Fragia Eleni

AGE : 1917-1976

EDUCATION: university

PROFESSION: university student

ADRESS: Plaka area


FAMILY INFO: orphan

EVIDENCES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

INFO EXTRACTED BY RESEARCH:

NARRATION:

CASE SOLUTION:



TEAM 8 PACK

- Set 0
- Set 1
- History Magazine
- Case cover
- Evidence Registration form
- Evidences
- Info about evidences
- Solution file

I was the only one of my family members who hadn't fought until the civil war. My grandfather fought at the Balkan wars (1912-1913) as a volunteer at the support department. My father was at Smyrna (during the Turkish-Greek war 1919-1922) and my two older brothers fought at Pindos (during the Italian-Greek war 1940-41). They are both dead. They died a hero's death (1). But we did not seem to catch a break. Some royalists in Halkidiki were causing trouble until 1935. Consider the Schism, you know Thessaloniki was the starting point of Venizelos, and the refugees that flooded in the streets of Thessaloniki (1922-1924) after the collapse of Asia Minor front. Things cooled off a bit with Metaxas. I was at EON for three years (2). We organized parades, dances, we worked all together for a good cause, raised money for Philoptochos and more. We were put in order.

1. Recent historical traumas

2. Relevant political ideology

We had enough of the democrats all these years. They only organized movements and people had no money (3). Personally, I didn't like the English and French long ago. I liked the Germans more, as I heard about the miracles that they made at their country (6). And Metaxas, had the country running fluently, that's what I liked about him (4). After April 1941 there was nothing to hold on to. Who would you listen to? The mayor already welcomed them at our city's entrance. I remember him saying that we should trust them (7).

3. Failure of political forces

6. Ideological relevance to totalitarian and fascist ideology

4. The experience of basic politics, security

7. Institutional collapse (officialdom, security forces)

My family had money in the past. My grandfather was a fabric merchant. Later, some Jewish shops opened near his and they shut his down. Jews were united and supported each other. That's how Jews are. Not like us. They knew how to control the market better than anyone. Money is their God, you know. We Greeks were against them very often in the city (10). We waited for something to happen, so that we felt that time was right. Maybe if the Germans started losing the war. No one expected that the situation would last so long (8). As I told you, we had been through a lot, due to political reasons (5). All I could think was what would my kids eat the very next day (12). The first two years were extremely difficult. People that lived at villages didn't starve as we did at Thessaloniki.

10. The significant other victim

8. The idea that the situation cannot be but temporary.

5. Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivalry in local, communal, economic or political fields)

12 Fear and instinctive defense.

I didn't climb the mountains to take part to resistance. Why should I? To help the communists? (9). But, we didn't wear that hood, even though we knew at which houses the insurgents were hiding (14). In 1942 I was called at the Administration Building and asked to take over the representation of the employees in the municipality cleaning service. I accepted. I thought that I could help put this city in order (16), (13). I knew the job better than most of people there. One could easily blame me, but I was not a collaborator. What could I do anyway? I had never fought, and, as I said before, my first priority was to help my family. Why would I pretend to be a hero? (18) In the end, the Germans didn't trouble us. At least, they didn't ever trouble me or my family. One time I even asked for the working hours to change. Even if I was arguing with them, they listened to me and in the end they offered us the hours that we wanted. (15)

- 9. Luck of trustworthy resistance proposal
- 14. The moral excuse of non collaboration
- 16. We need some order in this chaos
- 13. The idea of being law abiding
- 18. I am all alone, my actions would be a mere suicide and totally useless
- 15. They didn't give me any trouble

How do you interpret passivity?

It is important to take under consideration a number of parameters, before any attempt to study indifference. What kind of a regime we are dealing with? (see **graphic 01**). The **duration of a regime** is a crucial factor for what studies call **reflective self**. It describes the assimilation of external tenets of a regime towards legitimating as personal, transformed and transforming material. We must separate two stages of **legitimizing** a regime, first **on terms of origins**, then **of results**. Although, most of the regimes of such kind control information about their achievements, they usually end up trying to secure a gap between promises and realization, because even for sacrifices made in the name of a better future there has been a limit to people's patience. A crucial parameter is also the **control of resources** as a tool of political obedience (welfare dictatorship – political repression by the regime, social provision through the regime). Apart from that, there are always **shared values** to which the regime could always appeal in the name of a great(er) social goal. And of course, all regimes show **signs of evolution and decline**, phases like dynamism, stagnation and entropy, mainly caused by **corruption, opportunism and poor quality recruitment**.

One of the strategies of "totalitarian" regimes is to have so severe legal regulations (criminal laws) that, if taken literally, everyone is guilty of something, and then to withdraw from their full enforcement. In this way, the regime can appear merciful and at the same time wield a permanent threat to discipline its subjects. In any case, belonging to a society involves a paradoxical point at which each of us is ordered to embrace freely, as result of our choice, what is anyway imposed on us (we all must love our country or our parents).

Part of the answer lays down to what we could call **domain of habit**. To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not use them; when to violate them; when not to use a choice which is offered; when we are effectively obliged to do something, but have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice. The same goes for many political situations in which a choice is given on condition that we make the right choice: we are solemnly reminded that we can say no - but we are expected to reject this offer and enthusiastically say yes. **Habits are thus the very stuff our identities are made of**: in them, we enact and thus define what we effectively are as social beings, often in contrast with our perception of what we are - in their very transparency, they are the medium of social violence, and so at any case (resistance-indifference-collaboration) we need to be careful. Such an **institutional Unconscious** sustains the public institution repulsing a sense of chaos. Major influence in forming both the domain of habit and consequently our institutional unconscious comes from **education**. Another key for our approach is the importance of a measure called **"estimated majority"**, meaning the

feeling people have about how the majority thinks. We also know from historical figures and tables how political support has increased in totalitarian regimes because of **a sense of resignation**.

So, even in conditions of heavy repressive domination some kind of private space continued to exist permitting the formation of something legitimately called **popular opinion**, recognized by the regime. In conditions of silence, "frightened" by this loss of control a totalitarian regime usually institutes a spy network, not only to achieve suppression but also to search for legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Little sense is given to Manichean questions of whether people were "for" or "against" the solutions provided from the regime. Speaking about dedicated friends and committed opponents somebody "risks being telling a story of two minorities". People "in the middle" had a far more complex perspective over their experience, changeable through time and over different aspects of the same regime. Popular attitudes were formed basically based on **personal experience of the regime** and **available information** (mass media control). It is only a projection of modern individualistic liberal conception of choice the one often reflected upon totalitarian regimes. For example people in southern Italy even before Fascism were little concerned about what they should vote. But, let's return to the challenge of analyzing indifference.

Methodological – hermeneutical keys	Historical material
<p><u>Sociopolitical</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Recent historical traumas (historically documented) 2) Relevant political axon 3) Political failure 4) The experience of basic politics - security 5) Tradition of resistance 6) Traumatized collectivity (civil wars, rivals in local or communal or economic or political fields) 7) Near the edge – ideological relevance in parts of a totalitarian or fascist or extremist theory 8) Institutional collapse (religion , officialdom , security forces) 9) The idea of a provisional situation 10) Lack of a trustworthy resistance proposal 11) The significant “other” victim (cases that the victim has formerly negative relations with the passive mass) 12) Lack of spiritual leadership (intellectuals, religion leaders) <p><u>Personal-psychological</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 13) The prudential postponement (cases of late enlistment) 14) Instinctive defense (survival priorities) 15) The idea of been legitimate , structural personality effect 16) The moral excuse of non collaboration 17) They didn't hurt me 18) We need some order to this chaos 19) It's not my duty to save the world 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> I. Public Documents II. Maps III. Photos IV. Literary texts V. Spoken testimonies VI. Demographics VII. Newspapers VIII. Letters IX. Personal archives X. Posters XI. Personal items XII. Topographical data XIII. Telegraphs XIV. Cards, post cards XV. Building information

Index 01. Hermeneutical keys and categories of historical material

EXTRA HERMENEUTICAL KEYS
<p>20. legitimating by origins (shared values), and by results (control of resources)</p> <p>21. signs of evolution and decline of a regime</p> <p>22. domain of habit</p> <p>23. education</p> <p>24. estimated majority</p> <p>25. a sense of resignation</p> <p>26. personal experience of the regime</p> <p>27. available information(mass media control)</p>


Index 02. Extra hermeneutical keys



Graphic 02. Indifference map

REJECTION	ACCEPTANCE		OBJECTION
	BY FEAR	BY HABIT	
	FEAR		SHARED VALUES
	SHARED VALUES		SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP
SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP	SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP		SIGNIFICANT OTHER ENEMY
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE			PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
	MASS MEDIA		MASS MEDIA
CONTROL OF RESOURCES	CONTROL OF RESOURCES		CONTROL OF RESOURCES
	RESIGNATION-FORMER POLITICAL FAILURE OR INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE OR TRAUMATIZED COLLECTIVITY OR TRAUMAS (natural disaster etc)		

Graphic 04. To be filled using indexes 01 and 02.



Graphic 03. Hermeneutical keys distributed per indifference area (rejection-acceptance-objection)

History Magazine

ERASMUS+, LESSONS FOR PRESENT, LESSONS FOR FUTURE

SUMMER 2016

LETS TALK ABOUT HISTOPIA

INDIFFERENCE CASES
1936-1941

Short political history of Histopia

The period of Histopia's history that interests us starts almost 90 years after its independence. Histopia started as a small geographical entity struggling to survive economically and expand its borders. Concerning the second aim first in 1864 and then again in 1881 Histopia expanded its territory significantly, but the idea of liberating all places inhabited from Histopians in big numbers remained the basic political and ideological orientation.

For almost 25 years Histopia was involved in political and military actions trying to incorporate Krete and Macedonia. In 1897 a traumatic war defeat caused the financial collapse of the country, making it seem almost like a miracle how 15 years later both Krete and Macedonia were parts of Histopia along with Epirus. World War I brought new troubles since political and military administration was divided concerning the formal stand of Histopia. Should the country stand by Entente or should it stay neutral?

That question triggered the Great Division (1915) which finally took the proportions of a ruthless civil war for 2 years (1916-17) and ended with Venizelos in head of the winning side and King Konstantinos exiled. Soon after his win Venizelos led Histopian forces to the borders of the national dream that haunted the country for decades. The disaster followed was as huge as the dream itself. The evacuation of Histopian army in 1922 left over 1 million dead and as many as 1,5 million refugees. Histopia by that time had a population of 4,5 million. Most of the refugees inhabited the two major cities of Histopia, Athens and Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki was a city with over half its population Jewish, part of Histopia for just 10 years and a real bone of contention for neighbor states around Histopia.

The years after the refugee flood a titanic effort took place for the relief, accommodation and rehabilitation of the refugees, although not within ideal sociopolitical conditions. Native Histopian families had also suffered hundreds of thousands of dead or wounded soldiers. The healing process needed time for both sides, but the truth is that a psychological schism tantalized Histopian society until 1940.

Political situation was anything but helpful as the following timeline presents emphatically.

- 1924, 25 March: Histopia is proclaimed a republic. Pavlos Kountouriotis becomes the first President of Histopia.
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- 1935, March: Failed coup directed by Venizelos and Nikolaos Plastiras. Venizelos flees in France and dies in Paris the next year, the armed forces are purged of Venizelist and Republican officers.
- 1935, 10 October: Coup directed by Georgios Kondylis abolishes the Republic, confirmed by a rigged plebiscite later the same year.

During 1934 several major strikes took place in October 1935, C. Kondylis and Al. Papagos overturned threw K.. Tsaldari and imposed an autocratic royalist regime. Immediately (16 / 11.20.35) the new government issued Emergency Law to refer any industrial dispute to an arbitration procedure and prohibited any strike with heavy effects (reduction of payment, imprisonment, dismissal etc.) for offenders. In response to the imprisonments and exiles the Left organized general political hunger strike and nationwide protests in December.

- 1935, 3 November: George II is restored to the throne.

King George, commissioned the formation of a provisional government to the jurist Constantine Demertzi on November 30, 1935. The country was led to new elections on January 26, 1936, but their effect was to tie the 143 seats among Venizelist Themistocles Sofouli and Republicans of Panayi Tsaldari. The Communists with 15 seats had been buffering agents, but disagreements between political leaders did not allow to form a government, despite lobbying contacts between Themistocles Sofoulis and the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Stelios Sklavainas. The tragic cycle of fateful deaths started from the first month of 1936, with George Kondylis, who died on January 31st, five days after the conducted elections. The ongoing interventions of the Army in political developments forced King George to remove the Military Minister Alexandros Papagos and appoint in his place Ioannis Metaxas, on March 5th.

The Demertzi government renewed its mandate on March 14, 1936, because parliament parties still couldn't agree on forming a government. On March 18, 1936 Venizelos died exiled in Paris. His body was transferred to Chania

and not in Athens, after fierce opponents reactions. Third in the series of deaths, Prime Minister Konstantinos Demertzis left this vain world on April 13, 1936. King George, without consulting the parties, entrusted the formation of a government to Metaxas. The government appeared to Parliament on April 27, 1936 and got confidence or tolerance vote to rule until parties agreed on forming a government. Only Communists and George Papandreou voted against him. The rest voted for. Meanwhile, fourth in a row, Panagis Tsaldaris died of a heart attack on May 17th. The death of Tsaldaris particular gave Metaxas the opportunity to present himself more as the undisputed leader of the anti-Venizelists' world, cancelling partly any reaction to his plans. The four deaths, left the country without personalities capable to oppose the Metaxas plans.

1936, 4 August: Coup by General Ioannis Metaxas, who declares a state of emergency, decrees martial law, annuls various articles of the Constitution and establishes a crisis cabinet to end the increasing riots and to restore social order.

The day after September 18, 1936, the dictatorship of August 4 issued the Emergency Law 117 "on measures to combating communism and his consequences." This law came to replace the Law 4229 / 25.07.1929 "On security measures of social status and protection of citizens' 'freedoms', the notorious "Idionimon", which was voted in 1929 from Venizelos government. In reality, of course, both legislations came from the same matrix, the matrix of anti-communism that made these two politicians -the democratic Venizelos and the dictator Metaxas- look like two drops of water.

The responsibilities and powers of Metaxas were restricted in the fields of foreign policy, military and youth by the king's powers. The role of Metaxas in the first two sectors remained until 1941 complementary. During the regime (1936-1941) there were two distinct (tangent but not concentric) political power poles with centers the King and the dictator. During the first two years, the balance system of power tilted toward the first pole and we can talk about a royal dictatorship. Since September 1938 the royal powers and initiatives were limited and the status could fully determined as Metaxas dictatorship.

Relations between the two strong men (King and Metaxas) emerged (unseen) competitive predominantly in the youth education field. In November 1936 the National Youth Organization (EON) was founded, which aimed at creating the massive popular support that the regime lacked. Through the ranks of EON the regime would seek, in the future, dedicated persons to staff the state agencies. The State pursued through EON to create a "truly independent, responsible and selfless leader class" a "national political aristocracy", which would lead the Nation to "new cultural achievements" all based to the triptych "Homeland, religion, family" perhaps the most widespread "motto" of modern Hellenic history connected with dominant ideology and over time following very complex paths from 1880 to 1930.

EON members wore dark blue uniforms and *dikocho* (special hat), and were separated according to age in pioneers (7-13 years), phalangites B (14-18) and phalangites A (19-25). In December 1937, also in Athens, after the initiative of Mr. Kotzias, the Labor Battalions were founded, a paramilitary organization (approximately 400 persons with gray uniforms) following the Nazi model. The Labor Battalions were typically formed for the exploitation of the unemployed in public works, but actually aimed at functioning the praetorians' guard. Their action, however, was short-lived and practically did not exceed the limits of picturesque. On June 9, 1938 the Labor Battalions were abolished after Metaxas's decision and their members joined EON. Some of them trying to fit best in their new organization –some of them were over 30 years old- dedicated themselves in witch-hunting for regime enemies. In many cases the accusations were products of imagination or personal hatred.

The truth is that Metaxas had no trouble to control the press. Most of the newspaper owners and editors (even those who had previously criticized Metaxas) served with great pleasure the interests of the regime from the first day. After all, business was growing fast due to Metaxas's Emergency Law 23/36, of August 19, 1936, by which serious benefits were granted to the owners and editors of newspapers in exchange for full cooperation and unreserved support.

The only resistance expressed by the press, except for Rizospastis, was some illegal, minimum in number, non-communist, newspapers. The illegal organization "Society of Friends" (*Filiki Etaireia*) was founded in November 1937 and released three secret papers: "Freedom", with six issues, "the Constitution", with five issues and the Democrat, the first issue of which was printed, but was seized before the release. The organization adopted also the newspaper "Herald", which first issue was seized before its release too. Those publications were part of resistance activities from ex-Venizelists. Their greatest moment, the attempted coup of 1938, was an epic failure. Another newspaper, the "Flame" (*Floga*) was first published in 1937 by the Anti-dictatorship Youth Front (AMN) and continued

to be issued until September 1938. By that time, only an illegal communist youth organization, OKNE, was kept on the anti-dictatorship publishing effort.

The weak press resistance to the regime was partly a result of police work. Central figure on this field of the government was Konstantinos Maniadakis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Μανιαδάκης) notorious as the formidably efficient head of the internal Security Services of the 4th of August Regime (1936–1941). The newly established Secretary of State had all the security forces in the country under its jurisdiction (the Royal Gendarmerie, the Police, the Fire Department and the Directorate of Immigration and Passports) and was entrusted with one of the basic functions of Metaxa's government: to fight Communism and detect foreign spies (especially those from Italy, Bulgaria and later on, Germany and Britain). Under the supervision of Maniadakis, the Gendarmerie force increased, the City Police by 20% – free from political interference and partisan considerations. These also boomed the Political Police (the Histopian equivalent to the Gestapo, which increased its staff to 445 officers and non-commissioned officers up to 1,200 agents. The headquarters of the Special Security in Athens during the dictatorship of August 4th was a building with labyrinthine corridors, basements and offices at the junction of September 3rd number 106 and Derigny. Many communists and democratic citizens were tortured or even murdered in that building, as the veteran communist Nikos Valianatos on August 9th, 1938. From there many communists took the road to the exile mostly to islands of the Aegean Sea, like Anafi and Ai-Stratis, or places like Akronafplia for political prisoners.

- 1937, 15 December: Mass NKVD operation against Histopians in the USSR begins, based on Joseph Stalin's Directive 50125 of Dec. 1937, resulting in the loss of 38,000 Soviet citizens of Histopian descent at the Gulags of Siberia.
- 1940, 28 October: After the dictator Ioannis Metaxas rejects an Italian ultimatum demanding the occupation of Histopian territory, Italian forces invade Histopia. Beginning of the Histopio-Italian War.

After communism, a new, totally external enemy had emerged. And again even more than communism the external threat gave Metaxas the opportunity to increase social coherence around the regime. Anybody seems willing to tolerate something bad, if to avoid something worst.

You need also to use these:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_of_Greece
<http://metaxas-project.com/greek-fascist-youth-eon/>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_name

2016-08

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ACTIVE CASE FILE 2016-08

FOIA b 7

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Exemption No.

- EVIDENCE -

Case No.: 2016-08

Description of Enclosed Evidence: _____

Submitting Agency: ERASMUS+ HISTORY Dpt.

Telephone Number: classified

Evidence Recovered By: Research Team
(print name)

Victim's Full Name: no victim case

Suspect's Full Name: _____

Envelope Sealed By: Greek Office
(print name)

28th High School of Thessaloniki
(signature)

Date Sealed: 30/7/2016 Time Sealed: 23:58

am
pm

EVIDENCE 0804

ΕΙΔΗΣΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΛΕΓΡΑΦΗ

Η ΝΥΚΤΕΡΙΝΗ ΑΝΑΣΤΑΤΩΣΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΠΤΙΚΗ ΠΥΡΚΑΓΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΝΟΙΚΙΣΜΟΥ ΚΑΜΠΕΛ ΑΠΕΤΕΦΡΩΘΗΣΑΝ ΕΙΚΟΣΙ ΘΑΛΑΜΟΙ ΕΥΛΙΝΟΙ ΕΞ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΟΥ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΥΝ ΕΞ ΤΡΑΥΜΑΤΙΑΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΙΣΡΑΗΛΙΤΑΙ ΟΙ ΚΟΜΜΟΥΝΙΣΤΑΙ ΣΥΝΕΡΓΟΙ ΕΙΣ ΤΑΣ ΣΚΗΝΑΣ

Κατάστασις έκνευριστική έχει δημιουργηθή από της εσπέρας της προχθές. Τα πνεύματα εξηρεθίσθησαν μέχρι βαθμού επικινδύνου. Με το παραμικρόν και με το τίποτε δημιουργούνται επισοδικαί συμπλοκαί. Ως έχουν και ως εξελίσσονται τα πράγματα είναι δύσκολον να καταπνιγούν με την πυμνήν. Έκείνο που χρειάζεται, είναι η συναίσθησις του τι γίνεται, του τι διαπράττεται. Ανάγκη μεγίστη, ν' αρθρῶμεν πάντες υπέρ των παθόντων, πῶς δὲν εὐγενείας του παραδόσεις, πολλὴ φοβούμεθα, ὅτι δυσκόλως δὲ κατορθώσῃ νὰ ἐπιβληθῶν αἱ αὐστηρότητες.

Ἐπιβάλλεται ἐκκτερώδην ὁ κατευνασμός. Ἐπιβάλλεται ἐκκτερώδην ἡ λογικέσις. Δὲν εἶναι τῆς παρούσης στιγμῆς νὰ ἐξετάσωμεν τὰ αἰτία τῶν νυκτερινῶν ἐπεισοδίων. Οἱ ἀρμόδιοι καὶ ἀπευθύνει διὰ τὴν τήρησιν τῆς τάξεως, θ' ἀνακρίνουσιν, θ' ἀναζητήσουσιν καὶ θ' ἀνεύρουσιν καὶ θ' τιμωρήσουσιν τοὺς ὑπαιτίους, οἷσι-διόποτε καὶ ἂν εἴναι.

Ἀλλὰ πρὸς Θεοῦ! Ἀς παύσῃ πρὸ παντὸς αὐτὸς ὁ ἐξερση-
μός. Μέσα εἰς ἐκνευριστικὴν ἀτμοσφῆραν δὲν εἶναι δυνατόν
οὔτε νὰ συνεννοηθῶμεν, οὔτε νὰ ἐπιλύσωμεν τὰς διαφοράς.

ΠΩΣ ΔΙΕΔΡΑΜΑΤΙΣΘΗΣΑΝ ΤΑ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΤΑ

Ἀπὸ τὰς πρώτας ἐσπερινὰς ὥρας ἡ ἀστυνομία εἶχε πληροφορίαν ὅτι τὴν νύκτα ἐπρόκειτο νὰ γίνοντο ἀ-
φρόαι ἐπιθέσεις ἐναντίον Ἰσραηλιτι-
κῶν συνοικισμῶν. Συνεπεί τῶν πλη-
ροφοριῶν τούτων ἐλήφθησαν ἕως ἐ-
κτακτῇ μέτρᾳ προστασίας τῶν Ἰσραη-
λιτικῶν συνοικισμῶν εἰς ἓνα ἑκατοστὸν
τῶν ὁποίων ἐστάλησαν ἰσχυρὰ τμήμα-
τα χωροφυλακίης καὶ στρατοῦ.

Ἐξ ἄλλου, ὁ Εὐαγγελεὺς ἐκάλεισε
τὴν ἐσπεράς τὴν προεδρεῖα τῶν ὄργα-
νώσεων, οἵτινες μετέσχον τῆς τελευ-
ταίας κινήσεως, καὶ προεβίβη εἰς ἐντό-
νους συστάσεις, τονίσας ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἐκ-
κτενέσιν ὁ πέλεκυς κατὰ παντὸς ἐστὶς
ἡθελε διαταράξει τὴν τάξιν. Τὰ προ-
εδρεῖα τῶν ὀργανώσεων διεμαρτυρή-
θησαν, δεδαισύναντες ὅτι εἶναι ἀμετο-
χα πάσης κινήσεως ἥτις θὰ ἐτενεῖ εἰς
ἐπιθέσεις κατὰ συνοικισμῶν.

Ἐμπροσθέντος, δεδαισύναν ὅτι τι-

θεντικὴ εἰς τὴν διάθεσιν τῶν ἀρχῶν διὰ
νὰ ὑποδοχθῶσιν τὰς προσπαθείας αὐ-
τῶν πρὸς γαλήνησιν τῶν πνευμάτων,
ἐκφράσαντες τὴν γνώμην ὅτι θὰ ἐπρέ-
πει νὰ κληθῶν ἔνιοι τῶν ταχίων τῶν
Ἰσραηλιτικῶν καὶ οἱ ἀντιπρόσωποι τοῦ
Ἰσραηλιτικοῦ Τόπου, ἵνα συστηθῇ
εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐντόνως ὅτι ἀρτείουσαν νὰ
καταπούσωσιν τὰς προκλήσεις.

Αἱ Ἀρχαί, παρὰ τὰς διαθετικὰς
ταύτας, διετήρησαν καὶ ἐπέτειναν τὰ
μέτρα προστασίας τῶν Ἰσραηλιτικῶν
συνοικισμῶν, ἔχουσαι ὑπ' ὄψιν τὸν
γενικώτερον ἀνταρρασμόν. Παρὰ τὰ
μέτρα δημοῦ ταῦτα, δὲν κατορθώθη
ἀπὸ τῶν νύκτων ἀποσοθῆθαι σκηνὰι, προ-
καλοῦσαι ἀληθινὰ τὴν θλίψιν πάντων.

ΕἰΣ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΜΠΕΛ

Αἱ σκηνὰι ἐξεδηλώθησαν ἰδίᾳ εἰς
τὸν ἐξω τῆς πόλεως Συναγῶν Κάμ-
πελ μέτρον κινήσεως, ἐπὶ τῶν Τὰ λυτὴν ἐξωστρέψαντες ἀνέως εἰς διαί-
την.

πληρῶς ἐκνευριστικὴν ἀνταρρασμόν.

Τὴν 9.30 ὥρᾳ πολλοὶ πολῖται ἐκινῆ-
σαν εἰς Καλαμαριάς, ἐπετίθησαν
κατὰ τοῦ ἐν τῇ συνοικισμῷ Κάμπελ
κατενέου τοῦ Ἰσάκ.

Ἀστυνομικὴ δύναμις ὑπὸ τὸν ὀπο-
μοίραρχον κ. Παπαγιάννην ἐπεμύσας
ἐγκληματικὰς κινήσεις νὰ διαλύσῃ τοὺς
συγκεντρωμένους καὶ νὰ προλάβῃ τὴν
συμπλοκήν. Ἡ γαλήνη οὕτω ἐπὶ τῇ
πρὸς στιγμὴν εἰς τὸν συνοικισμῶν, αἱ
δὲ Ἀρχαί βασιμῶς ἤλπισαν ὅτι προ-
σλήφθησαν τὰ ἐκτροπα.

Ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμεταδόθησαν γεγο-
νότα, ἅτινα ἐπηρέησαν τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν
ἐρεθισμῶν. Τὰ γεγονότα ταῦτα ἐ-
χουν ὡς ἑξῆς:

Περὶ τὴν 10 μ.μ. καθήρχετο ἐκ τοῦ
ὄρχου Ἀεροπορίας περὶ πρὸς τὸ
Ντεπὸ δὲ στρατιωτικῆς τῆς Ἀεροπορί-
ας Γαβριὴλ Κωστομήρης ὅστις ἐδέχθη
τὴν ἐπίθεσιν ἑκείνου Ἰσραηλιτῶν συ-
λοκαπηθεὶς ἀγρίως καὶ πυροβοληθεὶς
παρ' αὐτῶν ἐπαρρησιμῶν.

Μία τῶν σφαιρῶν εὔρε τὸν Κωστο-
μήρην περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ τὸν ἐ-
τραυματίσας ἀρκετὰ σοβαρῶς.

Ἡ εἰδησις τοῦ τραυματισμοῦ τοῦ
στρατιώτου διεδόθη ἀστρακτικῶς εἰς
τὸν ὄρχον Ἀεροπορίας καὶ ἐφθασε μέχρι
τῶν Ἰσραηλιτικῶν καὶ οἱ ἀντιπρόσωποι τοῦ
στρατιώτου τοῦ ὁποίου ἐξεκίνησαν
πρὸς τὸν συνοικισμὸν Κάμπελ μετ' ἐ-
πιθετικῶν διαθέσεων.

Ἐν τῇ μεταξύ, ἡ εἰδησις αὕτη ἐ-
γνώσθη καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ὁπότεν
ἐμάζετο πολλὴν ἐπευσαν πρὸς τὸ
ἴδιον σημεῖον μετ' ἐπίσης ἐπιθετικῶν
διαθέσεων. Ἀμα ὡς οἱ ἐπερχόμενοι
εἰς ἀμφοτέρων τῶν σημείων ἐφθα-
σαν πρὸ τοῦ συνοικισμοῦ Κάμπελ
καὶ προσετέθησαν εἰς τοὺς ἐξῆς συγ-
κεντρωμένους ἐκεῖ πολλὰς ἐκ Καλα-
μαριάς κατεβάνη ἡ ἀνεπάρκεια τῆς
ἀστυνομικῆς δυνάμεως ἡ ὅποια ἦτο
ἀπολύτως ἀδύνατον νὰ ἀντιμετωπίσῃ

τῆς λατὴν μάχην. Διὰ τοῦτο ἐ-
ζητήθη ἐπείγοντως ἐνίσχυσις ἀπὸ τοῦ
κέντρου κατ' ἡν στιγμὴν ἀντερέπετο
κατ' ὅλην τὴν γραμμὴν.

Τὶς οἶδε πόθεν καὶ κατὰ ποῖον
τρόπον ἐξερχόμην ἡ πυρκαγιά εἰς τὸ
παρατήρημα ἡ ὅποια μετεδόθη καὶ
εἰς παρακείμενα τοιαῦτα. Τὸ πῦρ
ἐπέτεινε τὴν σύγχυσιν ἥτις ἐφθασεν
εἰς τὸν κατοικισμὸν μετὰ τοὺς πυροβο-
λισμοὺς οἱ ὅποιοι ἐφρίθησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ
πύρου, οἱ πυροβολισμοί, αἱ κρυφαὶ
καὶ αἱ ὕβρεις ἐπικράτησαν τοιαύτην
ἀνστατάσειν ὅστε οὐδεμία ἦτο δυνα-
τὴν νὰ γίνῃ ἄμεσος ἐνέργεια πρὸς κα-
τάσβεσιν τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ὅποιον ἐξη-
πλώθη καὶ εἰς τοὺς παρακείμενους
θαλάμους.

Οἷται, ὥς ἐξου φθάσαν αἱ ἀντὶ-
αἱ αἱ φλόγαι περιεκύκλωσαν 20 ἐν
ὅλῳ θαλάμους τοὺς ὁποίους καὶ ἀπα-
τέφρωσαν. Ἐγενήθησαν πρὸς στιγ-
μὴν φόβος μήπως διήρχον καὶ ἀνθρώ-
πινα ὅμιλα ἐκ τῆς πυρκαγιάς ἀλλ'
ἐξηκριβώθη ὅτι ἐτραυματίσθησαν μό-
νον ἐξ ἐκ τῶν ὑφ' ὁνόματι πυροβολι-
σμῶν ἐκ τῶν ὁποίων τέσσαρες Ἰσραη-
λίται καὶ δύο Χριστιανοί.

Οἱ Ἕλληνας τραυματίαι εἶναι ὁ
προαναφερθεὶς στρατιώτης ἀεροπο-
ρίας Γαβριὴλ Κωστομήρης εἰς ἄλλος
συνάδελφός του ἐλαφρότερον καὶ ὁ
ἀρτοποιὸς τοῦ συνοικισμοῦ Λεωνίδας
Παπᾶς λαβὼν τραύμα εἰς τὸ δεξιὸν
μέρος τῆς κοιλίας. Ὅσον ἀφορᾷ τοὺς
Ἰσραηλιτάς οἱ ὁποῖοι εἶναι ἐλαφρό-
τερα τραυματιζόμενοι εἶναι οἱ Σαλομὼν
Βεντούρα καὶ Ζοζέφ Ρομάνο.

Τὸ πῦρ ἀπὸ ἀπετέρως περὶ τοὺς
ἐκείνοι θαλάμους, τὸ σκολιὸν καὶ τὸ
φαρμακεῖον τοῦ συνοικισμοῦ καὶ ἀφῆ-
κεν ἀνέτους περὶ τὰς 150 οἰκονο-
μίας, ἐνετεπίσθη μετὰ τὸ μεσονύκτιον
ὑπὸ τῆς πυροσβεστικῆς ὑπηρεσίας.
Κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὥραν αἱ Ἀρχαὶ
ἐπέβαλλον ἀπολύτως τὴν τάξιν δια-
σκορπισθέντος τοῦ πληθους. Ὁ Διευ-

θυντὴς τῆς Ἀστυνομίας κ. Κολοῦρ
συνέλαχε κατεφθάρσας ἐπὶ τόκῳ
μετὰ τοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν κ. Γαβριὴλ ἐπα-
λήφθη ἀποπροσώπως ἀνακρίσεων,
τελείς καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλῇ τῶν ἐκεῖ ἀστυ-
νομικῶν καὶ στρατιωτικῶν δυνάμεων.

Αἱ Ἀρχαί, συνεγίζοντες τὰς ἀνα-
κρίσεις των, δὲν προέβησαν εἰς κατη-
ρηματικὰς ἀνακοινώσεις περὶ τῶν
αἰτίων τῶν νυκτερινῶν σκηνῶν. Τῆς
ὁποίας ἀλλωστε ἐπελήφθη καὶ ὁ
Εὐαγγελεὺς κ. Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ ὅποιος
συνέταρσε ἀκραν ἐπιφύλαξιν εἰς ἀνα-
κοινώσεις.

Ἐπὶ τῇ ὁσώτῳς ἡ πληροφo-
ρία ὅτι εἰς τὰς σκηνὰς ὑπ' ἡν
μερῶν ἐξεληχθήσαν, δὲν εἶναι
ἀμετάστοι οἱ κομμουνισταὶ ὁμι-
λοῖ τῶν ὁποίων διεσπάρησαν
μεταξὺ τοῦ πληθους καὶ παρῶ-
ν τῶν μὲν ἐναντίον τῶν
δὲ. Φαίνεται ὅτι αἱ Ἀρχαὶ κατέχουν
καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς συγκατακλίσεως τῶν
κομμουνιστῶν δὲν εἶναι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν
νὰ ἐνεργήσωσιν καὶ συλλήψαι ἐντὸς
τῆς ἡμέρας. Ἐν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων
τούτων εἶναι καὶ ἡ συγκεντρωσις
Κομμουνιστῶν εἰς τὸ Ρεζήν—Βαρόν
καὶ εἰς τὸν συνοικισμὸν Βαρόν
Χίρας, ὅπου ἐλέγετο ὅτι θὰ σημειω-
θῶν σκηνὰι.


Ἄλλοι στοιχεῖοι εἶναι ἡ προσφο-
ρά, ἡ γενομένη ὑπὸ κομμουνιστῶν
πρὸς τὴν Ἰσραηλιτικὴν κοινότητα,
ὅπως προστατεύουσιν τοὺς Ἰσραηλι-
κοὺς συνοικισμοὺς δι' Ἕλληνας κομ-
μουνιστῶν.

Τὸ στοιχεῖον τοῦτο κατετέθη
ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς Ἰσραηλιτικῆς κοι-
νότητος εἰς τὴν Γενικὴν Διοί-
κησιν, μετὰ τῆς τιμητικῆς δι'
αὐτὴν δηλώσεως ὅτι ἀπερίφρων
ἀσχητηται τὴν προσφορὰν ταύ-
την. Παρομοίως πληροφορίας ἔ-
χουν καὶ αἱ ἐθνικαὶ ὀργανώσεις
τῆν δυσφήμιον τῶν ὁποίων ἐπε-
δίδων οἱ κομμουνισταὶ.



EVIDENCE 0807

EVIDENCE 0803



Μία ώρα χαιρονομία

Ὁ Φαλαγγίτης Ἀγγελίδης Ἀθανάσιος προ-
χθές τὸ ἀπόγευμα ἀνεύρεν εἰς τὸν κινηματο-
γράφον «Σινεά» φάκελλον περιέχοντα 700
βραχυῖας καὶ διαφόρους σημειώσεις, ἐκ τῶν δι-
ποίων διευκαλύπη διὰ τὴν ἀνεύρεσιν τοῦ κα-
τόχου. Ὁ καλὸς Φαλαγγίτης ἐσπευσεν ἀμέσως
νὰ ἐπιστρέψῃ τὸ ἀνευρεθέν ποσὸν εἰς τὸν ἀπο-
λέσαντα αὐτὸ Σ. Ἀντωνιάδην, πτωχὸν ὑπάλ-
ληλον τῶν φόρων δημοσίων θεαμάτων.

Μ. Γ. ΘΕΟΔΩΡΑΚΑΚΗΝ. Σοῦ ἀπαντήσαμε
ἐγκαίρως. Τὸ ποίημα «Ἡ ἱστορικὴ μας τετρα-
ετία» ἔχει ἐξεζητημένον συμβολισμόν καὶ πολλὰς
χασμωδίας:

Τέσσερα - ἄστρα γύρω γύρω
καταμεσῆς ἥλιος λαμπρός,
τέσσερα χρόνια — ὅλο μῦρον
κι' ὁ ἥλιος! Ὁ Ἀρχηγός!

ΠΑΝΟΝ ΛΑΜΨΙΑΔΗΝ. Καλογραμμένες οἱ ἐν-
τυπώσεις σου ἀπὸ τὴν 4ην Λογοδοτοῦ 1940.
Δυστυχῶς δὲν εἶναι δυνατὴ ἡ δημοσίευσίς των
λόγω ἐλλείψεως χώρου. Ἐκτὸς τούτου δὲν ἔ-
χουν τώρα τὴν ἀπαιτουμένην ἐπικαιρότητα. —
ΧΑΡΑΛΑΜΠΟΝ ΕΜΜ. ΣΠΑΝΟΥΔΑΚΗΝ.
Εἶδε! Ὡραῖο τὸ γράμμα σου. — ΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΝ
ΚΡΑΤΣΗΝ. Καλὸ ὡς τὸν 4ον στίχον. — Α-
ΘΑΝ. ΚΩΣΤΟΠΟΥΛΟΝ. Σταθμάρχην Πλα-
γιάς Κομοτινῆς. Τὸ σκίτσο ὦραῖο ὡς ἐμπνευ-
σις, ἀλλ' ὥστερεῖ στὴν ἐκτέλεσιν. — ΠΑΝ. ΚΑ-
ΨΕΡΟΝ. Θὰ δημοσιευθῇ σὸ προσεχὲς τεῦχος.
— ΜΑΡΙΑΝ ΓΛΥΚΑ. Θὰ σοῦ ἀπαντήσωμε
ἀφοῦ ἐξετάσωμε προηγουμένως. — ΕΛΕΝΗΝ
ΓΚΟΥΒΑ. Οὔτε μέτρο οὔτε ὁμοιοκαταληξίαι
σωστές:

Κουκουβάου, κουκουβάου
ἀκούεται μέσα στὰ κλαδιά.
Εἶναι μιὰ κουκουβάγια
ποῦγει μιὰ φωλιά.



EVIDENCE 0805



EVIDENCE 080



EVIDENCE 0801

INFO ABOUT EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE 0801 photos

"Three days with my savior chef, uncle John" Hotel Apergi, Athens 4/8/1931

EVIDENCE 0802 photo of the subject in a EEE event.

EVIDENCE 0803 page from EON' s formal magazine.

Congratulations to member Aggelidis Athanasios for finding and handing over to the police a wallet full of money. (1938)
A note attached to it: "My only real connection with EON".

EVIDENCE 0804 Personal items. Armband. Central Agency of EON, high ranked members, 1941.

EVIDENCE 0805 cart postal

"Grandfather's store, before the fire and before Modiano ruined our lives"

EVIDENCE 0806 newspaper Macedonia, headline: Night turmoil in Thessaloniki. Destructive fire(arson) at Jewish settlement Kampel. 29/7/1931.

EVIDENCE 0807 photo Elis Modiano

Eli Modiano (1881-1968)

One of the most famous architects of Thessaloniki, member of the wealthy Sephardic Modiano family, son of the banker Jacob (Yako) Modiano.

EVIDENCE 0808 newspaper Akropolis , 28/10/1940

Declaration of war from Italy.

CASE FILE

2016-0_

NAME: Aggelidis Athanasios

AGE : 1919-1984

EDUCATION:elementary

PROFESSION:none steady

ADRESS: no permanent
address known

FAMILY INFO:no family

EVIDENCES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

INFO EXTRACTED BY RESEARCH:

NARRATION:

CASE SOLUTION:

